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EPIGRAPH
The tension between normative approaches, which are constantly
in danger of losing contact with social reality, and objectivistic
approaches, which screen out all normative aspects, can be taken as a
caveat against fixating on one disciplinary point of view. Rather, one must
remain open to different methodological standpoints (participant vs.
observer), different theoretical objectives (interpretive explication and
conceptual analysis vs. description and empirical explanation), the
perspectives of different roles (judge, politician, legislator, client, and
citizen), and different pragmatic attitudes of research (hermeneutical,
critical, analytical etc.) Habermas (1998: 6-7).
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SUMMARY
When confronted with decisions involving provision of environmental resources,
do individuals in a society act in non-cooperative and selfish ways or do they behave
cooperatively and altruistically? Controlled lab studies in experimental economics have
found that people are neither perfectly cooperative nor perfectly non-cooperative for
provision of public goods under the contextual conditions of voluntary mechanisms.  In
contrast, this study employs a field experimental methodology to investigate the
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in
the Atlanta airshed that arose under the contextual conditions of the Inspection and
Maintenance (IM) regulatory mechanism designed for the provision of clean air.
Previous studies show that the largest potential reductions in vehicular tailpipe
emissions from the Clean Air Act Amendments 1990 mandated regulatory mechanisms,
such as Atlanta’s IM program, are associated with a small number of high-emitting
vehicles. A recent National Research Council report recommended that more research is
needed to evaluate the impact of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of
high-emitting vehicle owners on the on-road vehicular emissions. This study also
evaluates the impact of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-
emitters on vehicular tail-pipe emissions of ozone pre-cursors -- such as Carbon
Monoxide (CO), Hydrocarbons (HC) and Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) -- in Atlanta between
1997 and 2001.
Environmental regulatory mechanisms, such as Atlanta’s IM program, mostly
share one common assumption that is known as the polluter-pays-principle (PPP):
polluters should pay the cost of clean-up to maintain the environmental quality standards
enshrined in specific regulations. While arguably PPP may be equitable in regulating
pollutant emissions from stationary sources of pollution, such as industrial plants, it can
be hypothesized that PPP is unfair in the case of environmental regulations aimed at
mobile sources of pollution, such as high-emitting vehicle owners. More specifically, the
following hypotheses are tested: (1) High-emitting vehicle owners, as detected by IM
program regulations, have significantly higher odds of residing in lower income and
African-American-dominated census block-groups as compared to the normal emitting
vehicle owners. (2) IM program intervention is unfair because it forces lower income and
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racial minority groups to pay an inordinate share of the environmental pollution clean-up
costs for maintaining clean air in Atlanta.
Remote sensing data of a random sample of approximately 1.42 million vehicles
observed on-road inside the IM program boundaries between 1997 and 2001 are
matched with IM program data and vehicle registration data to identify the cooperative
and non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners. Normal emitters are treated as a
control group.  The research uses multiple, statistical decision-theory models, including
both linear and non-linear regression analysis, to estimate the impact of cooperative and
non-cooperative behavioral strategies of high-emitters on vehicular tail-pipe emission
factors, CO, HC and NO, during the study period. A mixed-pool time-series analysis is
carried out to estimate changes in the vehicular tail-pipe emissions from year to year due
to the decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners during the study period.
The addresses of the sampled vehicle owners are geo-coded and information
about socio-economic parameters of vehicle owners at the census block-group level is
collected from the 2000 census data. A multinomial logistic regression model is
employed to test the hypotheses concerning the systematic variation in socioeconomic
and demographic conditions of vehicle owners in the cooperative, non-cooperative and
control groups. In addition, an ecological regression model is used to test differences in
the median household income of the vehicle owners at the census block-group
ecological level in the Atlanta airshed.
Approximately 42% of the high-emitting vehicle owners are found to be
cooperative and 58% non-cooperative.  The social theory that individuals behave
cooperatively appears to be farther from the truth under the contextual conditions of
regulatory mechanisms. On the other hand, the game theoretical assumption that
individuals behave selfishly is rejected but still appears to be holding for 58% of the
decision makers.  From the perspective of environmental policy, cooperative behaviors
of 42% of high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed caused a decreased
production of 47% in HC emission factors during 1997 and 2001. Surprisingly, there is
no statistical difference between the CO and NO emission factors of vehicles owned by
cooperative and non-cooperative high-emitters in the Atlanta airshed. This surprising
result suggests that the repairs of emission control systems carried out by cooperative
vehicle owners are not durable enough over a period of five years in reducing CO and
NO emission factors.
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Results also suggest that environmental regulations should not assume PPP
under all contexts because the IM program in the context of Atlanta is inequitable. The
IM program targets high-emitting vehicle owners who live in relatively lower median
household income areas as compared to the normal emitting vehicle owners in the
Atlanta airshed. Regulations should be context-sensitive. Cost-sharing mechanisms for
pollution clean-up, rather than PPP alone, may prove to be more effective and fairer in
some contexts, such as for high-emitting vehicle owners and other mobile sources of
environmental pollution. Changes in the current IM program could improve air quality.
Such changes include improving vehicle registration laws and IM program rules, such as
disallowing IM test failures from registering anywhere in the state of Georgia and
requiring an emissions test on every change of vehicle ownership inside the 13-county
IM program area, creating better incentive mechanisms for high-emitting vehicle owners,
and discussing new policy alternatives with non-cooperative vehicle owners. The
evidence from this study is expected to aid relevant decision-makers to adapt the
incentive mechanisms of IM programs, in particular, and environmental regulations, in
general, so that public policies are both more effective and equitable in their societal
impacts.




1.1 The objectives of the study
This study investigates three interconnected research questions: First, do people
decide to behave selfishly or cooperatively with societal regulations for the provision of
environmental resources such as clean air?   Second, if they decide to behave selfishly,
what is the resulting impact on the provision of environmental resources; and if they
decide to cooperate, is the provision of environmental amenities significantly increased
or not? Third, what are the socio-economic contextual conditions that affect the odds
that some decision makers will be more cooperative than others? Or, conversely, do
non-cooperative decision makers face socio-economic contextual conditions that
systematically differ from the cooperative decision makers?
More specifically, a quasi-experimental research design is used to evaluate the
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in
the Atlanta Airshed from 1997 to 2001. The cooperative and non-cooperative decision
behaviors emerge in response to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments’ mandated policy
intervention known as Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance (IM) program. The limitation
of the scope to the Atlanta airshed helps in focusing on the contextual conditions of
individual decision makers in a regional framework. It also allows modeling the impact of
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners on
the outcomes of vehicular tail-pipe emissions, especially Carbon Monoxide (CO),
Hydrocarbons (HCs) and Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx). Another advantage in limiting the
scope is that it allows analysis at a finer geo-spatial resolution to test whether
cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners come from systematically different
socio-economic and demographic contexts.
The issue of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behavior has been an
active research agenda among game theoreticians (Carraro and Siniscalo 1992; Carraro
and Siniscalo 1993; Chander and Tulkens 1992; Lehmann 2000; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom
1999; Ostrom 2000; Petrosjan and Mazalov 2000; Scharpf 1997), social psychologists
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(Axelrod 1980; Axelrod 1984; Rapoport 1989), experimental economists (Gintis 2000;
Kagel and Roth 1995; Ledyard 1995; Schmidtz 1991; 1993), sociologists (Marwell 1982),
political scientists (Orbell and Dawes 1991; Ostrom and Walker 1991) and evolutionary
biologists (Kauffman 1993; Kauffman 1995; Maynard Smith 1982). Game theorists start
from the foundational assumption that humans behave selfishly and thus they predict
that selfish players will not cooperate with community-mandated environmental
regulations if there are other non-cooperative and free-riding strategies that dominate
the (subjective) expected-utility of cooperative strategies available to the players. The
Nash equilibrium solution, for example, predicts the domination of non-cooperative
behavioral strategies in public goods games, which leads to famous prisoner’s dilemma
situations, such as Hardin’s tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968; Hardin 1982) and Sen’s
description of selfish agents as rational fool (Sen 1999). On the other hand, some
political scientists and sociologists argue that cooperative decision behavior is perfectly
rational and understandable in the context of human societies because humans cherish
values that cannot be exactly translated into a linear utilitarian calculus. Ledyard (1995:
121) summarizes the current crisis in decision theoretical research posed by the
fundamental behavioral question whether people are selfish or cooperative:
“The debate has been long-standing with much heat and little light.
Economists and game-theorists argue that the hypothesis of selfish behavior is
the only viable one as an organizing principle, yet they also contribute to public
television and vote in elections. Sociologists and political scientists argue that
societies are naturally cooperative through the evolution of social norms or
altruism. Preconceived notions bordering on the theological have sometimes
been rejected by data. But those who are reluctant to part with cherished theories
have in turn rejected the data. Disciplinary boundaries have been drawn,
breached, and redrawn. It is into this fray that experimentalists have come, trying
to generate light where previously there was little.”
Results from previous experimental studies, mostly conducted under controlled
laboratory conditions of voluntary mechanisms, suggest that human agents neither
behave perfectly selfishly nor perfectly cooperatively (Gintis 2000; Ledyard 1995). After
reviewing the state-of-the-art experimental research conducted to estimate the
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors for provision of public goods under
voluntary mechanisms, Ledyard (1995:172-173) states: “There appear to be three kinds
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of players: dedicated Nash players who act pretty much as predicted by game theory
with possibly a small number of mistakes, a group of subjects who will respond to self
interest as will Nash players if the incentives are high enough but who also make
mistakes, and respond to decision costs, fairness, altruism, etc., and a group of subjects
who behave in an inexplicable (irrational?) manner. Casual observation suggests that
the proportions are 50 percent, 40 percent, 10 percent in many subject pools”. Ledyard
is however quick to qualify this statement by stating: “…of course, we need a lot more
data before my outrageous conjectures can be tested.”
The previous experimental results have shifted the emphasis of current research
in game theory, experimental economics, political science and social psychology; the
question about cooperative and selfish behavior has now been reformulated as follows:
under what contextual conditions do people behave cooperatively or selfishly? Ledyard
(1995: 143) provides a list of individual level contextual conditions that experimentalists,
coming from various disciplinary perspectives, have hypothesized to have significant
effect on individual decision behaviors under voluntary mechanism environments. The
contextual conditions include marginal per capita return, numbers of players, repetition,
common knowledge, gender, homogeneity, thresholds, beliefs, economics training,
experience, friendship/group identification, learning, altruism/fairness, effort, risk
aversion, communication, rebates, unanimity and moral suasion. On the other hand,
empirical theorists in social psychology (Rapoport 1989) and political science (Boyd and
Iversen 1979) have hypothesized that it is not only the individual level attributes of
decision makers but also the group level contextual conditions, such as community level
socio-economic characteristics, that affect the behavior of decision makers.
While the controlled laboratory experiments have their own advantages and dis-
advantages in assessing cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors, as well
as the contextual conditions of cooperative and non-cooperative decision makers, quasi-
experimental field studies present another set of research methodologies to assess
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors. Controlled laboratory experimental
studies usually focus on modeling “voluntary mechanisms” for assessing cooperative
and non-cooperative decision behaviors. By contrast, this study employs a quasi-
experimental research methodology to examine cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors under the actually implemented “regulatory mechanism” of the IM
program in the Atlanta airshed.
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A quasi-experimental research design also enables the testing of hypotheses
about cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors from a meta-decision
theoretical perspective in actual field settings, whereby public policy interventions are
treated as experimental in nature (Cook and Campbell 1979; Norton 1999; Norton and
Steinemann 2001). In the language of controlled laboratory experimentalists, the meta-
decision theoretical perspective will allow one to compare “regulatory mechanisms” with
other forms and theories of governance, including voluntary, market or adaptive
mechanism designs.1
If meta-decision theory is defined as a second-order meta-theory of various
decision theories, then meta-decision theoretical research investigates in a larger frame
the ontological commitments and foundational assumptions made by first-order decision
theories. For example, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is concerned with predicting the
rational courses of actions that ought to be taken by rational individuals who fulfill certain
axiomatic assumptions, such as that rational agents should have complete, transitive
and consistent preferences over the outcomes resulting from all the available courses of
actions and events (Raiffa 1968; Rapoport 1989). On the other hand, John Rawls’ theory
of justice is concerned with finding if a well-ordered society is promoting the good of its
citizens, and if it is regulated by a public conception of justice (Rawls 1971). Taken alone
RCT, or the Rawlsian theory of justice, cannot critically review its own ontological
commitments or foundational assumptions from within its theoretical boundaries. Nor
can first-order decision theories internally justify the relevance of their ontological
commitments for a variety of decision behaviors encountered in the broader public
sphere.
By their very own ontological commitments, RCT and Rawl theory of justice are
examples of “normative” decision theories, unlike the “bounded rationality theory” of
Simon (1982), the “prospect theory” of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the “Fuzzy
theory” of Zadeh (1965), because these last three theories are examples of “descriptive”
decision theories. First-order decision theories have different ontological commitments
and traditionally they have been partitioned in normative and descriptive categories
(Kahneman and Tversky. 1988; Rapoport 1989). It is important for evaluating public-
sphere decision behaviors that the ontological commitments of first-order decision
                                                 
1 In chapter 2, I present a generic model of incentive mechanism designs and show how
regulatory mechanisms differ from voluntary, market and adaptive mechanisms.
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theories are duly considered before employing the framework of any one theory to test
empirical hypotheses about human decision behaviors in real-world situations. In order
to properly employ first-order decision theories as delimited by their ontological
commitments and foundational assumptions, meta-decision theory critically analyzes
first-order decision theories from external, second-order level, meta-theoretical
perspectives (Carnap 1950; Habermas 1998; Norton 1977). While a grand-world
application of meta-decision theory is a very ambitious and long-term research agenda,
this dissertation focuses on a small-world2 but real decision problem frequently
confronted in evaluating public policies that are implemented for managing environment
and resources.
Next, section 1.2 presents the well-established technique of decision trees
(Raiffa 1968; Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) and expounds meta-decision problems in
terms of modeling decision behaviors under uncertain states of the world through the
use of decision trees. Decision trees represent a collection of a set of possible actions
that can be taken by the decision makers, the possible set of probable events that ensue
as a result of decision makers’ actions and lastly the possible set of outcomes. I am
choosing the tool of decision trees because they are the underlying common structure in
many otherwise disparate normative and descriptive decision theories. Section 1.3
presents the cognitive perspective of regulated vehicle owners through a decision tree,
and describes the complex courses of actions, uncertain events/states of the world, and
the outcomes in the context of specific regulatory mechanism being implemented in the
Atlanta airshed. I also present a theoretical basis to designate cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors that emerge in Atlanta’s regulatory mechanism. Section
1.4 briefly outlines the quasi-experimental research design and empirical methodology
used to estimate cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting
vehicle owners in Atlanta. This section also presents limitations of the study. Finally,
section 1.5 lays the road map for each chapter of the dissertation.
                                                 
2 Joyce (1999) provides a formal definition to distinguish between grand-world and small-world
decision problems, which is implied here. Informally, grand-world and small-world decision
problems respectively entail infinite and finite space-time horizons in perceiving the outcomes of
decision-makers’ actions.
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1.2: Decision trees and meta-decision problems in behavioral models
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Raiffa (1968), Brown et al (1974),
Holloway (1979), and Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) have developed the technique of
decision trees to analyze the decisions under uncertainty and to suggest normative
recommendations to the decision maker regarding what s/he should do in the face of a
given decision problem. Decisions are uncertain because “the outcome of a decision
often depends not only on the option chosen but also on the external events not under
the decision maker’s control (Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986: 63).
A generalized one-stage decision tree, as shown in figure 1.1, represents n
possible actions branching out from top to bottom. Each action ai entails eij events with a
probability P (eij), such that ∑ j=1mi P (eij) = 1. Each act ai entailing event eij results in an
outcome xij. It is assumed that the decision maker obeys axioms of rationality:
completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence.3 The most commonly employed
dominance decision rule in RCT then states that the decision maker should choose the
act that maximizes Expected Value (EV), which is defined as follows:
(1.1): EV (ai) = ∑j=1mi P (eij) xij
In the case that we replace the scalar outcomes xij with a utility function u (xij), the
dominance decision rule states that the decision-maker should choose the act that
maximizes Expected Utility (EU),4 which is defined as follows:
(1.2): EU (ai) = ∑j=1mi P (eij) u(xij)
A cut through a generalized multi-stage decision tree is shown in figure 1.2. The
multi-stage tree has n initial acts, ni events following act ai, nij acts following event eij, and
nijk final events fijk, followed by outcomes xijkl. The dominance decision rule is to maximize
EV of act ai, which is calculated as follows:
(1.3): EV (ai) = ∑j=1ni P (eij) maxk {∑l=1nijk P (fijk) xijkl }
                                                 
3 Completeness requires that a decision maker is able to establish a preference order for all the
outcomes (i.e. either xi > xj or xj > xi or xi ~ xj). Transitivity requires that if decision maker prefers xi
over xj and xj over xk then s/he should also prefer xi over xk. Continuity requires that if a decision
maker has a preference order xi > xj > xk then there exists a unique p such that p(xi) + (1-p)xk ~ xj.
Independence requires that if a decision maker has a preference order xi > xj, then p(xi) + (1-p)xk
> p(xj) + (1-p)xk for all xk and p ∈ (0,1). Descriptive decision theorists have shown that human
decision makers violate all the four axioms under some contextual conditions.
4 Savage (1954) and Harsanyi (1967) proposed replacing EU with Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU), which allows use of Bayesian probability theory to implement the dominance decision rule.
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Figure 1.1: A generalized one-stage decision tree representing actions, events and
outcomes (adapted from Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986: 75)
Figure 1.2: A cut through a generalized multi-stage decision tree representing actions,
events and outcomes (adapted from Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986: 82)
The EU hypothesis for a generalized multi-stage decision tree correspondingly
states that a rational decision agent should choose the act that maximizes EU of act ai,
which is calculated as follows.
(1.4): EU (ai) = ∑j=1ni P (eij) maxk {∑l=1nijk P (fijk) u (xijkl) }
“Descriptive” decision theories challenge the EV and/or EU hypotheses. Simon
(1977; 1982) dealt a serious blow to RCT by positing that decision makers do not obey
the dominance decision rule (as shown in equations 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4), rather they
choose an action that satisfies their minimum thresholds for EV/EU for an action. Simon
x11 x1j x1m1
ACT1 ……             ACTi ……             ACTn





ACT a1 ……          ACT ai ……          ACT an
Ei1 Eij Eini
ACT bij1 ACT bijk ACT bijnij
Fijk1 Fijkl Fijknijk
OUTCOMES xijk1 xijkl xijknijk
Decision Maker
8
called it a satisficing decision rule. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) dealt another serious
blow to EV/EU hypotheses by positing that the cognitive faculties of individuals are not
perfect enough to carry out complex computations before every real-world decision.
They rather proposed prospect decision theory that has four important elements, each of
which is derived from experimental evidence: First, decision makers employ an editing
stage in which rules either dictate choices or transform gambles before they are
evaluated. Second, decision makers choose a reference point (from which gains and
losses are measured). Third, decision makers construct a riskless value function over
gains and losses. Finally, decision makers construct a subjective function that weights
probabilities nonlinearly and applies the resulting “decision weights” to outcomes to
evaluate gambles/courses of actions. Zadeh (1965) devised the concept of fuzzy set
theory, which has a logic that systematically differs from the underlying logic of RCT and
EV/EU hypotheses. Fuzzy sets, for example, need not be transitive and completely
known, while RCT requires its decision makers not only to know all the choices but also
to be consistent in making their choices. It has been shown by numerous psychologists
that the assumptions of transitivity and completeness do not describe human decision
behavior. In a nutshell, from a descriptive perspective, Simon’s satisficing theory,
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and Zadeh’s fuzzy set theory have provided
alternative decision theories that do not agree with the EV/EU hypotheses postulated in
RCT. From a normative perspective, however, the EV/EU hypotheses still merit
instrumental value as guideposts and reference points in providing methodological tools
to elicit the values of decision makers (Keeney 1988; Keeney 1992; Keeney 1996;
Keeney and Raiffa 1976).
In this dissertation, I use the tool of decision trees to illustrate that the EV hypothesis
is neither provable nor disprovable from a meta-decision theoretical perspective because
competing decision theories systematically differ in resolving meta-decision problems to
operationalize the concept of decision trees. In equation 1.1, to take the simplest case,
we come across three different kinds of variables: actions, events, and outcomes, which
by assumption are known to the decision maker. Stronger versions of these equations
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) also require that the probabilities of events eij
also be known to the decision makers. The meta-decision problems, which a decision
maker confronts before or during the structuring process of a decision (tree), are of three
broad types:
9
1) Which actions are included in the set of actionable actions (i.e. which cut-off
criteria are used to terminate the search for more actionable actions)? And,
which events and probabilities of those events are included in the set of events?
Does the decision maker use Bayesian or Frequentist probabilities?
2)  Which values are used to measure/quantify the set of outcomes? And, which
weights are assigned to these values (the price mechanism being one way of
assigning the weights)? In the language of economic theory, what should be the
arguments as well as the functional specifications of the utility functions?
3) Which decision rule is used to make a choice (i.e. dominance, satisficing, fuzzy
etc.)? More broadly, which decision theory (i.e. rational, satisficing, prospect,
fuzzy etc.) should be used to structure and evaluate the decision tree?
Some of these meta-decision problems are age-old, going back to the times of Plato
and Aristotle, and recurring since then in various forms and disciplines. Although each of
these meta-decision problem merits a treatise in itself, I am not able to address all of
them in this dissertation. My focus is rather on problem no. 2; however, problems 1 and
3 are also dealt with briefly in chapter 3. Next, section 1.3 presents a decision tree from
the perspective of the regulated vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed, and in the
process expounds the meta-decision problems (especially no. 2) in the context of a real-
world decision process. The real world decision process to be explored in detail in this
dissertation is the case study of the vehicle owners’ decision behaviors from 1997 to
2001 in response to the federally mandated public policy intervention of the vehicle
inspection and maintenance program in the Atlanta airshed.
1.3 Cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors: a decision tree from the
perspective of the regulated vehicle owners in Atlanta’s regulatory mechanism
Pursued under the US Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, motor-vehicle
Inspection and Maintenance (IM) programs require periodic testing of on-road vehicles
to diagnose whether the emission control system on a vehicle is working correctly, and if
not, then the vehicle owner is required to repair it (EPA 1993; EPA 1994). Conceptually,
the IM program is based on the precept of reducing CO, HC and NOx tail-pipe emissions
from mobile on-road sources, especially by targeting high-emitting vehicles through the
periodic inspection and efficient maintenance of emission control systems of on-road
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vehicles. CO, HC and NOx emissions pose adverse risks to human health because they
react in the atmosphere, especially during the high summer temperatures, to form
atmospheric ozone, which has been found to be correlated with increased incidence of
emergency visits for asthma-related respiratory attacks (Friedman, Powell et al. 2001). A
brief history, rules and evaluation studies of the IM program in the Atlanta airshed is
presented in chapter 4.
A recent US National Research Council report evaluating US IM programs states
that “typically, less than 10% of the fleet contributes more than 50% of the emissions for
any given pollutant…Thus, the largest potential reductions in emissions from IM
programs are associated with a small number of high-emitting vehicles” (NRC 2001:5).
Despite the lack of consensus and scientific uncertainty about the definition of high-
emitters, previous studies (NRC 2001; Wenzel 1997) show that between 10% and 27%
of vehicles that fail an IM test (based on EPA/state emission cut-points) never pass the
test. Their exact fate has not been well characterized, although some have been found
to be still in operation in IM areas more than a year after their last test (Harrington,
McConnell et al. 2000; Stedman, Bishop et al. 1997; 1998). Next, I present a decision
tree that shows (1) the actionable choices (2) probable events and (3) outcomes for
each path of action and events faced by the high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta
airshed in response to the IM policy intervention.
Figure 1.3 depicts the structure of a two-stage decision tree from the perspective of
the regulated vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed.5 The IM program in the Atlanta
Airshed relies on the regulatory punishment strategy of denying the vehicle registration
inside the 13 county program-area to vehicle owners whose vehicles do not pass the IM
test. In game theoretical language, this regulatory punishment strategy sets up an
incentive mechanism for the high-emitting vehicle owners, which is one possible
mechanism out of many others to attain the valued outcome of reducing vehicular
emissions. Given this incentive mechanism of regulatory punishment, it is the voluntary
decision of high-emitting vehicle owners either to pursue a cooperative strategy and
carry out actual repairs on the emission control systems of their vehicles or to pursue a
non-cooperative strategy by circumventing the regulatory punishment mechanism and
                                                 
5 Though the decision game continues for failed vehicles beyond the stage 2, the addition of
stage 3 really complicates the decision tree but does not change many of the outcomes. In other
words, stage 2 may be taken as sum of all the stages occurring after the stage 2.
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pursuing one of the following non-cooperative strategies: pre-test or post-test fraudulent
repairs, false IM passes through connivance with the management of the IM program
testing stations, registering their vehicles inside the program boundaries without passing
the IM test  by bribing the vehicle registration authorities, avoiding the vehicle
registration altogether, or more tactfully, by registering the vehicles outside the program






































































































































































Figure 1.3: A decision tree showing sets of actions, events and outcomes faced by





area through “wash sales”6 or “pseudo addresses” and continuing to drive the vehicle
inside the 13-county area. Vehicle owners also have the choice of scrapping or
selling/replacing their vehicles and thus choosing to “exit” from the decision game.
Translating Figure 1.3 in tabular form, Table 1.1 lists all the possible 39 paths of
actions and events leading to outcomes for the vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed. By
definition (i.e. given the emission cut points of the IM program), a normal-emitting vehicle
owner will expect his/her vehicle to pass the emissions test without any repairs of
emission control systems [i.e. a vehicle owner will expect Probability of the event e11 [P
(e11)] to be close to 1 and P(e12) to be close to 0]. Since the IM program is not designed
to have any impact on the emission production of normal emitters, I designate this fleet
of vehicles (or path no. 1) as the control group in quasi-experimental terminology. The
possibility that a normal emitting vehicle fails the initial IM test (i.e. observed P (e12) =1)
is also included in the decision tree.
The decision tree, as translated in table 1.1, becomes more interesting from the
perspective of the high-emitting vehicle owners, who expect their vehicles to fail the
emissions test without any repairs of emission control systems [i.e. P(e11) < P(e12)]. RCT
(as formally written in equation 1.3) will predict that high-emitting vehicle owners will
choose an action that maximizes the expected value of their outcomes. As I have
pointed out earlier, the crucial meta-decision question (much debated in RCT) concerns
how vehicle owners will measure the outcomes. In table 1.1, I use a cost function to
measure the outcome for each path (the idea being that the rational vehicle owner finds
the maximum expected value in an act that minimizes the expected cost). It is however
possible that those vehicle owners are also concerned with measuring the outcomes of
their actions in terms of two additional criteria: pollution prevention (i.e. emission
reduction) that will benefit the entire society, and fairness. If we measure the outcomes
on the three dimensional criteria (costs, emissions and fairness), the optimal actions
suggested by rational choice theory can be different than the case where outcomes are
only measured in terms of one criterion (costs).
In my view, the hostile debate between economists (who insist on measuring
outcomes only in terms of costs and benefits) and social psychologists/political scientists
                                                 
6 Through a “wash sale”, a vehicle owner retains the use of the vehicle inside the IM program
boundaries even after selling and/or re-registering it outside. This is contrasted with a “real sale”,
when a vehicle owner truly sells the vehicle outside the program boundaries to a new owner.
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Table 1.1: Possible decision paths and their outcomes as function of costs for vehicle
owners in response to IM program regulation in the Atlanta airshed
Where, c1: testing fee = $ 25, c2: travel & queuing time for trip to IM station, c3: travel & queuing
time for trip to repair workshop, c4: fraudulent repair cost, c5: bribe to IM testing station for clean
piping, c6: bribe to vehicle registration authorities for registration without IM pass, c7: cost of a
fake address/holding a PO Box, c8: cost of fine if caught driving without valid registration, c9:
actual repair cost, c10: parts cost, c11: cost/mental tension of keeping a lemon/IM failed vehicle,
c12: cost of traveling without an owned vehicle, c13: cost differential between a new and old
vehicle.
(who insist on measuring outcomes in terms of broader group-level social and political
values) can be dissolved if an agreement is reached at the meta-decision level between
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the two regarding which criteria/values should be used to measure the outcomes. The
rest of the dissertation is an attempt to make this meta-decisional point clearer. In the
remaining section 1.3, I will show that RCT will predict domination of non-cooperative
decision behaviors if the outcomes are only measured in terms of cost functions. I also
discuss why is it equally important to measure the outcomes from the second and third
dimensions of emission reductions and fairness respectively.7
Suppose that the high-emitting vehicle owner is extremely thoughtful and rational
and duly considers each decision in depth.8 S/he draws the decision tree of figure 1.3
(because it lists all the possible actions available to her/him as well as all possible
events pursuant to those actions). By virtue of her expertise in economic theory, she can
also write the cost functions. Suppose she thinks of following 13 kinds of costs, a
combination of which can befall her in the event of one or the other action in the decision
tree: c1: testing fee = $ 25, c2: travel & queuing time for trip to IM station, c3: travel &
queuing time for a trip to repair workshop, c4: fraudulent repair cost, c5: bribe to IM
testing station for clean piping, c6: bribe to vehicle registration authorities for registration
without IM pass, c7: cost of a fake address/holding a PO Box, c8: cost of fine if caught
driving without valid registration, c9: actual repair cost, c10: parts cost, c11: cost/mental
tension of keeping a lemon/IM failed vehicle, c12: cost of traveling without an owned
vehicle, c13: cost differential between a new and old vehicle. For analytical purposes, she
further assumes that c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5 < c6 < c7 < c8 < c9 < c10 < c11 < c12 < c13. An
empirical investigation will be not much different from this ranking of costs; but the point
is that the ranking of costs is a subjective preference ordering function if we consider
Bayesian rational choice theory; and an objective preference ordering if we consider
Frequentist rational choice theory.9
In the next step, the rational high emitter, who wants to minimize costs as an
outcome of any action that she takes, will consider outcomes of any possible 38 paths
(path nos. 2 to path no. 39) and decide her course of action. It will be useful to go
through the heuristics of each path and show how each path is designated as
cooperative or non-cooperative (or exit) before I prove that the expected value of non-
                                                 
7 The decision matrices with multi-criteria outcomes are discussed in this context in chapter 3.
8 The possibility that the vehicle owner is non-rational is considered in detail in chapter 3.
9 There are 213 possible ranking orders of costs, which, fortunately, empirically are of much
smaller magnitude because certain ranking orders can be ruled out due to fixed constraints.
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cooperative actions will be higher than the cooperative actions if costs are the only
dimension on which outcomes are measured and if the vehicle owner can establish a
partial rank ordering of the expected costs.
In the first stage of the decision tree, the high emitting vehicle owner can decide to
take any of the 8 courses of action: a1: take the vehicle to emissions test without any
repairs; a2: carry out pre-test “actual” repairs and then test the vehicle; a3: carry out pre-
test “fraudulent” repairs and test the vehicle; a4: seek a false IM pass by offering a side
payment to IM testing station personnel; a5: seek registration inside IM program
boundaries without passing the IM test by offering a side-payment to the vehicle
registration authorities at the county level; a6: simply avoid registration of vehicle and
keep on driving illegally inside the program boundaries; a7: register the vehicle outside
the program boundaries on a pseudo address (wash sale) but keep on driving the
vehicle inside the program boundaries; a8: exit the program by scrapping or selling the
vehicle.
Given these available options, the thoughtful vehicle owner will consider the possible
events that can follow any of her/his courses of action and measure the expected value
of each action based on the outcomes (in terms of costs associated with that action).
There are only two kinds of uncertain events that can happen to her/him if she takes the
vehicle to the IM testing station (i.e. a1 or a2 or a3): either she passes the test (e11, e21, or
e31) or she fails the test (e12, e22, or e32). In the former case, her vehicle is emitting lower
and in the latter case higher CO and HC emissions as compared to the emission cut-
points established by GA-DNR for that particular model/make of vehicle.
If she fails the initial test, she enters the second stage of the decision game/tree; and
then is again confronted with 7 courses of actions (b121,…,b127; b221,…, b227; b321,…,b327). If
she decides to take the vehicle for a second (or third, fourth…) test (i.e. b121, b122, b123;
b221, b222, b223; b321, b322, b323), she will again expect any of two events: either pass or fail
the test. If she fails the second time, the loop of the second stage continues until her
next birthday. In order to estimate the expected values of each course of action, it is very
important that she has some subjective probability whether her car would pass the test
after no repairs, actual repairs or fraudulent repairs. The probability of passing the test
for a high-emitting vehicle owner increases if she either carries out actual or fraudulent
repairs. Actual repairs are supposedly more durable and compliant with the laws, but
they entail higher repair/parts costs. On the other hand, fraudulent repairs are not as
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durable (but durable enough for her to pass the test) and not compliant with the laws, but
they entail relatively lower repair/parts costs (hence her ranking, c4 < c9). Now I assert
that if she measures the outcomes only on the one scale of minimizing costs for herself,
she should prefer to carry out a3 in the first stage of the game and not a2 (same applies if
she’s in second or higher stage). More specifically, the outcome x31 will entail lower costs
as compared to the outcome x21. Path no. 23 in table 1.1 shows that her cost function
will be (c1 + c2 + c3 + c4) if she arrives at an outcome of x31 (i.e. she passes the initial test
after fraudulent repairs). Similarly, path no. 12 in table 1.1 shows that her cost function
will be (c1 + c2 + c3 + c9 + c10) if she arrives at an outcome of x21 (i.e. she passes the
initial test after actual repairs). Now if she just compares action a2 with a3 and feels that
the probability of passing the test would be higher than the probability of failing test after
either actual or fraudulent repairs, the dominance decision rule (equation 1.1) suggests
that she should prefer alternative a3 over the alternative a2 because a3 has higher
expected value. This can be seen algebraically by showing that [(c1 + c2 + c3 + c4) < (c1 +
c2 + c3 + c9 + c10)] ⇒ [(c4) < (c9 + c10)], which is an empirical fact any vehicle technician
will readily tell you (i.e the cost of fraudulent repairs is less than the cost of the actual
repairs). The logic of the expected value hypothesis (assuming that the decision maker
only considers cost as the sole argument of her outcome function) therefore
recommends that the rational vehicle owner carry out fraudulent repairs and pursue a
non-cooperative/non-compliant strategy and defy the spirit of CAAA 1990, damage the
environment through vehicular pollution and take a free ride on clean air. My argument
(from a meta-decisional perspective) is that it is not just the expected value hypothesis
but also the assumptions built into it that result in such paradoxical recommendations for
rational agents/fools. In this case, the assumption is that the outcomes are measurable
and all the values of the decision maker can be concatenated into costs (and benefits
concomitantly).
Next, consider if the decision maker compares the alternatives a4 to a7 with her non-
dominated alternative a3, she finds that some of them may even entail lesser costs and
dominate the alternative a3, and they definitely dominate the alternative a2. Note that
alternatives a4 to a7 are all non-cooperative strategies/actions. Either she can bribe the
IM testing station personnel (action a4) or she can bribe the vehicle registration
authorities (action a5); however, in both cases she will have to find testing station/vehicle
registration authorities that are willing to accept her bribe offer. In case her search cost
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as well as the accepted bribe amount (c5 or c6) is less than the actual repair cost (c9 and
c10), the non-cooperative alternatives a4 and a5 will dominate the cooperative alternative
a2. If she compares a3 with a4 and a5, the alternative a3 will dominate both a5 and a6 if c4 <
c5 and if c4 < c6. However, in case c5 < c4 and/or c6 < c4, then the alternatives a4 and a5
will dominate a3. In game theoretical language, this points to the existence of multiple
Nash equilibria in this decision game.
Similar arguments can be made about the alternative a6. If the probability of being
caught driving without valid registration is low [P(e61) < P (e62)] as well as the fine after
being caught c8 is lower than the actual repair cost (c9 and c10), the action a6 (non-
cooperative) will dominate the action a2 (the cooperative alternative). Similarly a7 will
dominate a2 if the cost of registering the vehicle outside the program area (c7) is lower
than the actual repair cost (c2). Outcomes for all the 39 paths of the decision tree in
figure 1.3 are shown in cost functional form in table 1.1. The table also shows which path
is designated as control, cooperative, non-cooperative or exit.
Now suppose we designate a cooperative action (shown in red color in figure 1.3) as
Ac and a non-cooperative action (shown in pink color in figure 1.3) as Anc, and further
suppose that cost minimization is the only criterion of the high-emitting vehicle owner
given the regulatory incentive mechanism (c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5 < c6 < c7 < c8 < c9 < c10 <
c11 < c12 < c13), then EV (Anc) > EV (Ac). In a nutshell, this proves that the expected value
of the non-cooperative actions dominate the cooperative actions given the existing cost-
structure imposed by the regulatory mechanism of IM policy intervention in the Atlanta
airshed. A rational vehicle owner should decide to pursue a non-cooperative action and
not pursue a cooperative action, if cost minimization were her only value to measure the
outcomes of her actions and if the cost structure has the following incentive mechanism:
(c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5 < c6 < c7 < c8 < c9 < c10 < c11 < c12 < c13). In case, the vehicle owner
is not rational and acts as a satisficing, prospective or fuzzy decision maker, the
expected value of each alternative will be different than the case of rational choice EV
hypothesis, which I discuss in chapter 3. The more complicated problem is the
hypothesis presented by political science and social psychology theory: decision makers
act rationally, but they do not measure their outcomes only on a cost-benefit basis;
rather, other values, such as being good law-abiding citizens, long-term environmental
preservation and fairness, can also play a pivotal role in their non-linear calculus of
choosing the appropriate courses of actions. The prediction of political science theory
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will be different; and it will expect high-emitting vehicle owners to be more cooperative
because they want to be good law-abiding citizens and they value prevention of air
pollution more than the actual repair costs. From a meta-theoretical perspective, the
question how many high-emitting vehicle owners actually pursue cooperative strategies
and how many others pursue non-cooperative strategies, becomes an important
empirical research issue for deciding which theory more accurately describes and
predicts the human decision behavior in regulatory mechanism environments. Suppose,
Xijkl represents the total number of players who pursue any of the 39 decision paths
resulting in outcomes xijkl, as shown in figure 1.3 and described in table 1.1, then the
probability of cooperative decision players in the quasi-experimental treatment group can
be theoretically calculated by equation 1.5, which is essentially the total number of
cooperative players divided by the total number of both cooperative and non-cooperative
players in the decision game:
(1.5): Pr [Cooperation] = [X1211 + X21 + X2211 + X3211]/[X1211 + X21+ X2211 + X3211 + X1212 +
X1221 + X1222 + X123 + X124 + X1251 + X1252 + X126 + X2212 + X2221 + X2222 + X223 + X224 + X2251 +
X2252 + X226 + X31 + X3212 + X3222 + X323 + X324 + X3251 + X3252 + X326 + X4 + X5 + X61 + X62 +
X7]
The EV hypothesis will be justified if we find a yes as an answer to the following
question: Do all the high emitting vehicle owners act rationally in the face of the given
regulatory incentive mechanism by not cooperating with the IM program rules [i.e. Pr
[Cooperation] = 0]? There is not a straight answer to this question, because non-
cooperative vehicle owners do not confess in public that they are not cooperative. Given
the perverse incentive structures of high-emitting vehicle owners, it is not possible for the
mechanism designers to have complete information for empirically estimating the values
of all Xijkl in equation 1.5. Further, if we do not find all the high-emitting vehicle owners to
be non-cooperative, it is possible that their underlying decision processes are bounded-
rational or fuzzy; or perhaps they act more as good citizens than indifferent consumers.
Yet, rational choice theory predicts that all of them should be non-cooperative if cost
minimization is their only value.
The first hypothesis [H1] that is tested in this study states that the probability of
cooperation by high-emitting vehicle owners is 0% in the Atlanta Airshed. If all the high-
emitting vehicle owners do not cooperate with the rules of the vehicle Inspection and
Maintenance (IM) program implemented under the clean air act amendments of 1990,
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then the EV hypothesis predictions will appear to hold. On the other hand, if all the high-
emitters appear to be cooperative, then the EV hypothesis will be disconfirmed while the
predictions of political science/social psychology theory will hold. Finally, if there is
evidence of some high-emitting vehicle owners who cooperate with the IM program rules
and some others who do not cooperate, it will partially confirm the predictions of both
game theory and social psychology theory, and partially disconfirm them. I do not expect
to have perfect cooperation nor perfect non-cooperation, and rather expect that the
results will confirm the findings of the previous controlled experimental studies under
voluntary mechanisms (Ledyard 1995).
Previous evaluation studies of the IM program in the Atlanta airshed in particular
and in the USA in general have found that IM program is not as effective as it is
expected to be. These evaluation studies increasingly use remote sensing data to
ascertain the IM program effectiveness with respect to the on-road vehicular fleets.
These studies compare from a very broad and aggregated perspective the total effects
of IM program intervention.10 In this dissertation, I am interested in dissecting the total
effects to measure the IM program effectiveness, and focus on how cooperative and
non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners decrease or
increase the effectiveness of IM programs. In other words, I explore the question: what is
the impact on vehicular tail-pipe emissions of the cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners? The mechanism
designers/regulators are interested in knowing the outcomes of vehicle owners’ decision
behaviors not only from the perspective of their cost functions, but also the emission
outputs. All xijkl in figure 1.1/table 1.3 should not be just treated as scalar quantities,
rather they are vectors, as in multi-criteria outcome games (Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Yu
1979; Yu 1985).
The dissertation tests a second hypothesis [H2] that is of special environmental
decision-making interest in the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of environmental
regulations, such as IM programs, in reducing the on-road vehicular emissions. The null
hypothesis states: The difference between the vehicular emissions of cooperative and
non-cooperative vehicle owners is not significantly different than zero. The alternative
hypothesis states this expectation: Vehicles belonging to the non-cooperative fleets emit
                                                 
10 These studies are reviewed in chapter 4.
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significantly more vehicular tail-pipe emissions than the vehicles of cooperative fleets.
This expectation is based on the assumption that cooperative vehicle owners have
carried out repairs on their emission control systems according to IM program rules,
while the non-cooperative vehicle owners do not carry out the repairs and try to avoid
the IM program or circumvent its regulatory punishment strategy, as shown in figure 1.3.
Mechanism designers can also consider an estimation of fairness effects due to
the policy intervention of the IM program and resulting decision behaviors of high-
emitting vehicle owners. In other words, it can be asked: how are the costs of the IM
program distributed across the socio-economic contexts of the vehicle owners in the
Atlanta airshed? This question is also important from the cognitive perspective of the
vehicle owners and adds a third argument to the estimation of outcome sets in figure
1.3/table 1.1. A third null hypothesis [H3] tested in the dissertation states: The odds are
equal that high-emitting vehicle owners live in the same income-level neighborhoods as
do the normal emitters. The alternative hypothesis states: the odds are higher that high-
emitting vehicle owners live in lower-income-level neighborhoods than do the normal
emitters. The third hypothesis is tested to determine the fairness effects of the IM
program policy intervention.
A fourth null hypothesis [H4] tested in the dissertation states: The odds are equal
that cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners live in the same income level
neighborhoods as do the non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners. The alternative
hypothesis states: The odds are higher that cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners
live in relatively higher-income-level neighborhoods than do the non-cooperative high-
emitting vehicle owners. The fourth hypothesis tests the contextual conditions of
cooperative and non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners. Hypotheses about the
racial and demographic composition of normal emitters vs. high-emitters and
cooperative vs. non-cooperative high-emitters are also tested. Next, section 1.4 briefly
describes the quasi-experimental research design that is used to test the hypotheses
listed above.
1.4: The quasi-experimental research design and limitations of the study
The research methodology is designed in three phases.  Phase I empirically
addresses the following question: (1) what is the probability of a high-emitting vehicle
owner deciding to cooperate under the rules of the IM program in the Atlanta airshed?
And how does the probability of cooperation change over time from 1997 to 2001?
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Phase II, the core of this research design, seeks an empirical answer to the following
question: (2) what is the impact on vehicular emissions of CO, HC and NOx due to the
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in
the Atlanta airshed? Finally, phase III is designed to empirically answer the following
question (3) what is the effect of socio-economic contextual conditions on the probability
of a high-emitter pursuing a cooperative or non-cooperative action? The socio-economic
contextual conditions include median household income, per capita income and racial
profile of the vehicle owners at the ecological level of census block group in which their
vehicles are registered.
I used Continuous Atlanta Fleet Evaluation (CAFE) on-road vehicle emissions
remote sensing (RS) data (1997-2001) collected by AQL, IM program and exemption
data (1997-2001) provided by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (GA-DNR),
Vehicle Registration data (1997-2002) provided by the Georgia Department of Motor
Vehicles and Safety (GA-DMVS), census data (2000) released by the United States
census bureau and climate data (1997-2001) released by the National Climatic Data
Center. The descriptive statistics of the relevant variables are presented in table 5.1 and
discussed in detail in chapter 5. Next I briefly outline the quasi-experimental research
design for each of the three phases, which is explained in further detail in chapter 5.
1.4.1: Phase I: Estimating cooperative and non-cooperative behavioral strategies
of high-emitters
Phase I of this research design empirically explores the following question: (1) what
is the probability of a high-emitting driver cooperating or not cooperating under the rules
of the IM program in the Atlanta airshed? The mechanism designers cannot have all the
information needed to ascertain precisely how many high-emitting vehicle owners
pursued cooperative and non-cooperative actions. Previous researchers have employed
the methodology of collecting the data about vehicle owners through randomly testing
the vehicles by road-side pullovers; but this methodology has proven to be
overwhelmingly cost-ineffective and time-consuming. The IM data cannot capture all the
non-cooperative strategies listed in Figure 1.3. Fortunately, AQL in Atlanta regions has
been collecting remote sensing data since 199411 and trying to capture observations of
                                                 
11 This study however uses remote sensing data from 1997 onwards because the IM and vehicle
registration data between 1994 and 1996 have been found to be less reliable.
22
about 1% of the total on-road fleet annually in the Atlanta airshed.12 The remote sensing
data cannot provide 100% information about each of the cooperative and non-
cooperative paths listed in table 1.4 and figure 1.3. Despite some limitations discussed
later in this section, as well as in chapter 5, the available remote sensing data lets us
track most of the cooperative and non-cooperative actions of high-emitters in the
annualized samples. Next I explain how I measured (the measurable) cooperative and
non-cooperative behavioral strategies by using the remote sensing data from 1997 to
2001.
As shown in figure 1.4, the remote sensing sample of on-road data containing
observations on vehicles found registered in the state of Georgia is subdivided into two
further fleets. The IM eligible fleet contains vehicles that were required under the rules of
the IM program to appear in IM test and the IM ineligible fleet contains vehicles that were
not required under the rules of the IM program to appear in IM test. The eligibility criteria
reflect the rules of IM program for each evaluation year, such as gasoline powered cars
and light duty trucks under GVWR 8000 lbs between 3 to 25 year ages having odd
model years were required to be tested in 1999 and even model years in 2000.13 The
eligible fleet contains vehicles of two further kinds: IM exempted vehicles that are
checked by tracking the eligible fleet vehicles in the exemption data, and vehicles that
were not exempted from IM test. The non-exempted eligible fleet of vehicles of the on-
road sample is tracked in the IM program data using the variables VIN and model year.
The vehicles found in the IM program data are further sub-divided into three fleets:
control fleet if the vehicle passed the initial IM test, retest-pass fleet if the vehicle failed
the initial test but passed the re-test, and retest-fail fleet if the vehicle failed the initial test
and again failed the re-test or did not re-appear in the IM test.
The eligible fleet vehicles not found in the IM data of the evaluation year contain
vehicles of three further kinds: first, vehicles that were found in previous IM cycle and
failed an initial test. These vehicles belong to the “missing failed” fleet as they are found
registered inside IM program boundaries without passing the IM test in the year of
evaluation but they have failed the initial test in the previous IM cycle. Second, similarly,
the missing IM-eligible vehicles that passed the initial test in the previous IM cycle are
                                                 
12 Chapter 5 presents more details about sampling sites and times of remote sensing data.
13 Detailed IM program rules can be found at http://www.cleanairforce.com/ and at EPA’s website
http://www.epa.gov/oms/epg/progeval.htm. Some major rules are also discussed in chapter 4.
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classified as belonging to the “missing passed” fleet. Third, the IM eligible missing
vehicles that were not found in either current or previous IM cycle are categorized as the
missing fleet. These missing fleet vehicles potentially indicate the error rate in VIN and
Figure 1.4: The sampling methodology for characterizing 11 vehicle fleets (shown in bold
font) by using the on-road emissions data
 On-road sample
Vehicles registered in Georgia
Invalid observations: State not
identified (contains vehicles
avoiding registration but they
cannot be identified
Unique vehicles Vehicles with more than one observation
IM eligible fleet: Eligibility criteria based on the IM rules
for each evaluation year (a) model year eligibility (b)
registered in 13 counties (c) gasoline fueled, (d) vehicle
type (e) vehicles weighing under 8000 lbs
IM non-eligible fleet: if vehicles do not meet
eligibility criteria under IM rules
Vehicles not found in IM
evaluation year data
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model year variables as well as reporting error in IM, registration and remote sensing
databases.
From the set of unique valid vehicles that were designated as non-eligible
vehicles, two further sub-fleets are defined. The first sub-fleet includes vehicles that are
registered inside the 13 county-area but are not eligible to appear in the IM test as per
IM program rules. This fleet is designated as the IM ineligible fleet inside the 13 county-
area for that particular evaluation year. It is a noteworthy fact that under the biennial IM
testing program, the ineligible fleet contains vehicles that underwent testing in the
previous year. The second sub-fleet includes vehicles that are registered in the state of
Georgia outside the 13 county IM program boundaries.
The rest of Georgia fleet outside the 13 county-area is further subdivided into
three fleets. First, the “migrated failed” fleet includes vehicles that are found to have
failed an initial IM test in the previous IM cycle. This category of vehicles represents
those high emitting vehicles that appear to have migrated outside the IM boundaries but
are still driven inside the IM boundaries. Second, the “migrated passed” fleet includes
vehicles that are found to have passed an initial IM test in the previous IM cycle. Third,
the “rest of the Georgia” fleet which includes vehicles that have no record in the previous
IM cycle.
In a nutshell, as the bold-faced terminal nodes in figure 1.4 show, the sample of
the on-road data that is selected to evaluate the IM program for a given year is
subdivided into 11 vehicle fleets: control [Q1], IM ineligible inside 13 county area [Q2],
waived [Q3], rest of the Georgia fleet [Q4], missing [Q5], retest-pass [Q6], migrated-
passed [Q7], retest-fail [Q8], migrated-failed [Q9], missing-failed [Q10], and missing-passed
[Q11]. These eleven fleet types are coded as eleven binary variables (∑q=111 Qq), such as
the variable “retest pass” [Q6] is valued 1 if the vehicle belongs to the retest pass fleet
and 0 otherwise and the variable “retest-fail” [Q8] is valued 1 if the vehicle belongs to
retest-fail fleet and 0 otherwise, and so on. The control group (initial test/initial pass)
vehicles [Q1] serve as the reference fleet in regression models. Vehicles belonging to
retest pass and migrated passed fleets are characterized as belonging to cooperative
vehicle owners, while vehicles belonging to retest fail, missing fail, migrated failed and
missing passed fleets are characterized as belonging to non-cooperative vehicle owners.
Assuming that a vehicle is characterized as a high-emitter after it fails the initial
IM test as per IM emission cut-point rules, then the probability of cooperation is
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measured by taking a ratio of the cooperative fleet vehicles (belonging to the retest pass
and migrated passed fleets in this analysis) to the total initial fail vehicles (belonging to
the retest pass, migrated passed, retest fail, migrated failed, missing failed and missing
passed fleets in this analysis). Conversely, the probability of non-cooperation is equal to
100% minus the probability of cooperation. Formally:
(1.6): Pr [Cooperation] = [Q6 + Q7]/[ Q6 + Q7 + Q8 + Q9 + Q10 + Q11]
The empirical methodology to estimate probability of cooperation, as described in
equation 1.6, has the following limitations:14  (1) The probability of cooperation is over-
estimated because one cannot find those vehicle owners that simply avoid registration of
their vehicles inside the state of Georgia and still drive them inside the IM program
boundaries without valid license plates. Further, the probability of cooperation is also
over-estimated because the methodology cannot single out those vehicle owners who
register their vehicles out of Georgia state (through a wash sale) and still drive inside the
program area (i.e. path nos. 10, 21, 32 and 38 in table 1.1 are only partially captured).
(2) The probability of cooperation is under-estimated because the methodology cannot
separate the high-emitting vehicle owners who do pre-test actual repairs and pass the
initial test (path 12 in table 1.1) from the normal emitting vehicle owners who pass their
initial test without any actual repairs (path 1 in table 1.1). (3) Both IM and remote sensing
data methodologies contain the possibility of a matching error due to the incorrectly
reported VIN and model year variables. This matching error is probably represented in
the category of “missing fleet” vehicles.  A detail comparison between equation 1.5 and
equation 1.6 is presented in chapter 5 with a discussion of the methodological biases
that arise due to incomplete information, which is the most important limitation of this
research design.
 Phase II: Estimating the emission reduction impact of cooperative and non-
cooperative behavioral strategies of high-emitters
Phase II of the research design explores the following empirical question: What is
the impact on the outcomes of vehicular emissions due to the cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed?
                                                 
14 Table 6.1 presents estimated probability of cooperation as described in equation 1.6. The
results of Table 6.1 are discussed extensively in chapter 6. The expected biases and limitations
of the results are also discussed in chapter 5.
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Previous literature (NRC 2001) suggests that vehicular emissions (CO, HCs and NOx)
are complex functions of three broad groups of parameters.
First, vehicular characteristics, including their technological specifications, affect
the emissions. The vehicular characteristics include vehicle age, vehicle type, model,
make, manufacturer, manufacturing country, and mileage of the vehicle. The
technological parameters indicate if a vehicle is fitted with Air Injection Reactor system
(AIR), Oxidation (two-way) catalyst (OXY), Three Way Catalyst (TWC), Exhaust Gas
Recirculation (EGR), Closed Loop Combustion Control (CLL) and Thermostatic Air
Cleaner (TAC). Vehicular and technological parameters (∑r=131 Rr) are treated as control
variables in the quasi-experimental research design. Chapter 4 explains their expected
effects as proposed by theory.
Second, physical and temporal parameters at the time of measurement of
vehicular emissions also affect the vehicular emissions. Physical parameters include
speed and acceleration of the vehicle at the time of measurement, road grade at the
remote sensing observation site, ambient temperature, atmospheric pressure and
relative humidity. Physical (∑s=17 Ss) and temporal (∑t=14 Tt) parameters are also treated
as control variables.
Third, vehicular emissions are also affected by the individual decision behaviors
and broader policy parameters applicable in a specific place. I use 11 binary decision
variables to depict the 11 kinds of vehicle owners, as shown in figure 1.4. The control
group is represented by (normal emitting) vehicle owners in the remote sensing samples
who passed their initial IM test. The control group also serves as a reference group in
the statistical models.  Two cooperative and four non-cooperative vehicular groups act
as quasi-experimental treatment groups. Four additional groups of vehicles – the IM
ineligible group from inside program, the rest-of-Georgia group from outside program,
and the IM-waived group and the missing group – are included in the analysis because
they are also observed on-road by the remote sensors. The 11 decision variables are
depicted by (∑q=111 Qq).
Multiple statistical decision theory models, employing mixed-pooled time series
multivariate generalized linear and non-linear regressions are used to test hypotheses
concerning the impacts on vehicular emissions outcomes due to the cooperative and
non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners, after controlling for
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technological, vehicular, physical and temporal parameters. Three (linear) equations are
initially estimated to quantify/generalize the impact of cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors on the vehicular tail-pipe emissions15:
(1.7): YCO = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
(1.8): YHC = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
(1.9): YNO = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=45 δtTt + ∑t=45∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
YCO, YHC and YNO are measured in grams per gallon. Interaction effects [Δtq] are
estimated in equations 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 to test the changes in CO, HC and NO emission
factors of 11 fleet types from year to year. The error terms ε1, ε2 and ε 3 are
heteroskedastically robust errors. Furthermore, non-linear Box-Cox regression models
are also estimated and the results from non-linear models are used to further specify
transformed linear models (such as log-linear models). The details of these statistical
models are presented in chapter 5. The results from these models are used to test the
hypothesis whether cooperative decision behaviors, controlling for other variables,
reduce vehicular emissions; and if they do reduce them, then by how much.
Phase III: Estimating the socio-economic contextual conditions of cooperative and
non-cooperative vehicle owners
The contextual conditions of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners
occur at two ecological levels. At the individual level, the socio-economic parameters of
vehicle owners, such as their individual income level and their race, can hypothetically
affect their individual behaviors. Due to privacy issues, it is not possible to access data
that provide information about the individual level socio-economic parameters of vehicle
owners. This is another major limitation of this study.16 A second kind of individual
                                                 
15 Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, which are discussed in detail in chapter 6, present respectively the
estimated equations 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9.
16 Individual-level information is treated as missing or incomplete for the purposes of this study
because it is practically not possible to empirically collect this information for the entire sample
during the study period. Income tax data at the household level is protected under the rights of
individual privacy. Property tax data of the households can be used to elicit property tax value of
a house, which in turn can be used as a proxy variable to reflect the income of the vehicle owners
in the study sample. The use of property tax value as a proxy income variable will however raise
many other indefensible issues, such as the difference between renters and house-owners,
business cycle trends in the housing market, and above all, the non-linear relationship between
the property value and income of the vehicle owners. Another option was to elicit a survey
response from the vehicle owners in the study sample and directly and indirectly ask these
drivers questions about their income and other conventional contextual conditions. The survey
was expected to have the serious problem of response bias. Second, the sample of the study
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parameters include information about the vehicle characteristics as well as their
technological specifications, represented by variables (∑r=131 Rr), which are included as
controlling variables in phase III of the research design.
The group level contextual variables include socio-economic and demographic
parameters of the vehicle owners’ neighborhoods. The 2000 Census data provides
information about group level parameters at multiple ecological levels (block group, tract,
county etc.). I use two ecological levels to characterize the socio-economic conditions.
First, census block group level is primarily chosen because it is the smallest ecological
level at which socio-economic data about the neighborhoods of vehicle owners’
addresses is publicly available; and it is recommended that smallest ecological level
data should be chosen to explore the contextual conditions of decision makers (Boyd
and Iversen 1979). Second, county level is chosen because most of the public policy
decisions are operationalized at the level of county governments, such as vehicle
registrations and law enforcements.
The group level socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions that are
hypothesized to affect the decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners include the
following variables (measured at the level of census block-groups): (1) economic
variables: the median household income [W1], the per capita income [W2], the median
home value [W3], % employed [W4]; (2) social variables: percentage of white population
[W5], percentage of black population [W6], percentage of Hispanic population [W7],
percentage of Asian population [W8], percentage of other races’ population (such as
native Americans, pacific Americans) [W9]; (3) demographic variables: percentage of
male population [W10], percentage of female population [W11], percentage of population
between the ages of 18 and 24 years [W12], percentage of population between the ages
of 25 and 34 years [W13], percentage of population between the ages of 35 and 44 years
[W14], percentage of population between the ages of 45 and 54 years [W15], percentage
of population between the ages of 55 and 65 years [W16], and percentage of population
aging 65 years and above [W17].
The contextual conditions of decision makers (i.e.11 fleet types) are ascertained
through two kinds of models: first, linear ecological regression is employed to test the
                                                                                                                                                  
could have been drastically reduced from thousands to a few hundred. Third, the study period
could have been reduced from 5 years (1997 to 2001) to just the current year (2003).
Furthermore, an additional survey would have involved huge monetary and time costs.
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differences in the median household income of vehicle owners’ blockgroups as per 11
fleet types, while controlling for other vehicular parameters as well as social,
demographic and economic variables. The following ecological regression equation is
estimated:
(1.10): W1 =  α0 + ∑q=110 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=215κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt + ε1
Secondly, a multinomial variable “fleet type” [F] is created, which is coded 0 for
control group, 1 for IM ineligible group, 2 for waived fleet, 3 for rest of Georgia fleet, 4 for
missing fleet, 5 for retest pass fleet, 6 for migrated pass fleet, 7 for retest fail fleet, 8 for
migrated fail fleet, 9 for missing fail and 10 for missing pass fleet. In order to test the
hypotheses about the social, economic and demographic contextual conditions of
different groups of decision-makers/vehicle owners that affect the probability of a vehicle
owner being in one of the 10 groups relative to the control group, the following
multinomial logistic regression equation is estimated.
(1.11): Pr (F=i)/Pr (F=0) = {e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]i}, where i=1,2,…10.
A major limitation of the multinomial logistic model concerns the problem of the
“ecological fallacy” [Robinson (1950), Riley (1964), Alker (1969) and Stokes (1969)]
because census data variables reflect the group-level contextual conditions of decision
behaviors. Arguably, the qausi-experimentalist will commit the ecological fallacy if
individual behaviors are inferred from group level variables17.
Some researchers, such as Boyd and Iversen (1979) and King (1997), argue that
one will  commit the ecological fallacy if one attempts to derive inferences about the
individual behavior from the group level variables; but they also emphasize the flip side
that it will be fallacious if one ignores the group level contextual variables as explanatory
parameters of individual decision behaviors. Boyd and Iversen’s (1979) research
emphasizes that both individual and group level contextual parameters should be
included in the statistical decision models. King’s (1997) research places emphasis on
calculating the upper and lower bounds of socio-economic parameters for drawing
ecological inferences about the individual decision behaviors by using the aggregate
                                                 
17 Due to the ecological fallacy issue, the following hypothesis is not testable in equation 1.12:
The probability of cooperative behavior increases as household income of the vehicle owner
increases, controlling for other independent variables. Rather the following hypothesis is tested in
the study: The probability of cooperative behavior increases as median household income of the
census block group of vehicle owner’s address increases, controlling for other independent
variables.
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group-level data. I estimate equation 1.11 with both the individual-level contextual
variables that can be feasibly collected as well as the socio-economic and demographic
parameters of the vehicle owners observed in the census data at the block-group level.
The upper and lower bounds of group level parameters (νc) estimated by multinomial
logistic regression model of equation 1.12 represent “between-group” and not “within-
group” variation, which is another major limitation of the study.
1.5 Dissertation outline
Chapter 2 presents a detailed discussion of the cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors under different contextual conditions. Contexts of voluntary and
regulatory mechanism designs are explored in greater depth. The concept of adaptive
environmental policy mechanism designs is also presented in chapter 2.
Chapter 3 presents research on the state of the expected value hypothesis in
descriptive and normative decision theories, especially when outcomes are measured in
multiple value dimensions. The concept of meta-decision models is also formally
introduced in chapter 3.
Chapter 4 focuses on describing the regulatory mechanism of IM programs in the
USA in general and Atlanta in particular. Secondly, prior empirical research on
evaluating the effectiveness of IM programs in terms of reducing vehicular tail-pipe
emissions is presented in chapter 4. Thirdly, various behavioral research studies that
have been conducted to evaluate the decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners
are also presented in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 presents the research design and its limitations in greater detail. This
chapter is also divided into three major sections, corresponding to the three major
phases of the research design, and builds on the information provided in section 1.4.
The first phase of research design discusses the methodology to measure cooperative
and non-cooperative decision behaviors; the discrepancy between theoretical and
empirical models is bridged. The second phase of the research design estimates the
outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors in terms of expected
vehicular emissions. The third phase of the research design explains how hypotheses
about the outcomes on the dimension of fairness are operationalized. This phase
explores the methodology to test systematic differences about the socio-economic
contextual conditions between normal and high-emitting vehicle owners, on the one
hand, and cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners on the other hand. In
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addition, the threats to internal, construct, statistical and external validities of the quasi-
experimental research design as well as its limitations are presented in chapter 5.
Chapter 6 presents results for each phase of the research design. Chapter 7
contains a discussion on the analysis and implications of the results. In particular, the
focus is on substantive environmental policy implications, decision theoretical
implications and methodological implications.
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CHAPTER 2
COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION BEHAVIORS UNDER
DIFFERENT CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS: VOLUNTARY, REGULATORY AND
ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MECHANISMS
2.1: The Meta-decision problem of designing environmental policy mechanisms
Decision behaviors affect the environmental outcomes. Conversely, different
contextual conditions, including our environments, affect the nature of social decisions.
The interactive relationship between decision behaviors, on the one hand, and
contextual conditions, on the other hand, thus remains an active area of research in
social sciences, especially policy and decision sciences.
Enhanced understanding about the relationship between decision behaviors and
contextual conditions provides important information both for evaluating current public
policies and designing new policies. From the perspective of environmental policy, for
example, it is an important question: do people, especially polluters, decide to cooperate
with the community-mandated environmental laws? Furthermore, are there specific
contextual conditions that affect people’s decision behaviors that in turn affect
environments? An answer to these questions would enable environmental policy makers
to improve the design of policy mechanisms that protect environments because policy
designs can be adapted to create contextual conditions that promote desirable decision
behaviors.
In the previous experimental and non-experimental literature, decision behaviors
have been studied under different kinds of contextual conditions and policy mechanisms.
A very general framework of an experimental policy mechanism design was introduced
by Mount and Reiter (1974), which I briefly present in section 2.2. Given this generic
framework, it is possible to identify the following three broad kinds of environmental
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policy mechanisms that share one common assumption: the outcomes accruing from
decision makers’ actions can be represented by a single commensurate18 value.
(1) Voluntary policy mechanisms imply no governmental/policy intervention to
preserve environmental values and resources. (2) Regulatory policy mechanisms imply
“command and control” type of policy interventions to preserve environmental values
and resources. (3) Market-based policy mechanisms imply tax- and subsidy-based
policy interventions to control environmental resources in real markets and creation of
emissions’ permit trading in artificial markets. I present voluntary and regulatory
mechanisms respectively in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors that have been studied under the contextual conditions of voluntary
and regulatory policy mechanisms are reviewed respectively in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Since I focus in this dissertation on evaluating the decision behaviors under
voluntary and regulatory mechanisms, I do not present a detailed review of market
mechanisms. There are two kinds of market policy mechanisms: the first kind treats
pollution as external effects of the “real” market processes and argues that policy
interventions in the real markets should change the production level of externalities.
Lindahl’s (1919/1958) equilibrium theory is a standard example of modeling a real
market mechanism in the case of external pollution effects, the updated details of which
can be found in Baumol and Oates (1988) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995).19 A second kind
aims to create “artificial” markets for pollution permits. Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and
Groves and Ledyard (1977) are among the earliest examples of these kinds of market
mechanisms, while Franciosi et al. (1993), Cason and Plott (1996) and Ben-David et al.
(1999) provide examples of considerable recent research in this area. While artificial
market mechanisms have been experimentally introduced in the case of “stationary”
sources of pollution, such as SO2 controls on industrial plants, it remains to be seen how
they can be designed to control emissions/pollution for “mobile” sources of pollution,
such as ozone-forming pollutants from high-emitting vehicle-owners. This is an active
                                                 
18 Expected value/expected utility representation of each element of the set of values (by which
outcomes are measured in equation 1.1) assumes all the values are commensurable in units of
monetary value or utility value. Mathematically, outcomes can be quantified for commensurate
values through single-criteria maximization models under constraints. However, when the
assumption of commensurability is relaxed, the multiple-criteria decision-making models (MCDM)
come into play, which I present in chapter 3.
19 Recent introduction of congestion taxes in London is an example of “real” market mechanisms
to improve air quality as well as reduce congestion.
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area of research in environmental policy (Xepapadeas 1997), but beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
In section 2.4, I introduce the notion of adaptive environmental policy
mechanisms, which are designed at two levels. At the level of action, the policy designer
descriptively evaluates whether citizens respond cooperatively or non-cooperatively with
the prevalent (voluntary, regulatory and market) environmental policy mechanisms. At
the level of reflection, the meta-decision problem of designing an appropriate
environmental policy mechanism is normatively considered by the researcher in the light
of decision behaviors and environmental outcomes that emerge at the level of action and
decisions and outcomes that are desirable at the end of policy horizon. The level of
action is descriptive, while the level of reflection is normative. Adaptive policy
mechanisms prescribe socio-scientific learning-based policy interventions that are
iteratively adjusted according to changing contextual conditions for attaining the
desirable outcomes, which balance pluralistic values.20
One important meta-decision problem concerns the question: can we compare
regulatory mechanisms with voluntary, market or adaptive mechanisms? Though this is
an extremely important question from the perspective of meta-decision theory as well as
policy analysis and evaluation, it remains beyond the scope of empirical scrutiny in this
dissertation. However, since the data analysis results show that a regulatory mechanism
is not producing the best outcomes in terms of cost-effective emission reductions and
fairness values in the Atlanta airshed, it is natural to assume that there exist alternative
mechanisms which may produce better environmental outcomes than the outcomes of
the present regulatory mechanism. In this context and in the light of the empirical results,
alternative mechanisms –voluntary, market and adaptive-- are briefly discussed in
chapter 7 of the dissertation.
2.2: Environmental policy mechanism designs and decision behavioral models
The main components of experimental mechanism designs are environments,
outcomes, performance/value criteria, institutions and models of behavior (Ledyard
                                                 
20 Adaptive policy mechanisms relax the assumption of commensurate value measurement, and
allow the possibility of non-commensurate values on which decision makers do/should measure
the outcomes of their actions. The case of multiple values that may include non-commensurate
values is presented in chapter 3.
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1995; Mount and Reiter 1974). Figure 2.1 presents structural components of a generic
experimental mechanism design.
Figure 2.1: A generic environmental policy mechanism design (adapted from Mount and
Reiter 1974)
Formally, in a very general sense, Ξ is a set of environments21 and X is a set of
outcomes.22 Ω: Ξ → X is the performance/value criterion23 where Ω (e) = {x} is a function
                                                 
21 An Environment describes “the details of the situation that the analyst takes as given and the
experimentalist manipulates: the exogenous variables. The environment includes the number of
agents/people, their preferences and endowments, the physical constraints on their behavior
(biological and physical laws), those aspects of the legal structure (such as property rights) that
are taken as fixed, the structure of information (who knows what, and to what extent that might be
common knowledge), the technical details and possibilities for production of goods and bads.
Environment also includes a description of the range of possible outcomes of interest to
agents/people/citizens.” (Ledyard 1995:116)
22 An Outcome describes “the final distribution of resources and payoffs. How each individual
feels about the outcome depends on the particular environment since an individual’s preferences
for outcomes are part of the description of an environment.” (Ledyard 1995:116)
23 The performance/value criterion “determines (for each environment) a ranking over outcomes.
The idea is that in each environment the best outcome is the one which is ranked highest by the
performance/value criterion. A standard performance/value criterion used in experimental work is
a cost/benefit decision rule, which computes the sum of payoffs received as a percent of the












which identifies the “best” outcomes for each environment e. The institution24 is (Γ, g)
where Γ  is the language of mechanism, and g (x1,…, xi,….,xN) specifies the best
outcomes which are chosen if each individual i responds to the institution with xi. The
behavioral model is µ where µ (e, (Γ, g)) = (x1,…, xi,….,xN) specifies how each individual
will actually respond if the environment is e and the institution is (Γ, g).25
Ledyard (1995: 117) notes: “To evaluate how well an institution performs
(according to a particular performance criterion) we need to be able to predict what
outcomes will occur in each environment when that institution is used. To do that we
need a model of behavior; that is, we need a theory of how individuals respond in each
environment to requests for information and action by an institution. From a very broad
and general perspective, the behavioral model will predict different responses in different
environments to the same institution as well as different responses in the same
environment to different institutions.”
Formally, the question is which policy mechanism actually results in the “best”
outcomes for citizens of a society. This question, however, again leads us back to my
original meta-decisional question: which values should be used to measure the
outcomes and how should these values be weighed to determine what is the “best”
outcome? The theory of policy mechanism designs is silent on this meta-decisional issue
because it has taken for granted the measurement of the outcomes on the basis of cost-
                                                                                                                                                  
and decentralized information about the range of outcomes and values used to measure those
outcomes. The information is private property.” (Ledyard 1995:116)
24 The Institutions “arise to aggregate information and coordinate activities. An institution
specifies who should communicate with whom and how, as well as who should take various
actions and when.” (Ledyard 1995:116) Each mechanism (voluntary, regulatory or market) results
in different institutional arrangements and outcomes for the society and the individuals living in
that social system.
25 I define Γv as a voluntary mechanism, Γr as a regulatory mechanism, Γm as a market
mechanism and Γa as an adaptive mechanism. Correspondingly µv, µr, µm and µa respectively
denote behavioral models under voluntary, regulatory, market and adaptive mechanisms.
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benefit decision rule26, as also suggested by Ledyard (1995: 116).27 Next, I show how
voluntary and regulatory mechanisms differ from each other in terms of their specific
environments, outcomes, performance/value criteria, institutions and models of behavior,
while assuming that outcomes are rank ordered on the value/performance criterion of (a
measurable) cost-benefit decision rule.
2.2.1: voluntary policy mechanisms
A voluntary mechanism (Γv) has been traditionally modeled as prisoner’s
dilemma game to model the problem of provision of public goods/environmental
resources in a society (Hardin 1982; Ostrom 1990). Under a strict voluntary mechanism,
the central governmental authority has at best minimal presence and acts primarily to
coordinate the actions of citizens and protect property rights in public goods. The
voluntary mechanism generates a behavioral model (µv) that is explained by a prisoners’
dilemma model, which I explain below through a generalizable example in the language
of decision trees and EV/EU hypothesis that was introduced in section 1.2.
Suppose Mary is asked to contribute $ 200 (denoted as xc1) toward repairing the
emission control systems on her high-emitting vehicle. Once the vehicle is repaired, the
benefit of less vehicular emissions/better air quality will be shared by everyone in a
society of 100,000 (or N) citizens. The same suggestion is made to 9,999 (or K) of
Mary’s neighbors/other citizens who also own high-emitting vehicles. Let’s suppose
further that there are 90,000 (or N-K) other vehicle owners in this society whose vehicles
are clean/normal emitting. The individual benefit of Mary’s contribution, let’s suppose, is
$ 10 (or xb1), which is the value of clean air for Mary. Her individually rational strategy, as
decided by EV/EU hypothesis (as well as cost-benefit decision rule), is to decline to
                                                 
26 The Net Present Value (NPV) rule of the cost-benefit decision algorithm states that the policy
designer should maximize the present value of all beneficial outcomes minus costlier outcomes,
subject to specified constraints (Prest and Turvey, 1965). Expressed mathematically:
Maximize: NPV = ∑t=0n [(xbt – xct)/(1+r)t]. s.t. k is statisfied, ∀ k ∈ {K}
where: NPV = net present value, xbt = beneficial outcomes at time t, xct = costlier outcomes at
time t, r = discount rate, n = planning horizon, k = particular constraints, {K} = complete constraint
set. The decision rule is to choose the project or policy that has the largest NPV subject to the set
of constraints.
27 The case of multiple non-commensurably valued outcomes is considered in detail in chapter 3
both from the perspectives of descriptive and normative decision theories.
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contribute because 10 < 200 (or xb1 < xc1). But if she does contribute, then not just her
but all other citizens in the society also receive a return from her contribution. Suppose
they also receive an average of $10 benefit in value due to the clean air from Mary’s
contribution. Then her $200 contribution would produce a $ 1,000,000 benefit (or xB) for
the entire society. Nevertheless, according to RCT, her dominant behavioral action is to
withhold her contribution.
As Schmidz (1991: 62) puts it, voluntary mechanism examples, like Mary’s
choice example, “illustrates the general truth that contributing a unit of public good
generates benefits for the group in excess of the unit’s cost, but the unit’s cost exceeds
the benefits for the individual who contributes the unit. Each individual in the group is
strictly better off withholding than contributing. Because the players of this ‘game’ decide
as individuals rather than as a group, individually rational strategies thwart collective
efforts to produce public goods. The incentive structure is that of Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
The “extensive”28 decision tree form of incentive structure for a generalized
prisoners’ dilemma game, as explained in the preceding example, is presented in figure
2.2. Figure 2.2 uses the following notation:
xc1 = the unit investment that Mary/decision maker has to contribute if she cooperates.
xcK = the unit investment that Kth high-emitting vehicle owner has to contribute if she
cooperates.
xb1 = the benefit to Mary/decision maker from her contribution of xc1.
xbK = the benefit to Kth high-emitting vehicle owner from her contribution of xc1.
xB = Group benefit ∑i xbi in a group of  N members with K polluters, where i = {1,2,…..N}
and K ≤ N.
The outcomes matrix in figure 2.2 represents twelve extreme outcomes. The top
row shows Mary’s outcomes, the Kth row shows outcomes for Kth high-emitter (who
faces a similar decision tree as Mary does) and the Nth row shows outcomes for Nth
                                                 
28 The “normal” form of a similar example can be seen at Schmidtz (1991:65).
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Figure 2.2: A generalized decision tree representing the prisoners’ dilemma game for
provision of environmental goods under voluntary policy mechanisms
normal-emitter (who is affected by the decision behaviors of K high emitters in the
society). Each column of outcomes’ matrix in figure 2.2 represents four extreme
scenarios:29 (1) Mary cooperates and every other high-emitter cooperates; (2) Mary
cooperates and no other high-emitter cooperates; (3) Mary does not cooperate and all
other high-emitters cooperate; and (4) Mary does not cooperate and no other high-
emitter cooperates. Because there is non-rivalry in the consumption of clean
air/environmental resource, xb is added to every citizen’s benefit for each investment of
xc. Thus, if each high-emitter in the group of K high-emitters contributes (as in the first
column of the outcome matrix in figure 2.2), each player’s net gain will be the total
benefit xB, minus her own contribution of xc, or xB – xc. The return to the entire society as
a whole, formulated in terms of total benefits, xB, is the sum of individual benefits gained
by each individual member of the society. If one player withholds and the remaining
                                                 
29 The complete outcomes matrix for the group of 100,000 citizens would have 100,000 columns
and 100,000 rows!













































players cooperate (as in the third column of outcome matrix in figure 2.2), then the
cooperative return is lowered by xb, i.e. from xB to (xB - xb), because one less player is
investing xc. Each high-emitter’s net gain will be (xB - xb - xc), except for the withholding
high-emitter/Mary, whose net gain will be (xB - xb), because she saves xc by not
contributing her share to clean the air.
Two more crucial assumptions are needed to be sure that the incentive structure
of the public goods game presented in figure 2.2 is a prisoner’s dilemma: for all citizens,
(1) xB substantially exceeds xc,30 and (2) xc exceeds xb. Schmidz says, “The first
assumption assures that producing the good is important. The second assumption
ensures that the incentive to withhold will be real. Together, the assumptions that xB
exceeds xc and that xc exceeds xb are necessary and sufficient to ensure that the
generalized collective action problem depicted in figure 2.2 is a Prisoner’s Dilemma,
exhibiting both the free rider and assurance problems” (Schmidz 1991: 65).31 Further he
explains that “in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, players have a dominant strategy, and
following it leads to wholesale withholding, which has the paradoxically self-defeating
effect of minimizing the benefits players secure as a group” (Schmidz 1991: 65).
From a meta-decision theoretical perspective, the above-mentioned description
of the provision of public goods as Prisoner’s Dilemma contains not just two
assumptions (i.e. xB >>> xc > xb), rather it contains many other hidden assumptions that I
have listed as meta-decision problems in sections 1.2 and 3.1. I will focus on the meta-
decision assumption that citizens measure outcomes as single-valued monetized costs
and benefits. I suspect that this grand assumption is one of the causes that we do not
observe as many free-riders in actual public goods games as predicted by RCT/game
theory. First, benefits of public goods cannot always be easily monetized. How can you
                                                 
30 If xB does not exceed xc for a player (such as xc  > xB > xb), then that player in the decision
game is not cognitively playing a prisoner’s dilemma game. In the case of IM program, for
example, a high-emitting vehicle owner may value social benefit of reducing vehicular emissions
to be less than repair costs. Note that even if a player is not cognitively playing in a prisoner’s
dilemma game, the non-cooperative action will still dominate her choices (if outcomes are
measured on the value of cost-minimization), which in turn would have prisoner’s dilemma model
effects on the entire society, if and only if (xB >>> xc > xb) is true.
31 It is on the basis of these two assumptions (i.e. xB >>> xc > xb) that the incentive structure
presented in figure 2.2 leads to the inference for Mary that EV (Anc) > EV (Ac), no matter what
others play. The non-cooperative action thus dominates the cooperative action and Nash
equilibrium is the fourth column in the outcome matrix of figure 2.2.
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place a monetary value on one thousand tons of CO, HC and NOx? Some costs are
probably easy to monetize, but the costs occurring in distant futures and/or intangible
costs are not easily monetized due to the unresolved issues associated with finding
agreeable discount rates (Costanza, d'Arge et al. 1997; Freeman 1993; Norton and
Toman 1997). Second, the provision of public goods does not always have to be
measured on the value of efficiency (which is the cornerstone of cost-benefit decision
rule), rather the value of (both intra-generational and inter-generational) fairness also
hypothetically plays a significant role in the provision of public goods, especially
environmental resources such as clean air and biodiversity (Norton 1996; Norton 1997).
Figure 2.2 is a classical example of voluntary mechanism designs. Most of the
experimental studies that have been conducted in the laboratory to investigate the
provision of public goods assume an incentive structure that is very similar to figure 2.2. I
review some of these studies in section 2.3.1. These experimental studies test the game
theoretical prediction that decision makers should play non-cooperative/non-contribution
strategies given the incentive structure, which is essentially similar to figure 2.2. Both
real-world and controlled experimental studies show that people do cooperate/contribute
higher-level provision of public goods than predicted by the game theoretical model
presented in figure 2.2. Why is there a discrepancy between the game theoretical
prediction and real-world practice? In my view, the answer to this question lies in digging
out the pluralistic values of citizens in which they measure the outcomes of their actions.
The game theoretical model depicts citizens as very narrow and myopic who are also
able to reduce all of their values in terms of single-valued monetary costs and benefits.
The reality is however much more complex and pluralistic.
Voluntary mechanisms existed in Atlanta before the introduction of IM policy
intervention (i.e. before 1981). I have however no independent data that goes back to
the early 1980s to show how voluntary mechanisms affected the air quality of the Atlanta
airshed. In this dissertation, the focus is more on modeling the decision behaviors of
vehicle owners after the regulatory mechanism was intensified/extended under the
enhanced IM program, which began in January 1997.
In most of the experimental economics literature, cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors have been investigated under the framework of a
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voluntary mechanism (Γv), which is briefly reviewed in section 2.3.1.  In the case study of
the Atlanta airshed, we cannot precisely say that IM program intervention entails a
voluntary mechanism. Rather it is a case of regulatory mechanism, even though
voluntary decision choice of cooperating or not cooperating with the mandatory
regulation still remains a volitional choice with the vehicle owners. The incentive
structure generated by a regulatory mechanism is presented in the next section.
2.2.2: regulatory policy mechanisms
Since the RCT theory predicts that every rational person should free ride under
voluntary mechanisms, regulatory mechanisms were widely introduced in USA and
Europe during the early 1970s to ensure the mandatory provision of environmental
resources. Most of the regulatory mechanisms are designed to ensure that polluters do
not emit above certain threshold values of pollutant emissions. In the case of vehicular
emissions, these threshold values have been gradually reduced significantly over the
last 30 years. I have two important points to make about the regulatory mechanisms.
First, most of the regulatory mechanisms are single-valued programs, i.e. pollution
reduction is their foremost important value. Most of these mechanisms assume the
“polluter pays principle” (PPP), which in some cases have raised serious environmental
justice concerns. Second, most of the regulatory mechanisms rely on introducing
“regulatory punishment costs” (xp) for those polluters who emit above the regulatory
standards. The institution of regulatory punishments changes the incentive structure for
individual decision-makers/polluters (as shown in figure 2.3) as compared to the
voluntary mechanisms (as shown in figure 2.2) but regulatory incentive structures do not
always ensure that polluters cooperate with the society to produce the desirable level of
environmental goods.
Figure 2.3 presents a simplified incentive structure for Mary after the IM program
regulation is introduced in the voluntary mechanism design of figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 uses
the same notation as figure 2.2, except that xp is added to represent the regulatory
punishment for a non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owner. In the case of the IM
program, xp means that the vehicle owner is not allowed to register his/her vehicle inside
the program boundaries if his/her vehicle emits higher emissions than the regulatory
standards and she fails the emissions test.
Now, if xp > xc, then outcomes in column 1 of figure 2.3 [(xB - xc1 – xp1), (xB - xcK –
xpK)] would reflect the Nash equilibrium and everybody will cooperate/contribute. On the
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Figure 2.3: A generalized decision tree representing the prisoners’ dilemma game for
provision of environmental goods under regulatory policy mechanisms
other hand, if xp < xc, then the outcomes in column 4 of figure 2.3 [(xp1), (xpK)] would
reflect the Nash equilibrium and every player’s dominant strategy will, as in the case of
voluntary mechanisms, still be not to cooperate/contribute. Figure 1.3 in chapter 1
presents the detailed decision tree faced by a vehicle owner in Atlanta after the
regulatory mechanism is introduced. This dissertation is focused on studying this
particular regulatory mechanism, as shown in figure 1.3, because there are
actions/strategies available to the high-emitting vehicle owners, which have xp < xc.
In the case of the Atlanta airshed, IM policy intervention is an example of a
“regulatory mechanism”. This mechanism is mandated under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments and has resulted in the institutional arrangements that include IM testing
stations, IM repair stations, special departments in governmental agencies such as EPA,
GA-DNR, and private contractors (such as Clean Air Force). The market institutions of
automobile manufacturers, automobile dealers (especially dealers of used cars) are also
affected by the IM policy intervention. Furthermore, the enforcement involves













































governmental institutions such as traffic police, county vehicle registration authorities,
and the state department of motor vehicles and safety (for a detailed list of affected
stakeholder institutions in California’s IM program please see (Bedsworth and
Kastenberg 2002)). While I am not able to present in this dissertation details about all
the institutions involved in Atlanta’s IM program, my focus remains on four issues: (1)
what is the high-emitting vehicle owners’ decision behavior (µr) given the incentive
structure of the regulatory mechanism (figures 1.3 and 2.3)? (2) what is the resulting
outcome in terms of pollution reduction due to the decision behaviors of high-emitting
vehicle owners? (3) from the perspective of the mechanism designer, are there other
values, such as fairness, that influence the outcomes due to the regulatory mechanism
of IM program? and (4) do fairness concerns also influence the cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors?
2.3: cooperative and non-cooperative decision behavioral research under the
contextual conditions of voluntary and regulatory policy mechanisms
Experimental and quasi-experimental studies have been conducted in the past to
estimate the probability of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors of decision
makers under various mechanisms, institutions and environments. Most of the
experimental research has been conducted under voluntary mechanism designs (section
2.3.1 and figure 2.2); however some studies have also been conducted under regulatory
(figure 2.3) and adaptive mechanism designs. Next, I review their major findings. During
the review, my focus is primarily on a discussion of the contextual conditions that have
been hypothesized by the (quasi-) experimentalists to increase or decrease the
probabilities of cooperation within each of the mechanism/governance designs.
2.3.1: Cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors under the contexts of
voluntary policy mechanisms:
Public goods games present one kind of voluntary experimental mechanism
designs to study cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors. During the late
1970s and 1980s, pioneering experimental work in this area was done by the sociologist
Gerald Marwell (Marwell 1982; Marwell and Ames 1979; 1980; 1981), the psychologist
Robyn Dawes (Dawes 1975; 1980; Dawes, McTavish et al. 1977; 1986), the political
scientist John Orbell (Orbell and Dawes 1981; 1991; 1993; 1990; Orbell, Schwartz-Shea
et al. 1984), and the economists Marc Isaac and James Walker (Isaac, McCue et al.
1985; 1988; Isaac and Walker 1988a; 1988b; Walker 1978; 1980; Walker, Gardner et al.
45
1990). Since the early 1990s, most of the experimental research has focused on
ascertaining the contextual conditions that affect the probability of cooperation. Following
is a common variant of the experimental game under controlled laboratory conditions
(Ledyard 1995: 113): “Four male undergraduates from a sociology course are brought to
a room and seated at a table. They are each given an endowment of $5. They are then
told that each can choose to invest some or all of their $5 in a group project. In
particular, each will simultaneously and without discussion put an amount between $0
and $5 in an envelope. The experimenter will collect the “contributions”, total them up,
double the amount, and then divide this money among the group. The private benefit
from the public goods, in this case, is one half the total contributions, which is what each
receives from the group project. No one, except the experimenter, knows others’
contributions, but all know the total. The procedure is implemented and the subjects are
paid. The data collected, beyond the description of experimental parameters, is simply
the amount contributed by each individual (my italics).”32
What will be the expected outcome of this experiment? The economists/game
theoreticians will predict that no one will ever contribute anything (i.e. the probability of
contribution/cooperation will be zero %) because the expected value of the non-
cooperative strategy dominates the cooperative strategy, no matter what other players
play. The individual self-interest is at odds with the group interest under this theory. On
the other hand, socioliogists/psychologists predict that each subject will contribute
something. They claim that altruism, social norms or group identification will lead each to
contribute $ 5, the group optimal outcome. According to this theory, there is no conflict
between individual and group interest.
The findings from major/pioneering experiments suggest that neither theory is
right. Generally, total contributions lie between $8 and $12, or 40% to 60% of the group
optimum. Dawes and Thaler (1988) state: “it is certainly true that there is a ‘free rider
problem’….On the other hand, the strong free rider prediction is clearly wrong.” Ledyard
ascribes these confounding results to the lack of control of specific experimental factors
in many studies. According to Ledyard (1995: 115), the generic experiment described
above is “neither particularly elegant nor carefully controlled. Even so, at least twelve
                                                 
32 The dependent variable in all of the public goods games is thus “the amount of contribution”,
which in other variants of prisoners’ dilemma games is assumed to equate with “the
amount/extent of cooperation”.
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major choices have been made in creating this design: (1) the number, (2) gender, and
(3) education of the subjects, (4) whether they are face to face or acting through
computer terminals or in isolated rooms, (5) how much endowment to give to each and
in what form (cash, tokens, promises,…), (6) whether discussion is allowed and in what
form, (7) whether contributions are private or public, (8) by how much to increase the
total contributions, (9) how to divide up the larger pie (for example, in proportion to
contribution or to number), (10) whether or when to announce the results, (11) whether
to pay subjects publicly or privately, and finally (12) whether to run the procedure once
or, say, 10 times. Each of these choices represents a potential treatment or control.
Each treatment has been shown by at least one experimenter to have a significant effect
on the rate of contribution.” In addition, there are some other intangible factors that are
difficult to control, which include the history and experience of the subjects, the beliefs
and risk attitudes of the subjects.
Six pioneering public goods experiments were reported by Bohm (1972), Dawes
et al. (1977), Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac and Walker (1984), Isaac et al. (1985) and
Kim and Walker (1984). All of them found that the rate of contributions in the initial
period ranged between 41% and 71% of the Pareto optimum/efficiency level. The
economists found that probability of contribution/cooperation significantly decreases with
repetition (Isaac, McCue et al. 1985; Isaac and Walker 1984; Kim and Walker 1984);
while sociologists/psychologists found the cooperation increases with communication
(Dawes, McTavish et al. 1977; Marwell and Ames 1979). Economists found that in the
last period contribution declined to a range of 8% and 19% under repetitive contextual
conditions; while sociologists/psychologists found that contribution rate increases up to a
range of 72% to 81% under communicative contextual conditions. Economists/game
theoreticians could not show experimental finding with 0% contribution rate; nor
sociologists/psychologists could show a finding with 100% contribution rate, which is the
group/Pareto optimum in these designs.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of experimental research under voluntary
mechanisms and shows 19 individual-level contextual conditions that controlled lab
experimentalists hypothesize to potentially affect the percentage of contributions as a
percentage of Pareto-optimum/efficient contribution levels. No single experiment has
simultaneously controlled for all of these contextual conditions, while some of them
remain untested to date. The interaction effects are also untested. I discuss the effect of
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contextual conditions on percentage contributions in the following order, as shown in
table 2.1: (i) strong effects that are replicable and experimentalists have (mostly)
consistent findings, (ii) weak effects that are relatively difficult to replicate and findings
are not very consistent, (iii) null/mixed effects that have either null effect or the effect
appears to be cancelled out by inconsistent findings, and (iv) the effects that are difficult
to control in experimental public goods games settings, and therefore not much is known
empirically about them. Authors who tested or hypothesized about each of these effects
are listed in the third column.33
Table 2.1: Individual level contextual conditions that affect the percentage of contributions









Studies that tested/identified the effect and their
findings: [+] means positive effect, [-] means
negative effect, and [0] means null effect.
I. Strong effects
Experience Negative/null Isaac et al. (1984)[-], Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993)[-/
0], Marwell and Ames (1980) [0], Isaac et al.
(1988)[0]
Repetition /iteration Negative Isaac et al. (1984, 1985, 1990)[-], Brookshire et al
(1989a) [-], Kim and Walker (1984) [-], Brown-Kruse
and Hummels (1992) [-], Banks et al (1988) [-], Sell
and Wilson (1990) [-], Andreoni (1988b) [-] , Isaac
et al (1990) [0], Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) [0],
Bagnoli and McKee (1991) [+], Isaac et al (1988) [-],
Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) [-]
MPCR (Marginal Per
Capita Return)
Positive Isaac et al. (1984)[+], Isaac and Walker (1988b)[+],
Kim and Walker (1984) [+], Brown-Kruse and
Hummels (1993) [+], Isaac et al (1985) [+],
Brookshire et al.(1989a), [+] Fischer et al. (1988)
[+], Palfry and rosenthal (1991a) [+],  Rapoport and
Suleiman (1993) [+], Palfry and Prisbrey (1993) [+],
Isaac et al (1990) [0]
Communication Positive Dawes et al. (1977) [+], Isaac et al (1985) [+], Isaac
and Walker (1988a, 1991) [+], Chamberlin (1978)
[0], Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991b) [0], Dawes et al
1987 [+], Orbell et al (1988, 1990) [+]
Economics training Negative Marwell and Ames (1981) [-], Isaac et al (1985) [-]
                                                 
33 Most of the economists showed contextual conditions that decrease the % contributions, while







Negative Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980) [0], Isaac et al
(1985) [-], Bagnoli and McKee (1991)[-], Brookshire
et al (1989a)[-], Fisher et al (1988)[-], Rapoport and
Suleiman (1993) [-]
Common knowledge Negative/null Isaac and Walker (1989) [0], Brookshire et al
(1989a) [-]
Thresholds Positive Marwell and Ames (1980)[0], Isaac et al (1984,
1988) [+], Dawes et al (1986)[+], Suleiman and
Rapoport (1992)[+], Palfry and Rosenthal (1991a)
[+/-], Rapoport and Suleiman (1993)[0],
Beliefs Positive Dawes et al 1977 [+], Orbell and Dawes 1991[+],
Rapoport and Suleiman 1993[+]
Friendship/Group
identification
Positive Dawes et al (1977) [+], Orbell et al (1988)[+],
Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1992) [+]
Rebates Positive Dawes et al (1986) [+], Isaac et al (1988) [+]
Unanimity Negative Banks et al (1988) [+/-]
3. Null/mixed effects
Number of players Zero/mixed Marwell and Ames (1979) [0], Chamberlin (1978)
[+], Bagnoli and McKee (1991) [+], Isaac et al.
(1988) [0], Isaac et al (1990) [-]
Gender Zero/mixed Dawes et al (1977)[women +], Mason et al
1991[women +], Isaac et al (1985) [0], Poppe and
Utens (1986) [0], Orbell et al (1992) [0], Brown-
kruse and Hummels (1992) [men +]
4. Unmeasured effects
Fairness, altruism positive Marwell and Ames (1979) [+]
Learning Unknown Not clearly tested.
Decision costs Unknown Dawes and Orbell (1982) [0]
Risk aversion Unknown Not clearly tested
Moral suasion Unknown Not clearly tested
I: Strong effects: Experience, repetition/iteration and economics training in subjects
strongly decreases percentage contributions. Higher Marginal Per Capita Return
(MCPR)34 and communication among subjects strongly increases percentage
contributions/cooperation.
If experience is measured by the yardstick of whether the subjects have
previously participated in similar experiments, then some studies find that more
experienced players/subjects contribute less, while other studies find that there is not
much significant difference between the contributions made by experienced and non-
experienced subjects. The data in Isaac et al. (1984) suggests that subjects who have
                                                 
34 Isaac and Walker (1984) define Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) as marginal rate of
substitution of the private good (zi) for the public good, y = ∑ck. MPCR = - (δui/ δy)/ δui/ δci), where
ui = p (z-ci) + a.y/N.
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previously been in a voluntary contribution experiment contribute less than those who
are first-timers but still more than zero. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993)’s data shows a
negative direction of contributions for more experienced players but the effect is not
statistically significant. Both Marwell and Ames (1980) and Isaac et al. (1988) controlled
for experience of subjects and found no significant effect.
Repetition/iteration in the same game/experiment set up with no threshold levels
causes the percentage of contributions to decrease significantly. This is confirmed by
Isaac et al. (1985; 1984; 1990), Brookshire et al (1989a), Kim and Walker (1984),
Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Banks et al (1988), Sell and Wilson (1990), and
Andreoni (1988b). However, Isaac et al (1990) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) found no
effect of repetition on percentage contributions in non-threshold environments. The
experiments with threshold environments report confounding effects of repetition:
Bagnoli and McKee (1991) report a positive effect, while Isaac et al. (1988) and
Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) report a negative effect on the percentage contributions.
Marginal benefit of the public good compared to the private good is called
“Marginal Per Capita Return”(MPCR), which is easily controllable in laboratory
experiments. Isaac et al. (1984) and Isaac and Walker (1988b) found that as MPCR is
increased, the percentage contributions also increase. Subjects therefore do appear to
respond to incentive structures in a consistent way according to these two pioneering
studies. The positive effect of increased MPCR has been confirmed by Kim and Walker
(1984) and Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) under symmetric pay-off environments
and Isaac et al. (1985), Brookshire et al. (1989a), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991a),
Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) under asymmetric pay-
offs. Isaac et al (1990) however report that increases in MPCR under large numbers of
subjects do not significantly increase the percentage contributions.
Dawes et al. (1977) showed that permission of relevant communication among
subjects increased contributions for public goods, which according to the hard-core
game theory should not matter at all. Uniquely dominant Nash strategies should not be
dependent upon whether subjects communicate or not and all forms of communication is
nothing but mere “cheap talk”, or at best “coordination-improving mechanisms”. The
experimental results however show categorically that communication improves
cooperation/contributions and confirm the earlier findings of Dawes et al. (1977). Isaac et
al. (1985) and Isaac and Walker (1991; 1988a) were not able to reject the positive effect
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of communication on increased contributions. Only Chamberlin (1978) and Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1991b) found no significant effect of communication on contributions. All the
studies conducted by sociologists/psychologists found a positive effect of communication
on contributions (Dawes, van de Kragt et al. 1987; 1990; Orbell, van de Kragt et al.
1988). The “cheap talk” theory of games stands discredited even in experiments
conducted by economists. On the other hand, sociologists/psychologists hypothesize
that communication improves cooperation because either “it provides an occasion for
(multilateral) promises or because it generates group identity – or possibly some
combination of those two hypotheses (Orbell et al. 1990: 619).” More research is needed
to test explanatory hypotheses for the positive effects of communication on cooperation.
Marwell and Ames (1981) raised the question: are economists the only free
riders? They found that contributions were significantly lower if and only if the subjects
were graduate students in economics at Wisconsin. Economics training thus appears to
reduce the percentage contributions. Isaac et al. (1985) compared economics
undergraduate students from Caltech with sociology undergraduate students from
Pasadena City college and found that, under iterative conditions, sociologists also tend
to free ride at an increased rate as do the economists. It is however not clear in both
studies how students in economics and sociology courses are totally randomly
distributed from other aspects of their personalities. Further, it is not clear how one can
exactly measure and define economics training and differentiate it from sociology.
II: Weak effects:
Marwell and Ames (1979; 1980) found no significant effect of heterogeneous
endowments and asymmetric outcomes on the percentage contributions of subjects. On
the other hand, Isaac et al. (1985) hypothesized and found that heterogeneous
endowments and asymmetric outcomes/preference functions cause percentage
contributions to decrease. The negative effect has been confirmed by Bagnoli and
McKee (1991), Brookshire et al. (1989a) and Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), but it is not
clear whether interaction of heterogeneity with other effects, such as common
information and repetition, decreases or increases the percentage contributions.
The effect of common information (about the incentive structures of a public
goods game) on percentage contributions is hypothesized to be negative; i.e. complete
information about other players’ payoff functions leads to higher contributions while
incomplete information causes a decrease in contributions. Isaac and Walker (1989)
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found no effect of common information on percentage contributions, while Brookshire et
al (1989a) found that contributions tend to be less under complete information than
under incomplete information environments. The interaction effects of information
structures with other effects, such as heterogeneous payoffs and threshold levels, is less
clear and not explicitly tested.
If a threshold level is set for the total contributions, then the hypothesis is that
generally the percentage of contributions increases but the rate of attaining the threshold
levels of contributions decreases. The experimental evidence is not so clear.  Marwell
and Ames (1980) report no effect of threshold levels on increased percentage of
contributions, but Isaac et al. (1988; 1984), Dawes et al. (1986), and Suleiman and
Rapoport (1992) report a positive effect of threshold levels on attaining more
contributions. In the case of heterogeneous environments and asymmetric payoffs,
Palfry and Rosenthal (1991a) find that setting up thresholds increases contributions in
some cases and decreases them in other cases, but Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) find
no effect.
  “Beliefs about the world” (hardly testable) potentially make subjects commit
mistakes in the game that results in higher contributions. It is difficult to design an
experiment for testing the beliefs of subjects. Some experimentalists have attempted to
model the effects of beliefs, such as beliefs about other players in the game (i.e. whether
a cooperative subject believes other players to be more cooperative) by asking
respondents survey questions (Dawes et al. 1977, Orbell and Dawes 1991, Rapoport
and Suleiman 1993). The survey data has been rejected/questioned by a majority of the
economists such as Ledyard (1995: 162), who states: “I would suggest that perhaps the
(survey) data on beliefs and risk attitudes are unreliable and that before one rejects
those [expected utility and altruistic] models one should try to find better ways to
measure what is needed.”  Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), on the other hand, rejected
both expected utility and altruistic models and argued that belief structures and risk
attitudes of subjects (as measured through the survey data) powerfully explain the
variation in percentage contributions.
Dawes et al. (1977) and Orbell et al. (1988) tested the hypothesis whether
friendship or some form of group identification has positive effect on the contributions.
Both studies found that friendship among subjects increases the rate of
cooperation/contributions. Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) compared community
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versus non-community groups and found a very small positive effect on the increased
contributions for the groups comprised of similar community subjects. The precise
measurement of friendship/group identification is still a hotly debated issue.
Rebates also increase the contributions (Dawes et al. 1986, Isaac et al. 1988).
The decision rule of group unanimity35 increases the contributions but there are so few
success periods (about 13%) that the gain in potential contributions is outweighed by the
failures (Banks et al 1988). More studies are needed however to establish the effect of
group unanimity on percentage contributions.
III: Null/mixed effects: The number of participating subjects (and group sizes) is easily
controllable in experiments. Theorists disagree whether increase in the numbers of
subjects (as well as group sizes) positively or negatively affects the percentage
contributions. Some argue that contributions decrease as subjects/group size increases
because non-cooperative behavior is difficult to detect and therefore self-interested
individuals will be less willing to contribute. On the other hand, other theorists
hypothesize that a large number of subjects/group sizes increases the percentage
contributions because the altruistic tendency of the subjects is reinforced in large
groups. Marwell and Ames (1979) found no effect on percentage contributions with an
increase in the number of subjects/group sizes, while Chamberlin (1978) and Bagnoli
and McKee (1991) found a negative effect on contributions as the subject pool
increased. The effect of the subject pool was more explicitly controlled and tested by
Isaac et al. (1988) and they found no significant effect. On the other hand, Isaac et al.
(1990) report a positive effect of large groups of subjects on percentage contributions,
especially when marginal benefit from public goods is relatively higher. The results are
confounding because it costs lots of money for experimentalists to pay extremely large
subject pools36 and no study has been attempted with more than 1000 subjects.  The
quasi-experimental study, attempted in this dissertation, involves samples as large as
500,000.
The effect of gender, which is easily controllable in lab experiments, on
percentage contributions has mixed evidence. Some studies (Dawes, McTavish et al.
1977; Mason, Phillips et al. 1991) found women to be initially more cooperative (but
                                                 
35 Group unanimity requires that even a single veto will result in abandoning the public project.
36 Some experimentalists have attempted to lie to the subject pools to indicate that they were in
large groups. I think this distorts the results.
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gender differences vanish in later iterations); while others (Isaac, McCue et al. 1985;
Orbell, Schwartz-Shea et al. 1992; Poppe and Utens 1986) found no difference between
men and women. Brown-kruse and Hummels (1993) also found no significant
differences between men and women in their total contributions but they found that men
contributed at higher rates than did women. The findings on gender effects are still
inconclusive.
IV: Effects with not much experimental data: If “fairness” is defined as “equal percentage
of contributions for each player”, then how do concerns for fairness affect the percentage
of contributions? Marwell and Ames (1979) suggest that concerns for fairness are
important mediating factors in investment decisions for public goods, when fairness is
defined as a question “what is fair percentage of contribution for each player?” Marwell
and Ames (1979) found that subjects less “concerned with fairness” (measured through
survey of experimental subjects) contributed less in public investments. This finding still
needs to be re-tested.
On the other hand, most of cooperative game theory defines fairness by asking
the question: what is the fair allocation of outcomes among the subjects if they decide to
cooperate (Aumann 1987)?” Not much experimental work has been done to study the
effect of fairness in the context of public goods games either from the perspective of fair
contributions and/or fair allocations, primarily because it is extremely difficult to measure
the “concerns for fairness” and it is ambiguous how to precisely define what is fairness
(Stone 1997).37
The effects of learning on percentage contributions are not well understood
because it is difficult to segregate them from history, experience, repetition and strategy
effects. From the perspective of game theory, players “learn” to become selfish Nash
players, while sociologists argue that players “learn” to become better altruistic group
                                                 
37 I test indirectly the effects of fairness on the odds of cooperation in this study. I use group-level
contextual variables to test the hypothesis whether cooperative and non-cooperative high-
emitting vehicle owners systematically come from different income-level and racial
neighborhoods/census block-groups. If the odds of cooperative vehicle owners coming from
systematically higher income-level white neighborhoods are high, then it can be inferred that
concerns for fairness improves the rate of contributions/repair costs. Conversely, if the odds of
non-cooperative vehicle owners coming from systematically lower income-level black
neighborhoods are high, then it can be inferred that concerns for unfairness decreases the rate of
contributions/repair costs.
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members. Both the theories have opposite predictions but no experiment clearly tests
the effects of learning, primarily because learning cannot be measured/segregated.
The effect of “decision costs” and “risk aversion levels” on the percentage
contributions are also under-researched areas and it is not clear how they affect the
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors. Decision costs occur due to
concerns raised by the theory of bounded rationality in the backdrop of computational
and informational complexity (Simon 1982). Dawes and Orbell (1982) found no
significant difference in the percentage contributions between two groups of subjects
who had 5 minutes and 24 hours respectively to think before taking a decision. It is
however possible that “precise optimization carries cognitive processing costs which are
traded off by subjects against rewards: the lower the rewards the more errors in
computation (Ledyard 1995: 167).” This hypothesis has not been directly tested in
experimental research.
Another hypothesis that remains untested concerns the effect of the subject’s risk
attitude on the percentage contributions.38 The problem in experimental economics
remains how experimentalist can measure the preference function of their subjects? This
measurement problem makes it difficult to model experiments controlling for risk averse,
risk neutral and risk-taking subjects.
The effect of moral suasion concerns the indirect/intangible effect of
experimentalist on the belief/value structures of subjects. An experimentalist, while
giving the directions for the experiment to the subjects, may hint at the optimal strategy
that may cause experiments conducted by economists to have lower contribution rates
while by sociologists to have higher contribution rates.39 Future research in experimental
economics is expected to test the effects of fairness, decision costs, risk aversion levels
and moral suasion on the percentage of contributions for public goods. Compared to the
voluntary mechanism designs, the study of cooperative and non-cooperative decision
behaviors under the contextual conditions of regulatory policy mechanisms is relatively
newer area of research that I discuss in the next section.
                                                 
38 I discuss the details of individuals’ decisions under risk and uncertain conditions in chapter 3.
39 I think the effect of moral suasion can be measured by a meta-analysis of the data collected in
experimental studies in different departments (economics, sociology, political science,
psychologists). Analysis of the set of directions is also important from this viewpoint.
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2.3.2: Cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors under the contexts of
regulatory policy mechanisms:
A growing number of the field studies evaluating the effectiveness of
environmental regulations have taken a close look at compliant and non-compliant
behaviors of individuals and organizations. It is relatively easier to evaluate the
compliant and non-compliant behaviors of organizations because they are “stationary”
(though the measurement of pollutants still poses a huge implementation problem). On
the other hand, evaluating compliant and non-compliant behaviors of individuals is
relatively difficult because they are “mobile/non-point” sources of pollution. Evaluation of
compliant and non-compliant vehicle owners is one example of mobile sources of
regulated pollution that is attempted in this study and I devote a considerable part of
chapter 4 to reviewing this particular aspect of decision behavior under regulatory
mechanisms.40 Agricultural farmers provide another example of mobile sources of
pollution because it is difficult to measure the effect of agricultural/nutrient runoffs from
individual farmers on the observable water pollutant levels.
Previous empirical studies that have evaluated the compliance and non-
compliance rates of organizations with the environmental regulations have two (not
exactly compatible) findings: The first group observes that firms only comply (and pollute
less) when environmental regulations exist and are strongly enforced. If pollution
abatements actions are voluntary or weakly enforced, firms keep on polluting (Gray and
Scholz 1993; Helland 1998; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Segerson and Miceli 1998). The
second group observes that regulatory enforcement is not a necessary condition for
obtaining compliance (and pollution below regulatory standards) by all firms. Some firms
“go beyond” regulatory minimums (Arora and Carson 1996; Prakash 2000) and “over-
comply” (DeHart Davis 2000), while others take action in the absence of specific
regulations or strong enforcement (Gunningham, Kagan et al. 2003; Haines 1997;
                                                 
40 I do not use the term compliant and non-compliant behaviors because of two overarching
reasons: First, some people can be compliant but non-cooperative (such as migrated fail group of
vehicle owners) as well as non-compliant but cooperative (such as a high-emitter who actually
repairs the vehicle as per IM rules but still always fails the emissions test) according to the
definitions of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior presented in sections 1.3 and 1.4.
Second, there are linguistic effects. I hope that the use of cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviors will reflexively lead to a positive image of the polluters and not just a negative image
implied in the name compliant and non-compliant behaviors. Nevertheless, broadly speaking,
cooperative and compliant may be treated as synonyms except for some extreme caveats
mentioned above.
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Harrison 1999; King and Lenox 2000; Welch, Mazur et al. 2000).  May (2003)
hypothesizes that there are three underlying motivations for regulatory over-compliance
by the firms: (1) the deterrent fear associated with being found in violation of regulatory
requirements, (2) a sense of civic duty, and (3) a social motivation that arises from peer
and other social pressures. Prakash (2000) argues that reputation effects are among the
strongest motivations for over-compliance.
The polluters contributing mobile sources of pollution, including high-emitting
vehicle owners, may not have to worry about reputation effects as much as the firms
need to. The deterrence fear, sense of civic duty and social motivation may have a
stronger effect in the case of cooperative vehicle owners. But then it is not clear why
non-cooperative vehicle owners will have low deterrence fear, sense of civic duty and
social motivation. These questions are interesting future qualitative research questions
but beyond the scope of this dissertation.
2.4: adaptive environmental policy mechanisms
I am introducing the concept of “adaptive mechanisms”, which is actually based
in the theoretical frameworks of “adaptive management” and “adaptive games”. The
adaptive management framework is understood as based on an experimental attitude
toward environmental valuation and decision-making (Norton and Toman 1997).
Adaptive management theorists propose that policy-makers often have to act under
uncertainty, so policies should be designed as probes of the system, capable of reducing
uncertainty for the future through social learning (Gundersen 1995; Gunderson and
Holling 2002; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Holling 1978; Holling 1992; Lee 1993;
Norton and Steinemann 2001; Walters 1986). The theorists of “adaptive games” also
emphasize the concept of learning by players (Broseta 2000).
Learning can work both ways: if a high-emitting vehicle owner learns how best to
cheat the regulatory mechanism, then learning may have over-all negative
repercussions at the societal level. On the other hand, if a mechanism designer learns
that the existing mechanisms result in outcomes that are not collectively desirable, then
perhaps new mechanisms can be “adaptively” instituted through policy changes that
help attain the outcomes that are socially desirable. Norton (in press) elaborates in detail
how policies can be adapted -- even in the face of uncertainty -- given the social and
scientific learning that is constantly undertaken in human societies.
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Adaptive mechanisms focus on real world situations. Reality is perceived at
multiple spatio-temporal scales. The contextual conditions that effect the cooperative
and non-cooperative decisions occur at multiple ecological scales. Further the contexts
are nested within multiple ecological scales. An individual-scale context may affect as
much the individual’s decision behaviors as the group-scale contexts. Group-scale
context may be measured/observed at various hierarchical spatio-temporal boundaries,
such as residents of north Atlanta may differ from south of Atlanta, residents of Georgia
may differ from the residents of Washington, residents of the USA may differ from the
residents of India, and so on. Perception of the same individual from one ecological
scale to another scale, and one context to another context, makes the contextual
conditions nested within each other and dynamic in character. The multiple-scaled
contextual differences, in my view, have a significant affect on the decision behaviors of
individuals under uncertain and risky situations.
It will be a very difficult study to evaluate the decision behaviors under all the
hypothesized multi-scaled contextual conditions. In this study, for the purposes of simple
demonstration, I use two scales of contextual parameters to test the differences between
cooperative and non-cooperative decision makers in the Atlanta region between 1997
and 2001 (See chapter 5 for more details on the research design). In chapter 4, I present
contextual details of the regulatory mechanism in the Atlanta airshed that aims at
reducing vehicular emissions from high-emitting vehicles by requiring their owners to
carry out periodic testing and maintenance of the emission control systems on their
vehicles. Analysis of individual- and group-scaled contextual conditions, and their effect
on cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors, is an important analytical tool of
adaptive environmental policy mechanisms.
However, before I focus on contextual details of Atlanta airshed, it is important to
review the MCDM literature in normative and descriptive decision theories that relaxes
the assumption of commensurable values. This is because in real world “adaptive”
decision making situations decision makers use multiple non-commensurable values to
evaluate alternate courses of actions and states of the world and use these evaluations
to make their decisions. The case of outcomes measured on multiple non-
commensurable values is presented in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY ENTAILING MULTI-VALUED OUTCOMES:
TOWARDS META-DECISION MODELS FOR DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY MECHANISMS
3.1: The expected value hypothesis and outcomes measured through multiple
values: defining meta-decision problems
Multi-criteria decision making models (MCDM) present one methodology to
characterize multiple values, such as efficiency and fairness, in evaluating public policy
outcomes on multi-dimensional value scales. MCDM is a normative decision theory.  At
the same time, public policy evaluations are also concerned about knowing which values
do actual decision makers take into account to measure the outcomes of their actions.
This is known as the “ontological” research question of descriptive decision theorists. In
real world policy problems, however, we cannot separate normative from descriptive
decisions.
Decision theory is mostly classified in two categories: descriptive and normative
(Cleveland 1973; Corner, Buchanan et al. 2001; Gal, Stewart et al. 1999; Hwang and
Yoon 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1968; Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980; Winterfeldt
and Edwards 1986; Zeleny 1982). These classifications are based on Hume’s thesis that
descriptive facts are separate from normative values (Hume 1777/1955). Most decision
theorists share the ontological commitment that they can potentially discover an
optimizing decision algorithm that can either describe how people make decisions, or
prescribe how people should make decisions. Due to this ontological commitment, they
have created many descriptive and normative decision algorithms. I contend, however,
that description and prescription are two facets of the same decision process (Norton in
preparation) and that (1) each descriptive decision algorithm, in order to formally and
precisely describe the decision behavior, and (2) each “normative” decision algorithm –
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in order to arrive at a final “correct” recommendation -- makes a priori methodological
assumptions for deciding the following four meta-decision problems:
(i) Which values are/should be included in the criteria set of evaluation to
measure the outcomes of our actions? Is the value set compact and closed or is it non-
compact and open? Do human societies only care for the values of cost-effectiveness,
fairness, efficiency, social justice and environmental preservation in evaluation of any
environmental policy decision; or there are/should be some additional values such as
eco-system health, animal welfare that are/should also (be) included in the evaluation
process. Concisely, what is the logic of a meta-choice that a value is/should be included
in the criteria set of evaluation? In the rest of the dissertation, I refer to value ambiguity
as a meta-decision problem of the criteria set. (ii) What is the logic of the meta-decision
by which an alternative is included in the set of policy alternatives? This is referred to as
the meta-decision problem of the alternative set. (iii) Given the multiplicity of decision
models and algorithms, we are confronted with the problem of how to choose which
descriptive or normative decision rule/algorithm to apply in a given situation. I call this a
meta-decision problem for determining the decision rule set. (iv) How shall the weights
be assigned to the pluralistic values on the basis of which we judge actions/decisions? I
call this the meta-decision problem of weighting methodology.
Next, I present the formal version of each of the four meta-decision problems of
choosing the criteria set, alternative set, method set and weighting methodology and
then analyzing the assumptions made about these four meta-decision problems in
descriptive and normative decision theories.
I define A ≠  ∅ as a non-empty set of alternative paths (also called policies,
actions, strategies or feasible solutions) of a decision problem.41 Further I define a multi-
criteria outcome function f as follows:
(3.1): f : A → Rx
 Each function fk : A → R  with fk (a) = zk (k ∈ {1,…,x}, a ∈ A) and f (a) = (z1,…,zx)
is defined as a multiple value function. In the most general sense, ϕ = (A, f) is defined as
a multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem.
                                                 
41 The set of alternatives is always non-empty because the alternative of “no action” is always an
alternative in any decision problem. Further, alternative paths include both the actions and
events/states of the world, as defined in section 1.2.
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(i) The first meta-decision problem concerns whether the set of alternative paths
A is a finite set (as defined by Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) theorists) or is
it infinite (as defined by Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM) theorists) or is it
fuzzy (as defined by Fuzzy set theorists). Further, what meta-criteria should be used to
include or exclude an alternative path from A?
(ii) The second meta-decision problem concerns the decision as to which
value/criteria zk (k ∈ {1,…,x}) shall be included in the multiple value function of equation
3.1. Restricting the value set z to 1 element concatenates the MCDM problem to a scalar
problem.42 In the case of x ≥ 2, we have a multiple-value decision problem. The meta-
decision problem remains: which values shall be included in the evaluation function f to
determine the desirability of actions faced by decision makers?
(iii) The third meta-decision problem concerns which weighting methodology shall
be used to weigh the x ≥ 2 values. Should the value trade-offs be set up as a zero-sum
game with ∑h=1x wh .zh = 1 or a positive-sum game with ∑h=1x wh .zh > 1? Furthermore,
which methodology should be used to ascertain the values of the weights wh for the
criteria zh (where h = 1,…,x) ? (iv) The fourth meta-decision problem concerns which
decision rule (decision algorithm, decision method) shall be used to solve the decision
problem ϕ = (A, f).
Both descriptive and normative decision theories face the aforementioned four
meta-decision problems. The expected value/expected utility hypotheses, introduced in
section 1.2, assume a priori answers to the four meta-decision problems when decision-
makers measure outcomes on multiple value dimensions. In section 3.2, I briefly review
the state of expected value/expected utility hypotheses in the light of meta-decision
problems confronted in descriptive decision theory. Section 3.3 presents the state of
EV/EU hypotheses in the light of meta-decision problems in normative decision theory.
In section 3.4, I introduce the concept of Meta-Decision Models (MDMs) that are used to
evaluate the impacts/outcomes of environmental policy decisions on multiple value
dimensions.  The MDMs operate interactively and simultaneously at two levels: At the
level of action, multiple valued outcomes of our real world decisions are measured and
                                                 
42 As discussed in chapter 2, the cost-benefit function concatenates any decision problem with
multiple valued outcomes to a single valued outcome. All the values are thus represented by
monetary units, which are commensurable scalar quantities.
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evaluated. The policy designer aims to describe the current state of outcomes that
ensue from our decisions. At the level of reflection, the policy designer undertakes a
normative analysis to determine where we are (in terms of multiple valued outcomes
measured as a function of decision behaviors at the level of action) and where we want
to be (measured in terms of multiple valued outcomes desired at the spatio-temporal
horizon of an environmental policy decision problem). The concept of adaptive
environmental policy mechanisms (elaborated in section 2.4) is also revisited in the light
of meta-decision models. Hwang and Yoon (1981) present description of 12 decision
rules that are more often discussed in normative decision theory to solve decision
problems that involves measurement of outcomes on multiple value dimensions43.
3.2: The expected value hypothesis and descriptive decision theory
Camerer (1995) provides an excellent review of experimental research that has
been conducted in the area of descriptive decision theory. In particular, he elaborates
seven decision theories that systematically differ in their description of human decision-
making processes under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Especially, the shape, form
and informational requirements of decision makers’ utility/value functions systematically
differ among the seven descriptive theories. Table 3.1 lists each of the seven decision
theories and presents their respective hypotheses about the functional form of decision
makers’ utility/value functions that are proposed to describe the decision making process
of individuals for measuring the expected value of different decision alternatives under
uncertain and risky states of the world. Note that all of these seven theories are based
on probabilistic accounts of measuring the expected utility/value. Zadeh’s fuzzy decision
theory is based on possibilistic or modal logic, which I briefly discuss after elaborating
table 3.1.44
Equation no. 3.2 in table 3.1, which shows continuous and concrete functional
forms of expected utility hypothesis, is discussed in section 1.2 of the dissertation. The
first major challenge to EV/EU hypotheses came at a symposium in Paris in 1952, where
Maurice Allais presented an initial version of the so-called “Allais paradox” (Allais 1953;
                                                 
43 Hanne (2001) suggests that there are about 135 decision rules/algorithms in MCDM normative
decision theory. Discussing each of them would require another dissertation.
44 An interesting meta-decision problem concerns whether probability theory and fuzzy/modal
logic are complementary or competitive. Zadeh (1995) argues that they are complementary, while
Laviolette et al. (1995) argue that they are competitive. This is an interesting area of research in
meta-decision theory, but beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Allais 1979). One of the most famous Allais examples illustrates a “common
consequence effect” that is a consequence of EV/EU hypotheses. Subjects choose
between A1 and A2, where A1 = 1 million francs and A2 = 0.1 probability of 5 million
francs, 0.89 probability of 1 million francs, and 0.01 chance of 0 francs45. Subjects also
choose between B1 = 0.11 probability of 1 million francs, and 0.89 probability of 0 francs;
and B2 = 0.1 probability of 5 million francs, and 0.9 probability of 0 francs46. The EU
hypothesis of equation 3.2 predicts that if (risk-averse) subjects prefer A1 over A2, then
they should also prefer B1 over B2; and if they (risk-takers) prefer A2 over A1, then they
should also prefer B2 over B1. This is the “common consequence effect” of EV/EU
hypotheses in equations 1.3, 1.4 and 3.2. Allais hypothesized that subjects’ preferences
over uncertain/risky choices were not consistent, as assumed by EV/EU hypotheses and
predicted by common consequence effects. Actually the most frequent choice pattern of
subjects in experiments – A1>A2 and B2>B1- violates the consistency requirements of
EV/EU hypotheses, which is Allais paradox.
Table 3.1: Predictions of 7 descriptive decision theories about the functional form of





Continuous, U* (F(x)) Discrete, U* (∑pixi)
Expected utility 3.2 ∫ u(x)dF(x) ∑piu(xi)
Weighted utility 3.3 [∫ u(x)w(x)dF(x)]/[ ∫w(x)dF(x)] [∑piw(xi)u(xi)]/[∑piw(xi)]
Implicit
expected utility










3.6 ∫ u(x, cF)dF(x)





3.7 Not applicable π(px)v(x) + π(py)v(y)
if px + py < 1 or x < 0< y; and
(1- π(py))v(x) + π(py)v(y)




3.8 ∫ u(x)d[g(F(x))] ∑i=1n u(xi)[g(∑j=1i pj)- g(∑j=1i-1 pj)
                                                 
45 EV(A1) = 1 is sure bet, while  EV (A2) = 0.1x5 + 0.89x1 + .01x0 = 1.39 is a risky bet; but note
that EV (A2) > EV (A1), which means that EV hypothesis will predict that a (risk-taking) rational
agent should choose A2.
46 E(B1) = 0.11, while E (B2) = 0.5. Note that E (B2) > E (B1).
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The Allais paradox was replicated by other researchers in experimental settings.
MacCrimmon (1965) reported about 40% EV/EU violations. Morrison (1967) reported
about 30% violations, while Slovic and Tversky (1974) found 60% violations. Slovic and
Tversky (1974) even presented written arguments to the experimental subjects that
listed pros and cons of EV/EU. After reading both arguments, slightly more subjects
switched their choices to become more inconsistent with EU than becoming consistent!47
A second serious challenge to EV/EU hypotheses was posed by psychologists,
which are known in the literature as “process violations”. In many experiments, subjects
appear to use decision making procedures or processes that are much simpler than
EV/EU. For instance, in one study the value of gambles was better predicted by an
additive combination of probability and outcomes than by their products48 (Slovic and
Lichtenstein 1968). Tversky (1969) showed that subjects chose intransitive outcomes,
and this finding has been recently reconfirmed by Loomes et al. (1991). Payne (1976)
found that subjects even did not seek information about all the alternatives before
making their decisions, which suggests that the descriptive process of decision-making
among subjects is not the one suggested by EV/EU hypotheses.
Thirdly, many researchers have discovered systematic biases in elicitation of
utility functions. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) found that substantially more subjects
preferred a loss of $10 to a gamble of losing $1000 with a probability of 1% when it was
called an insurance premium than when it was unlabeled. Hershey and Schoemaker
(1985) also found that utility functions elicited using probability and certainty equivalents
were systematically different, violating the assumption that utility is invariant to the
procedure used to elicit it.
 As researchers began to question the empirical validity of the EV/EU
hypotheses, others have proposed many alternative descriptive decision theories. Table
3.1 shows six of them, each of which, in a sense, is a broader generalization of EV/EU
hypotheses, relaxing one or the other foundational axioms of EV/EU theory. The
problem is that some of these alternative descriptive decision theories are not as easily
testable as EV/EU theory is.
                                                 
47 MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) review in detail the experimental tests conducted to check
the emergence of Allais paradoxes under different parametric choices of outcomes/lotteries and
found Allais paradox to be robust.
48 EV/EU hypotheses assume that subjects multiply probabilities with their outcomes.
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Equation 3.3 in table 3.1 shows weighted utility theory proposed by Chew (1983).
This theory relaxes the axiom of independence of EV/EU theory and proposed a “weak
independence” axiom.49  Note that the weighted utility theory proposes that the utility of a
gamble/alternative is a normalized linear function of the expected probabilities and
weights of the utility functions over specific outcomes.
Dekel (1986) proposed “implicit Expected Utility” [equation 3.4 in table 3.1], which
also depends upon a weakened form of the independence axiom called
“betweenness”.50 The utility function u(xi, U*) in equation 3.4 denotes the utility of an
outcome xi, but the utility function used to evaluate xi depends upon an implicit utility
function U*. Note that “implicit expected utility” also proposes linear preference functions,
though they need not be parallel as EV/EU and weighted utility theory has assumed.
Machina (1982) proposed a fanning out hypothesis (equation 3.5 in table 3.1)
that suggests that people are more risk averse towards gambles that are better in the
sense of stochastic dominance. Beckar and Sarin (1987) proposed lottery dependent
utility theory (equation 3.6 in table 3.1) which suggests that the utility functions are
exponential in form. Indifference curves fan out in the exponential form and lottery
dependent preferences are quasi-convex if h(x) is concave. Quiggin (1982) and Segal
(1989) proposed rank-dependent utility theory (equation 3.8 in table 3.1). This theory
suggests that cumulative probabilities are weighted functions, and the utilities of
outcomes are weighted by the differential in the weighted cumulative probability. The
weight of an outcome depends on its probability and its rank order in the set of possible
outcomes. Note that if g(p) = p in equation 3.8, the bracketed expression reduces to pi,
and equation 3.8 reduces to EU hypothesis of equation 3.2.
The most generalized hypothesis about the form of utility functions is presented
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory (equation 3.7 in table 3.1).
This theory suggests that indifference curves may vary with the choice of the reference
point. The shape of the utility functions depends on π (p), which is suggested to be a
non-linear function in the extreme outcomes and more linear in mixed/non-extreme
                                                 
49 The weak independence axiom states that if a decision maker prefers the outcome xi over xj
(i.e. xi > xj), then for all p in [0,1] there exists a unique q in [0,1] such that decision-maker should
choose p(xi) + (1-p)xk > q (xj) + (1-q) xk for all xk.
50 The axiom of “betweenness” states that if a decision maker chooses xi > xj, then s/he should
also choose p.xi+ (I-p)xj > xj for all p in [0,1]. Betweenness implies neutrality toward randomization
among equally good outcomes.
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outcomes. Kahnemann and Tversky’s prospect theory thus suggests that respondents
act as expected utility maximizers in non-extreme outcomes, but the violations of EU/EV
become strong as extreme outcomes are presented to the respondents.51
A review of seven descriptive decision theories, as summarized in table 3.1,
suggests that most of the furor in descriptive decision theory centers around finding a
correct functional form and arguments of the utility functions of decision makers. From a
meta-decision theoretical perspective, I propose that the assumption of fixed and given
preference functions should be abandoned. Preference functions are spontaneously
constructed (Slovic 1995), reversible (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) and context-
dependent and dynamic (Norton, Costanza et al. 1998; Norton 1991; 1994).
Zadeh’s (1965; 1968; 1973; 1995) fuzzy decision theory is specifically designed
to be context-dependent. Fuzzy set theory is based on the assumption that probability
theory is not sufficient by itself for dealing with uncertainty and imprecision that we
observe in real world decision making contexts. Zadeh (1986; 1995) provides the
following limitations of probability theory (which has been a cornerstone of all the other
seven descriptive decision theories reviewed above): (1) Probability theory does not
support the concept of a fuzzy event.52 (2) Probability theory offers no techniques for
dealing with fuzzy quantifiers like many, most, several, few. (3) Probability theory does
not provide a system for computing with fuzzy probabilities expressed as likely, unlikely,
not very likely, and so forth. (4) Probability theory does not provide methods for
estimating fuzzy probabilities. (5) Probability theory is not sufficiently expressive as a
meaning representation language. (6) The limited expressive power of probability theory
makes it difficult to analyze problems in which the data are described in fuzzy terms.
Zadeh (1995: 274) categorically states that “classical probability theory has definite
limitations – limitations that stem for the most part from an avoidance of issues and
problems in which fuzziness lies at the center rather than on the periphery. What has to
be recognized is that in real-world settings such issues and problems are the rule rather
than the exception.”
                                                 
51 Extensions of prospect theory for multiple criteria outcomes are presented by Tversky and
Kahnemann (1992), which they call as “cumulative prospect theory”.
52 Following are, for example, propositions containing fuzzy events: tomorrow will be a warm day;
there will be a strong earthquake in the near future; the prices will stabilize in the long run; if it
rains heavy tomorrow, my car will pass the emissions test.
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On the other hand, Zadeh (1995: 275) claims that fuzzy logic offers “an effective
methodology for exploiting the tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty, and partial truth to
achieve tractability, robustness, and low solution cost. The key concept in this
methodology is that of a linguistic variable – that is, a variable whose values are words
rather than numbers (Zadeh 1973). The concept of a linguistic variable is the point of
departure for the development of the calculus of fuzzy if-then rules.” Recently, fuzzy
decision theory has gained wider popularity among decision theorists. From a meta-
decision theoretical perspective, however, fuzzy theory is also built on certain
foundational assumptions that leave unanswered some of the meta-decision problems
raised earlier in this chapter.  Fuzzy decision theory, for example, allows the
measurement of outcomes in terms of fuzzy quantifiers, but it does not answer
“quantifiers of what values/nouns”.
The meta-decision question of which values should be used to measure the
outcome functions remains an elusive question both for the fuzzy as well as probabilistic
descriptive decision theorists. Most of the probabilistic descriptive decision theorists
have actually used very degenerate versions of lotteries (i.e. outcomes are strictly
measured in monetary terms of costs and benefits). The values that cannot be
monetized result in distorting reduction of the underlying non-linear utility functions into
simple linear utility functions. Even the apparently non-linear utility functions have to
resolve to some underlying weighting mechanism to convert the incommensurate values
into common value measure, before it can be hypothesized that the utility function is
non-linear as a function of that pre-weighted common value measure. Section 3.3
reviews meta-decision problems in normative decision theories.
3.3: The expected value hypothesis and normative decision theory
Hwang and Yoon (1981) describe twelve most widely applied normative MCDM
decision algorithms, many of which employ different methodologies to define A, z, wq
and the decision rule. All of the 12 decision algorithms assume exogenous determination
of value and alternative sets that are mostly based on the preferences of the decision
makers. But preferences of the decision makers are intransitive, inconsistent,
spontaneous, context-sensitive and dynamic, as I have shown through the review of
descriptive decision theory in section 3.2. The exogenous determination of alternative
and value sets is a vital limitation of normative decision algorithms. Next I discuss each
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decision algorithm’s methodology of determining the weights wq and their respective
decision rule to determine the solutions, i.e. assigning rankings (i.e. strict or partial order)
over the set of alternative paths A.
The dominant decision algorithm requires the determination of dominant and
non-dominant alternative paths, which in fact is a subjective preference method to
assign weights to multiple decision criteria. The decision rule is to choose a subset of
non-dominated alternatives from the set of A. Due to non-transitive group preferences; it
sometimes happens that this decision algorithm finds neither entirely dominated nor non-
dominated alternatives.  Neither the maximin nor maximax decision algorithms can be
applied unless the multiple decision criteria have commensurate units of value, which is
rarely the case in complex environmental decision problems.
There are methodologies that convert the incommensurate units of value into
commensurate units by establishing the relative ratios, which in itself pre-supposes a
methodology to assign weights to multiple criteria, since more than one denominator can
potentially be chosen to estimate the relative ratios. Both conjunctive and disjunctive
decision algorithms require determination of minimum satisfactory cut-points for each of
the policy alternatives. Alternatives that meet these minimum satisfactory requirements
of multiple decision criteria are called “satisficing” alternatives in the previous literature
(Simon 1960; Simon 1977; Simon 1982). Conjunctive and disjunctive methods are useful
in limited situations where satisficing alternatives are determinable. However, in complex
decision problems, it is not easy to determine the satisfactory cut-points. If the cut-points
are set too high, the algorithm would not choose any satisficing alternative, or if the cut-
points are set too low, the algorithm would end up choosing all the alternatives as
satisficing.
Choosing cut-points is thus like determining the weights to be assigned to the
multiple decision criteria in conjunctive and disjunctive decision algorithms. Both
lexicographic and elimination-by-aspect decision algorithms assume a priori that
decision makers can arbitrarily assign weights to the multiple decision criteria by rank
ordering them from the most important to the least important. This rank ordering is,
however, not easy to establish in complex situations because some stakeholders may
emphasize efficiency criteria and attach zero weight to fairness, or vice versa. Further, it
is precisely this a priori allocation of weights that I perceive to be the root cause of
present confusion in environmental policy decision problems. In the case of simple
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additive weighting and weighted product decision algorithms, in which both decision
algorithms assume that the weights are assigned exogenously, the issue of weights is
left to the whim of the decision maker.
Furthermore, the decision algorithm of TOPSIS requires exogenous
determination of positive and negative ideal values. So, in the process of assigning
positive and negative ideal values, one decision maker may choose an alternative i as
an optimal solution because i is closest to the set of her positive ideal values and
farthest from the set of her negative ideal values [in terms of Euclidean space]. A
conflicting decision maker, on the other hand, may reject the same alternative i as an
optimal solution because i is farthest from his set of positive ideal values and closest to
his set of negative ideal values. The important issue in applying TOPSIS to collective
environmental decision making problems is that the assignment of positive or negative
ideal values cannot camouflage the assumption that these ideal values are actually
euphemisms for assigning a priori weights to the multiple decision criteria.
The decision algorithm of ELECTRE, though highly sophisticated in other
respects, also requires the exogenous determination of weights for multiple decision
criteria. The ELECTRE method has another serious problem: that of confronting the
empty Kernel, which is a situation in which none of the alternatives can outrank all of the
other alternatives. Finally, the decision algorithm of analytical hierarchical process (AHP)
explicitly recognizes the need to identify weights for the multiple decision criteria, and
provides a useful technique: a 9-point intensity scale that compares the incommensurate
multiple decision criteria. This method would, however, require the determination of one
over-arching focus or objective of the decision maker, while I have argued that, in the
case of complex environmental management decisions, one objective cannot be
maximized because each objective competes with other worthy objectives. Assuming
that the decision maker has found one over-arching objective, then AHP requires the
determination of weights for the multiple-decision criteria through pair-wise binary
comparisons among all possible permutations of criteria for each of the alternatives.
The analysis of the 7 descriptive and 12 normative decision algorithms shows
that the assumption that it is possible to find algorithmic solutions has blocked most
MCDM researchers from addressing truly complex environmental policy decision
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problems because the real problem of meta-decisions is assumed to be taken care of
through means that are exogenous to their models. This theoretical block, in my view, is
pervasive in decision theory because the methodological assumptions for deciding about
meta-decisions have not been critically analyzed. The emphasis has rather been on
finding an algorithm that provides the best and most optimal decision. Complex
environmental policy problems, as I explained before, cannot by definition have singular,
optimized solutions because exogenous decisions on meta-choices foreclose the real
issues and reduce the decision problem to mere application of pre-defined algorithmic
decision rules, while in actual policy contexts, these meta-choices make a real difference
in each stage of evaluating the decisions.
Dutta (1996) provides a survey of recent efforts by decision theorists to integrate
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and optimization (OPT) models for programming the meta-
decisions and finding a meta-decision algorithm. Dutta (1996: 224-6) concludes that
integration of AI and optimization models is still facing a paradigmatic crisis due to the
following unresolved issues: (a) Aritificial intelligence representations, such as rule
bases and frames often use list structures that are very different from the arrays and
matrices used by optimization models. The consequence is that programming languages
for optimization models are fundamentally incompatible to AI languages. (b) A second
barrier to AI/OPT integration is the sheer complexity of information that may need to be
exchanged for seamless integration.   Dutta (1996), however, remains optimistic that
integration of AI and optimization models will occur once we overcome these barriers.
Hanne (2001) is an excellent resource for understanding the meta-decision
problem in MCDM, though he binds the meta-decision problem to just the choice of a
suitable MCDM methodology. Hanne (2001: 25-31) reviews the following four
approaches in previous MCDM literature that have been used to resolve the meta-
decision problem of method selection for a decision problem: (a) the suitability of a
decision model for a type of decision problem; (b) meta-criteria based on solution
concepts; (c) meta-criteria oriented towards implementation of the proposed solution to
decision problems; and (d) meta-criteria based on the specific decision situation. Hanne
(2001) treats the meta-decision problem as a problem of method design: First, he shows
that the MCDM decision algorithms are basically parameter optimization problems, and
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these decision algorithms are not capable of making meta-choices. Second, he shows
that all of the MCDM decision algorithms share the ontological commitment of finding
efficient solutions and maintaining partial order in formal mathematical and logical terms.
Third, he proposes that meta-decision problems are solvable by constructing new
methodological designs for MCDM problems, such as neural networks and evolutionary
learning algorithms, which can act as meta-algorithms that can find optimal solutions
through constantly updating the parameter values of the selected MCDM methods. The
updating of parametric values is carried out by the learning mechanisms incorporated in
the meta-algorithms such as neural networks and evolutionary models.
This brief survey shows that MCDM researchers still cherish the hope of finding a
meta-decision algorithm that will find optimal solutions to multiple criteria decision
problems. My contention is that MCDM researchers will not be able to resolve the
complex decision problems, especially the meta-decision problems, unless they give up
the ontological commitment of finding singularly best and optimal solutions through
decision algorithms. Furthermore, MCDM researchers should also accept that decisions
-- both descriptive and prescriptive -- are part of larger continuous decision processes,
which are riddled with uncertainty and ignorance. In section 4.1, I show that air quality
management decision problems, involving potential emission reductions from high-
emitting vehicles, are complex in nature and require extremely difficult decisions on
meta-choices, such as choices of A, z, w and the decision rule.
A review of normative (section 3.3) and descriptive (section 3.2) decision theories
opens up a Pandora’s box of unanswered questions; especially the meta-decision
problems raised in section 3.1 appear to remain unanswered. At the same time, it is only
at the meta-decision level that both descriptive and normative decision theories can be
reconciled and real world decisions can be researched. At one level, the researchers
can aim to describe the real world decision behaviors in specific contexts; while at the
other level, the researchers can undertake normative analysis to see which values are
used to set up the context of our decisions. In the next section 3.4, I show from a meta-
decision theoretical perspective that decision making in environmental policy is
confronted with the question: which values are/should be chosen to measure the impact
of the decision behavior of individual agents on the outcomes of policy actions?
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3.4: The logic and methodology of meta-decision models in environmental policy
In a Meta-Decision Model (MDM), environmental policy decisions are modeled at
two interactive levels: At the level of action, descriptive analysis is undertaken to
ascertain the current state of the world, such as existing policies, and the outcomes
ensuing from current policies/decisions. At the meta-level of reflection, normative
analysis is employed to determine the socially desirable values by which outcomes of
(current and future) policy actions are measured.
MDMs explicitly aim to resolve meta-decision problems. In section 3.1, I have
defined four critical meta-decision problems that are shared by 7 descriptive and 12
normative decision algorithms: choice of value/criteria set, choice of alternative set,
choice of weights for the values and choice of the decision rule. The meta-decision
models do not treat the meta-decision problems as exogenous to the policy evaluation
system; rather these choices are treated as endogenous to the policy system. Both
decision analysts and decision makers cannot move further in their analysis without
making meta-choices. Instead of hiding these choices in the mystical shrouds of
programming languages employed in decision algorithms, MDMs aim at focusing on
meta-choice decision problems.
The focus on meta-decision problems however comes at an extreme cost: The
decision scientists will perhaps, at least in the short run, not be able to construct a
universal and non-regressive meta-decision algorithm. The cost is that decision sciences
will have to do away with the notion of programming every unprogrammed decision, or in
other words, the price is the abandonment of the decision algorithmic approach. The
proposed meta-decision models are thus not written in the logical terms of syntactical
and semantical rules. The meta-choice decision problems, by their very definition, are
concerned with the choice of a syntactical and semantic system for environmental
evaluation that is sensitive to the context in question and to appropriate space-time
horizons. The meta-choices have to be written and communicated in ordinary language,
which is not as determinate as syntactic and semantic systems; rather the pragmatics of
language play a very dominant role in the construction and understanding of meaningful
statements in environmental policy discourse.
Meta-decision problems are tied up with natural languages employed by human
decision agents in societal communication processes, which means that environmental
policy discourse is indispensably carried out in multiple languages/discourses. Multiple
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languages evolve under various natural and conventional contexts, in which shared
environmental discourse is carried out. Proposition 3.1 states that the outcomes
described/prescribed in environmental policy discourses are functions of the natural and
conventional contexts of the discussants/decision makers. The meta-decision models in
environmental policy analysis are thus context sensitive and they cannot be conceived
or understood independent of the context. In section 3.4.1, I explain in more detail the
context sensitivity of the outcomes, as they are measured/conceptualized in meta-
decision models on multiple value-dimensions.
Proposition 3.2 states that the outcomes of environmental policy actions cannot
be characterized in absolutist terms, valid for once and always; rather outcomes occur
as continuous processes, for which no fixed spatio-temporal boundaries can be drawn.
Policy scientists, however, need to draw “artificial” spatio-temporal boundaries around
any environmental policy decision problem to measure the outcomes under different
states of the world on multiple value-dimensions. Section 3.4.2 elaborates the process-
orientation of the outcomes which is an important ingredient of the meta-decision
models.
Proposition 3.3 states that the environmental policies cannot be treated as fixed
on any a priori knowledge grounds. The policy actions are rather treated as experimental
in nature and open to change as context and power relations change in human societies.
The meta-decision models are thus adaptive and experimental, which I explain in detail
in section 3.4.3. Section 3.4.4 elaborates the broader/generalized methodology of the
meta-decision models.
3.4.1: Context sensitivity
It turns out that one can identify at least three broad types of contextual features
of any multiple-valued outcome (X) of an environmental policy decision. Let us call them
conventional contexts (C), natural contexts (N) and technological contexts (T). Formally:
Equation 3.9: X = f (C, N, T)
Conventional contexts include the type of decision context imposed by the social
aspects of the choice situation, such as the nature of institutions in a place, its
governance structures and laws, and values of the society. Empirically, I model the
conventional context to be a sub-function of decision behaviors/actions (A). Formally:
Equation 3.10: C = g (A)
73
 Natural context includes the description of state of physical/natural features of
the environment in question. Empirically, natural context is described through
physical/natural parameters (Q) of the policy system/question. Formally:
Equation 3.11: N = h (Q)
Technological context indicates the specific technological regime (R) that exist in
the spatio-temporal horizon of the environmental policy decision problem. For example,
the technological regime of emission control systems and fuel inputs for vehicles
represents the technological context of air quality management decisions that concern
vehicular emissions. Formally:
Equation 3.12: T = i(R)
I define the outcome of a decision as “context-sensitive”, if the decision analyst
and/or decision maker includes the conventional, natural and technological contexts of a
decision in evaluating alternative courses of actions. Formally:
Equation 3.13: X = f [C(g(A)), N (h(Q)), T (i(R))]
Conversely, I define the outcome of a decision as context-free if the decision
analyst and/or decision maker uses a decision making algorithm (such as the ones
presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3) that does not take into account conventional, natural
and technological contexts of the decision situations.
3.4.2: Process-orientation
The outcomes of policy decisions occur at multiple spatio-temporal scales in a
continuous process, which cannot be absolutely quantified. Any horizon of an
environmental policy decision problem can only be defined once the spatio-temporal
boundaries of a decision problem are drawn. Outcomes of continuous and context-
sensitive decision processes are thus observed in specific slices of space (s) and time
(t). Formally:
Equation 3.14: Xst = f [C(g(A)), N (h(Q)), T (i(R))]st
3.4.3: Adaptive and experimental
Environmental policies are treated as experimental in nature, and can therefore
be changed in subsequent time periods as new information is made available to the
policy makers about the outcomes of policy decisions in previous time periods.
Environmental policies are thus treated as adaptive. I presented the concept of adaptive
mechanism/policy designs in section 2.4.
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3.4.4: The methodology:
Essentially, meta-decision models aid meta-choice decisions by applying meta-
criteria heuristics. I accept the considerable limitation that the choice of meta-criteria
heuristics is itself open to change as meta-meta-criteria evolve in human societies, as
well as in their languages and discourses. Here I want to emphasize the role of practical
reasoning and the logic of pragmatism. Any logical decision system is confronted with
the possibility of an infinite regress of meta-choices. It is, however, practical reason that
guides us to eschew the possibility of infinite regress -- pragmatism leads us to base our
decisions on the basis of real world outcomes of actions as observed empirically by a
researcher at the level of action. At the same time, for heuristic purposes, a meta-level of
reflection is introduced in MDMs, at which normative analysis is carried out. On
pragmatic grounds, all meta-meta-level choices can be considered as driving the
normative analysis at meta-level of reflection. A detailed discussion of meta-meta-level
[and higher level] choices is left as an area for future research in relation to hierarchical
systems theory. In this dissertation, due to the pragmatic demands of environmental
policy decisions, I limit the discussion to meta-choices and their relationship with meta-
criteria heuristics.
Meta-criteria heuristics act as principle determinants for temporarily resolving
meta-decision problems. The meta-decision problem of value-ambiguity, for example, is
explicitly explored at the outset by the policy designer. In the case of environmental
policy decisions, the foremost value is perhaps efficient/effective reduction of
contaminants/pollutants from our environments. Outcomes in MDMs will thus invariably
involve environmental pollution/resources as one scale/dimension of measurement.
Most of the environmental regulatory mechanisms are designed to attain the outcomes
on this value scale. This is one important part of descriptive decision analysis at the level
of action in MDMs, but it is not the whole story. MDMs also aim at evaluating the
outcomes of environmental policy decisions on other value scales/dimensions that are
considered important by the civilized society.  Which other values should thus be
included to measure the outcomes, however, always remains an outstanding and
iterative feature of MDMs.
MDMs thus recommend strong collaboration between expert-based decision-aid
systems and participatory/collaborative models of decision making because it is only
through participation of large segments of affected decision makers that experts can
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correctly identify the values on which the outcomes of policy actions are measured at the
level of action in MDMs. For demonstration of MDM application at the level of action in
real-world policy situations, I use two non-commensurate values – effective emission
reductions and fairness – to measure the outcomes of IM program/policy intervention in
the Atlanta airshed between 1997 and 2001. The generalized case of n-valued
outcomes of environmental policy interventions is discussed in chapter 7.
At the meta-level of reflection, the policy designer compares the outcomes
measured at the level of action with the outcomes that are deemed normatively desirable
within the space-time horizon of environmental policy decisions. At this level, once
again, meta-decision problems are resolved through iterative experimentation and
collaboration between expert and lay decision-makers. The normative analysis at meta-
level of reflection results in policy prescriptions/recommendations that aim at getting
“there” from “here” given all the uncertainty, ignorance and incomplete information. The
normative analysis at the level of reflection for Atlanta’s airshed—in value terms of
attaining outcomes that balance/maximize effective vehicular emission reductions and
fairer distribution of program/policy costs—is presented in chapter 7 in the light of
descriptive results, which are presented in chapter 6.
Next, in chapter 4, I explain the background of IM program/policy intervention in
the Atlanta airshed, review literature on previous evaluation studies that concern
effective vehicular emission reductions as well as fairness outcomes of IM programs in
USA, in general, and in Atlanta, in particular.  The research design for operationalizing




THE REGULATORY MECHANISM OF VEHICLE INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
(IM) PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ATLANTA AIRSHED
4.1 Vehicular tail-pipe emissions and travel patterns: the raison d'être of vehicle
inspection and maintenance (IM) programs
While gasoline-powered automobiles increased exponentially in the twentieth
century as the modal choice of travelers, concerns about the impact of automobile tail-
pipe53 emissions on the air quality have also raised serious environmental challenges.
The data from American Automobile Manufacturers Association shows that worldwide
automobile stocks increased eight-fold from 75 million in 1950 to 600 million in 1992.
United States alone experienced a four-fold rise of motor vehicle stocks from 50 million
to 200 million vehicles between 1950 and 1992. One-third of the total world motor
vehicle stocks in 1992 were registered in the United States. The 2001 estimate of motor
vehicle stocks stood at staggering 235 million in USA, of which about 7 million were
registered in the state of Georgia.54
Corresponding to the exponential rise in the stocks of motor vehicles, the flow of
carbon monoxide (CO), oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and hydrocarbon (HC) tail-pipe
emissions from on-road automobiles increased exponentially between 1950 and 1975
but decreased since 1975. Based on an EPA simulation model (2000), Figures 4.1 to 4.3
show respectively the trends in CO, NOx and HC emissions flows from on-road
automobiles between 1940 and 1998 in the USA. These figures also show respectively
the trends in CO, NOx and HC emissions flows from other sources such as fuel
combustion, industrial processing, and non-road sources in the USA.
                                                 
53 In addition to tail-pipe emissions, vehicles also emit evaporative emissions. Evaporative
emissions are not the focus of this study, though they constitute an extremely important part of
over-all environmental policy to control vehicular emissions.
54 Source: vehicle registration data at www.transtats.bts.gov
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Figure 4.1: Simulated trend of Carbon Monoxide (CO) emissions from 1940 to 1998 in
the USA. Source EPA (2000).
Figure 4.2: Simulated trend of Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) emissions from 1940 to
1998 in the USA. Source EPA (2000).
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Figure 4.3: Simulated trend of Volatile Organic Compounds emissions from 1940 to
1998 in the USA. Source EPA (2000).
Figure 4.4: Simulated trend in gross domestic product (GDP), population, vehicle
miles traveled (VMT), total fuel consumption, VOC and NOx emissions, and SO2
emissions in the USA between 1970 and 1998. Source EPA (2000).
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One noticeable feature in figures 4.1 to 4.3 is that the exponential trend in the on-
road automobile emissions tapered off after 1975. CO emissions flows decreased from
more than 80 million tones per year in 1975 to less than 50 million tones per year in
1998, where as NOx and HC emissions flows remained almost constant during this
period respectively at less than 10 and 5 million tones per year.
The tapering off trend of vehicular tail-pipe emissions flows since 1975 is mostly
attributed to various emission control technological innovations that have been
introduced in automobiles since the early 1970s. The emissions control hardware on
automobiles has changed over time to reflect changing regulatory emissions standards
as well as changes in vehicle design, fuel efficiency standards and technological
capabilities (NRC 2001: 46). Emission control systems on vehicles are grouped into
three categories: engine, evaporative, and diagnostics. This dissertation is focused on
engine emission control systems,55 which experienced the following three major stages
of technological innovations in chronological order: (1) Engine adjustments were
introduced between 1968 and 1974. Primary engine adjustments consisted of
modifications to mixture56 strength and spark timing; (2) Oxidizing catalysts were
introduced between 1975 and 1980. Lean mixtures and two-way oxidation catalysts
were used for HC and CO controls. The technology of Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR)
was also introduced during this period to control NOx. (3) Closed-Loop combustion
controls (CLL) and Three-way catalysts (TWC) have been introduced in automobiles
since 1981. CLL allows precise mixture configuration, while TWC control tail-pipe
emissions of HC, CO, and NOx. The technological parameters of emission-control
systems on automobiles, briefly, indicate if a vehicle is fitted with Oxidation (two-way)
catalyst (Oxy), Three Way Catalyst (TWC), Positive Crankcase Ventilation System
(PCV), Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR), Closed Loop Combustion Control (CLL), Air
Injection Reactor system (AIR) and Thermostatic Air Cleaner (TAC). More details about
these emission control technological systems can be found in NRC (2001:48-52).
                                                 
55 More detail about evaporative and diagnostic emission control systems can be found in NRC
(2001: chapter 4).
56 Mixture is technically air/fuel ratio, which is the ratio by weight of air to gasoline entering intake
in a gasoline engine. The ideal ratio for complete combustion is 14.7 parts of air to 1 part fuel.
Air/fuel ratio less than 14.7 are termed “rich mixtures” and contain excess fuel for combustion,
while air/fuel ratios greater than 14.7 are termed “lean mixtures” and contain more air than is
required for complete combustion (NRC 2001: 48).
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It has been argued that the automobile manufacturers introduced these
technological innovations after they faced stringent regulatory laws mandated under the
US Clean Air Act 1970 and its amendments in 1977 and 1990 (EPA 2000; NRC 2001).
Total HC and NO emissions are somewhat constant57 because massive declines in per-
vehicle emissions (following technological innovations) have been largely offset by
rapidly rising VMT. Figure 4.4 compares the VMT growth trend in the USA with other
major macro-indicators between 1970 and 1998, such as gross domestic product (GDP),
population, total fuel consumption, volatile organic compounds (VOC) and NOx
emissions. This figure shows that both VMT and GDP have more than doubled between
1970 and 1998, while the VOC and NOx mass emission rates decreased by about 30%
in the same period. The trends in population and fuel consumption, both of which were
about 1.3 times higher in 1998 than their 1970 levels, also overlap. Figure 4.4 is based
on an EPA (2000) simulation model, which unfortunately does not indicate the expected
error rate and gross uncertainty associated with estimating the VMT and actual
emissions from multiple anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic sources.
Large scientific uncertainty is also associated with the potential impact of the on-
road vehicle tail-pipe emissions on human, animal and plant environments. Previous
studies have attributed increased asthma among children due to secondary pollutants,
such as ozone, which are formed after the primary pollutants, such as NOx and HCs,
from motor vehicles react in the atmosphere during high-temperatures (Edwards,
Walters et al. 1994; Friedman, Powell et al. 2001; Livingstone, Shaddick et al. 1996;
Wjst, Reitmeir et al. 1993). Following research, in contrast, focuses on evaluating
various precautionary policies that can proactively reduce the primary pollutants – CO,
HC and NOx – that are emitted from the tail pipes of on-road vehicles.
The search for appropriate policy actions to proactively reduce tail-pipe vehicular
emissions is however confronted with the meta-decision problem of bounding the set of
policy alternatives that was explained in chapter 3. Figure 4.5 shows various policy
alternatives – including IM programs -- that can possibly be employed at multiple spatio-
temporal scales of policy outcome horizons to reduce tail-pipe emissions from on-road
vehicles.
                                                 
57 The constant rate since 1975 is estimated at 10 million tones per year for NOx and 5 million
tones per year for VOCs, as it is shown in figures 4.2 and 4.3.
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Figure 4.5: The wicked problem of emission reduction strategies for on-road
vehicle sources
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The evaluation of an IM program, in particular its impact on high-emitting
vehicles, is a complex policy design problem because no particular decision rule can be
applied to address the meta-decision problem of bounding the set of policy alternatives.
First, formulating the decision problem and clearly defining the set of alternatives
involves complex choices because reductions in CO, NOx and hydrocarbon (HC)
vehicular emissions due to IM programs are not separable from other causal factors and
policy interventions that affect the emissions of these pollutants. This is illustrated in
figure 4.5, which shows that the CO, NOx and HC tail-pipe emissions from on-road
vehicles can be reduced either by reducing these emissions per vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) or by reducing the VMT itself.
The emissions per VMT can be reduced by (1) altering the technologies (such as
introduction of low, ultra-low and zero emission systems on vehicles), (2) changing the
inputs (such as altering the gasoline mixes and converting to alternative fuels), (3)
changing the patterns of vehicle use (such as combining short trips, controlling speed
and improving the traffic flow), and (4) maintaining the efficiency of on-board emission
control technologies (such as IM programs, clean screening and vehicle profiling
programs, scrappage programs and automobile manufacturer insurance programs).58
The VMT itself can also be reduced by both shifting travel to environment friendly
alternatives (such as shifting drivers to car pools, mass transit systems and improving
biking and walking alternatives) as well as reducing travel demand through long-term
regional planning (such as altering landscape forms by using integrated home, work,
shopping and recreation designs). The IM program, the policy intervention to be
evaluated, is essentially pursued under the strategy of maintaining the efficiency of
emission control technologies mounted on on-road vehicles, which falls under the higher
order objective of reducing emissions per VMT (or also emissions per unit of fuel
consumption). The policy alternatives to IM programs are nested within each other and
have impacts at multiple spatio-temporal scales. Vehicular technologies are changing at
                                                 
58 It is not necessary that IM, clean screening, vehicle profiling, scrappage and insurance
programs only affect the higher order objective of keeping the on-board emission control
technologies efficient, rather it is possible that they also affect the other higher order
objectives, such as changing the fuel inputs and patterns of vehicle use. This further
adds to the complexity of the meta-decision problem of choosing the set of alternative
actions by policy makers.
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a much more rapid temporal scale than the transportation infrastructure. The set of
policy alternatives to evaluate the IM program can either be bounded by the alternatives
that can be designed to maintain the efficiency of emission control systems in changing
vehicle technologies, or it can be unbounded to include all the policy alternatives listed in
terminal nodes of Figure 4.5, which is not an exhaustive list. The complex problem is
where to set the boundaries and how to bound the set of alternatives. This will require
decisions at the meta-level.
While it would be interesting to compare and explore the integrative impact of all
of the nested strategies outlined in figure 4.5 for possibly reducing the on-road vehicular
tail-pipe emissions, the following research narrowly focuses on evaluating the decision
behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in the existing IM program in the Atlanta
airshed.
In section 4.2, I present brief description of IM programs as mandated by 1990
CAAA and compare IM programs’ design parameters across the states. Section 4.3
presents a brief history of IM program in the Atlanta airshed as well as description of IM
program rules during the study period 1997 to 2001. In section 4.4, I review prior
research that—in particular by using remote sensing data -- evaluated the vehicular tail-
pipe emission reduction effects of IM programs. In section 4.5, the decision behavioral
research studies that have been carried out in the context of IM programs are reviewed.
In section 4.6, I present an argument that multiple decision criteria evaluation of IM
programs is needed, and show how can this be carried out by operationalizing Meta-
decision Models (MDMs), the task of this dissertation.
4.2 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and IM programs: A regulatory
environmental discourse
The 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) was the first legislation that gave states the option
to implement IM programs and delegated responsibility for program oversight and
guidance to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. IM programs were made
mandatory under the 1977 CAA Amendments for states which were persistently not
complying with federal air quality standards. EPA’s first guidelines for IM programs
provided information about the minimum emission reductions required for such
programs, as well as implementation requirements and timeframes (EPA 1978). It is
noticeable that the general and to some extent vague nature of EPA’s 1978 guidance
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document resulted in IM programs that vary significantly in IM design and enforcement
parameters from state to state, as shown in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: a comparison of IM program elements across the various states in the USA




















































































































































































aCut points are for HC in ppm and CO in percent for ASM and idle test, and for HC, CO, and NOx
in grams per mile for IM240 and IM147 tests.
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Table 4.1 shows major design parameters of selected IM programs in Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado and Georgia. Important regulatory design parameters of IM
programs include decisions from the state-level regulators on the following eight
important issues (which are shown for nine different IM programs, including Atlanta, GA,
in table 4.2): (1) What should be the IM program’s network type (centralized,
decentralized or hybrid)?59 (2) What should be the IM test type (Idle, ASM, IM 240, IM
147)?60 (3) What should be the emission cut-points to separate out high-emitters from
normal emitters? (4) What kind of visual checks and (5) evaporative tests should be
undertaken? (6) What should be the frequency of IM testing? (7) Which vehicle types
and (8) vehicle model years should appear in the IM test?
The design parameter of the IM network type – i.e. whether emissions testing
should be conducted by centralized, decentralized or hybrid networks of testing stations
– was debated extensively during the 1980s. In particular, EPA attributed the IM
program’s lack of effectiveness during the 1980s to decentralized network types and
cited improper testing and poor quality control as a leading cause of ineffectiveness.
                                                 
59 A centralized network consists of a relatively small number (relative to a decentralized network)
of stations that perform only emissions tests. Vehicles that fail the emissions must be repaired
elsewhere. This network typically is operated by a government entity or by a contractor with
government administration (NRC 2001: 58). A decentralized testing network consists of a larger
number of low-volume stations that do both emissions testing and vehicle repairs. This type of
network links testing to the repair process and is operated by private sector stations (NRC 2001:
59). A hybrid network is one that incorporates elements of both decentralized and centralized
programs. One hybrid type, for example, may incorporate both high volume centralized test-only
stations and low volume decentralized repair-and-retest stations; while another hybrid type may
incorporate high-volume decentralized test-only stations and low volume centralized repair-and-
retest stations (NRC 2001:60).
60 There are two basic kinds of emissions tests: (1) Mass emissions tests include following: (a) the
Federal Test Procedure (FTP) which measure the tail-pipe and evaporative emissions from new
vehicles over the Urban Dynamometer Driving Schedule, which attempts to simulate an urban
driving cycle. Automobile manufacturers are required by EPA to pass FTP for prototypes of
vehicle models before being sold for the first time. (b) the IM 240 test is a loaded-mode transient
dynamometer test, which measures the mass of emissions collected over a 240-second, 2-mile
driving cycle that corresponds to the first 240 seconds of FTP. In addition, there are shortened
versions of IM 240 test, such as BAR-31 (first 31 seconds), IM 93 (first 93 seconds) and IM 147
(final 147 seconds of IM240). (2) Concentration tests include following: (a) the Idle test is a
steady-state unloaded test that uses a tailpipe probe to measure the concentrations of CO, HC
and CO2 in exhaust emissions from idling vehicles. The high idle test is measured at an engine
speed of 2500 rpm, while the low idle test is measured at lower engine speeds. Idle tests do not
measure NOx because unloaded vehicles have very low NOx concentrations. (b) ASM series of
loaded-mode steady-state emissions tests measure exhaust concentrations from motor vehicles
operated on a dynamometer. ASM 5015 test measures emissions at 50% of the maximum load
conditions at a speed of 15 mph. ASM 2525 measure emissions at 25% of the maximum load
conditions at a speed of 25 mph.
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EPA believed that improper testing sometimes stemmed from an inherent conflict of
interest in test-and-repair programs; emissions inspectors might be tempted to falsely
pass a regular customer’s vehicle or a vehicle that did not pass after repairs.
Decentralized test-and-repair networks also have a greater number of geographically
dispersed test stations that are operated independently of one another. As a result, EPA
asserted, it was more difficult for administering agencies to ensure that test technicians
were properly trained and that tests were competently and honestly performed.
Furthermore, improved emission testing technologies, as well as the
introduction/planning of newer tail-pipe emission control technologies led EPA to advise
congress to revise IM related laws of the CAAA 1977 in the CAAA 1990.
The US Congress approved more stringent requirements for IM programs in the
1990 CAAA  (Title I §182). The 1990 CAAA defines two IM program types, basic and
enhanced. Basic IM programs apply to moderate and marginal ozone non-attainment61
areas. Enhanced programs apply to serious, severe and extreme62 ozone non-
attainment areas with urbanized populations of 200,000 or more and to all metropolitan
statistical areas with a population of 100,000 or more in the Northeast Ozone Transport
Region. Enhanced IM program areas must use improved test technologies and test
procedures; conduct centralized testing, unless the state demonstrates that
decentralized testing is equally effective; inspect cars annually, unless a state
demonstrates that less frequent testing is equally effective63; and deny vehicle
registration to motorists who fail to comply with inspection requirements (Title I
§182c3C).
                                                 
61 The national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for Ozone is based on the expected number
of days per year with a one hour concentration of 0.12 ppm (parts per million) or greater. For an
area to achieve attainment the average number of days above the standard within that area must
be equal to or less than one for three consecutive years. This means that if an ozone-monitoring
site measures four days above standard in a year, that site will be in violation even if no readings
above standard are measured during the next two years. The area in which that monitor is
located is considered to be a non-attainment area.
62 Five classifications of non-attainment for the one-hour ozone standard are specified in the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) – Marginal, Moderate, Serious, Severe, and Extreme. The
severity or magnitude of the exceedance is determined by the amount that the measurement is
above 0.12 PPM.
63 While the CAAA legislation emphasized annual testing, most enhanced IM programs conduct
biennial inspections to defray higher inspection fees that result from more costly advanced testing
technologies.
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The 1990 CAAA enacted radical changes in the scope and stringency of IM
programs.  Mandated in the wake of persistent growth in VMT and chronic air pollution in
the nation’s largest metropolitan areas, 1990 CAAA requires enhanced IM programs that
employ advanced testing technologies and procedures as a way to better ensure the
operability of vehicle emission control systems. This law also requires biennial
evaluation of enhanced IM programs and on-road measurement of inspected fleet
emissions, but does not link together the two requirements (CAA Title I §182c3C; CAA
Title I §182c3Bi; Title I§182c3Ci).
Table 4.2: Passenger-car exhaust gaseous emissions standards (all values in grams per





HC CO NOx NMHCa CO NOx
Model Year
Precontrolb 10.6 84.0 4.1 -- -- --
1968-1969 275
ppm
1.5% -- -- -- --
1970-1971 4.1 34.0 -- -- -- --
1972 3.4 39.0 -- -- -- --
1973 3.4 39.0 3.0 -- -- --
1975-1976 1.5 15.0 3.1 -- -- --
1977-1979 1.5 15.0 2.0 -- -- --
1980 0.41 7.0 2.0 -- -- --
Category










-- -- -- 0.09 4.2 0.3
Tier 2 – default
set in 1990 CAAA
(beginning with
model year 2004)
-- -- -- 0.125 1.7 0.2





-- -- -- >0.09c >4.2c 0.07
One important design parameter of IM programs concerns emission cut-points. It
should be noted that IM program emission cut-points are always higher than the
emissions standards that are set for automobile manufacturers. Table 4.2 (NRC
2001:27) shows passenger car exhaust gas emissions standards for various model
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years/ages and categories of vehicles that have been imposed by EPA/regulators on
automobile manufacturers. It is noteworthy that as age of the vehicle decreases, the HC,
CO and NOx standards become more stringent. This is shown in two-dimensional graph
of figure 4.6 where x-axis shows vehicle age in 2001 and y-axis shows pollutants emitted
in grams per VMT.64 Even if we control for vehicle age, IM program emission point
standards are less stringent than the standards for automobile manufacturers. This can
be seen by the following example. Tier 0 standards imposed on automobile
manufacturers since 1981 require vehicles to emit less than 0.41 g/mile of HC (as shown
in column 1 of table 4.2). On the other hand, IM program cut-point for HC in IM program
of Denver, Colorado, declares a vehicle normal emitter if it emits less than 5 gram/mile
of HC, and high emitter if vehicle emits more than 5 gram/mile.
                                                 
64 Tier 2 standards, for example, beginning with vehicle model years 2004 (age = -3 in figure 4.6)
are much more lower/stringent for CO than the Tier 1 standards required for vehicle model years
1991 to 2003 (age –2 to 10 in figure 4.6). Similarly, NOx and HC standards have also become
more stringent for newer vehicles.
Passenger-car emissions standards





















Figure 4.6: EPA-mandated passenger-car tail-pipe emissions standards
required from manufacturers
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Even though IM program emission cut-points are much looser than the
manufacturer standards, the complex problem of clearly defining a high-emitting vehicle
remains unresolved due to the following questions. Should uniform cut-points for CO,
NOx and HC emissions be established across all the technology groups of vehicles, so
that more people would be encouraged to buy low-emitting cars rather than sport utility
vehicles and trucks? Or, should the cut-points be made relative to the technological
groups to encourage the introduction of low or zero-emission vehicle technologies?
Further, the problem of choosing minimal cut-points is a very tricky and politically
sensitive issue, because these choices can exempt a very small or very large fraction of
vehicles from the regulatory purview of governmental intervention. If the cut-points are
too high, very few vehicles are characterized as high-emitters. If they are relatively low,
too many vehicles may be declared as high-emitters. The current fleet-average CO cut-
point in Atlanta’s IM program is 1.2% of CO2 concentration, which means state
regulators expect about 10% of the on-road vehicles to fail the initial IM test in one
testing cycle. However, if the cut-point is chosen at 2.4%, then less than 5% vehicles will
be expected to fail the test; while if the cut-point is chosen at 0.6%, then more than 20%
vehicles will be expected to fail the test. The choice of emission cut-points to define a
high-emitter is a meta-choice decision and needs careful normative evaluation.  For the
descriptive analysis in this research, I will treat IM emission cut-points as exogenously
set IM program design parameters that are used to distinguish normal from high-
emitters. Design parameters of Atlanta’s regulatory IM program are shown in last row of
table 4.1, which I discuss in greater detail in next section.
4.3 The IM program in the Atlanta airshed: the rules of the regulatory game in the
southeastern USA
Atlanta’s first IM program was established in 1981, covering the three ozone non-
attainment area counties of Fulton, Cobb and DeKalb, and it was implemented in a
decentralized test-and-repair network. Fast-growing Gwinnett County was added in
1986. Testing was originally required for the latest ten model year vehicles, but was
expanded in 1986 to include the latest twelve model years. Inspections were conducted
on an annual basis.
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In response to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), the Georgia
legislature revisited emissions testing in 1992.65 This legislation enabled the Georgia
Department of Natural Resources (Ga-DNR) to upgrade Georgia's IM program to an
“enhanced” program, bringing it into compliance with the 1990 CAAA and new federal IM
regulations. This enhanced version of the program received limited implementation in
October 1996,66 with emission inspections required only for those vehicles migrating to
the Atlanta IM program area. The new program commenced in January 1997, with
biennial emissions testing required of all vehicles from the 1975 model year to two years
of age.67 The new program also spanned the 13-county non-attainment area,
incorporating nine new counties that were not subject to the previous basic IM program
(as shown in figure 5.2). This study focuses on the first five years of the Atlanta
“enhanced” IM program, during which time vehicles younger than 5 years of age were
inspected using a two-speed idle (TSI) testing procedure (that measures emissions
under idle and a 2500 RPM engine speed), while vehicles older than 5 years were
inspected through ASM tests.68
As table 4.1 shows, Atlanta’s IM program had a “hybrid” testing network. A ‘fleet-
average’ vehicle failed the test if it emitted more than 220 ppm of HC and/or 1.2% of
                                                 
65 1992 Georgia Air Quality Act, Article 2: Motor Vehicle Emissions Inspection and Maintenance
Act (OCGA Section 12-9-40 et seq.).
66 October 1996 was chosen as the soonest possible start-up date after the previous basic IM
program, which operated during a January-to-April vehicle registration “season.” Vehicle
registration is now conducted year-round in Georgia, as is enhanced emissions testing.
67 Three significant changes have recently been made to the Atlanta enhanced IM program. The
waiver limit increased in January 2000 to $608, which represents $450 plus increments based on
the consumer price index and fulfills EPA requirements. In 2001, testing frequency changed from
biennial to annual; the requirement to inspect back to 1975 model years was replaced with the
requirement to inspect the latest 25 model years; and the exemption of the two newest model
years was changed to exempt the newest three model years.
68 Changes have been made to the program since the first two-years of operation, which are the
focus of this analysis. For example, the program began to require vehicles over six years of age
to undergo the more rigorous Acceleration Simulation Mode (ASM) testing in October 1998. The
primary difference between ASM and TSI  testing is the approximation of real-world driving
conditions, i.e., placing the engine under load.  While the emissions inspector depresses the
accelerator to achieve 25 miles per hour (MPH), ASM testing places the vehicle’s drive wheels on
a treadmill-like dynamometer that applies a 25 percent load on the vehicle engine.  The latter
approach is more representative of actual driving conditions than an idle test.
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CO.69 Visual checks of the catalyst and gas cap were also part of the vehicle inspection.
The gas cap was also inspected to ensure that there were no excessive evaporative
emissions. Between 1997 and 2000, IM program in Atlanta was “biennial”; however, in
2001, the IM program was changed from “biennial” to “annual” testing for all LDGVs and
LDGTs. Furthermore, vehicles less than 2 years of age and older than 1975 model year
were exempted from testing between 1997 and 2000; while in 2001, vehicles less than 3
years of age were exempted from testing. The quasi-experimental mixed-pooled
research design (presented in chapter 5) enables quantification of the impact of changes
in Atlanta’s IM program rules between 1997 and 2001 on tail-pipe vehicular emissions
from year to year.
4.4 Prior research on evaluating the vehicular tail-pipe emission reduction effects
of IM programs by using remote sensing data
IM programs have been evaluated by using in-program IM data (Ando,
McConnell et al. 1999; Environ 1998; Glover and Brzezinski 1997; Sierra-Research
1998; Wenzel 1999a), roadside emissions inspections data (CARB 2000), ambient air
quality data (Scherrer and Kittelson 1994) and simulation computer models such as
MOBILE and EMFAC. NRC (2001) and EPA (2002) explicitly suggest that each of these
four data techniques have inherent biases and preferably should not be used
independently for evaluation of IM programs. In-program IM data cannot estimate the
fraudulent behavior by drivers or test centers (phenomena of clean-piping), neither can it
correctly estimate the program avoidance rate (migration of vehicles outside the IM
program boundaries). In addition, it has been suggested that the evaluations based on
IM program data over-estimate the emission reduction benefits due to a statistical
phenomena called as “regression towards the mean” (DeHart-Davis, Corley et al. 2002;
Stedman, Bishop et al. 1997).
Roadside emissions inspection data has sample biases – called self-selection
bias -- since it includes only those vehicles in the sample, which are volunteered by their
drivers. One study found that self-selection bias leads to under estimation of the high-
emitters by the roadside emissions inspection data (Stedman, Bishop et al. 1994). This
study found that about 30% of the vehicles pulled over refused the voluntary test for one
reason or another in a 5-day survey during July 15-19, 1991, in various northern
                                                 
69 Note that both idle and ASM tests use concentration ratios to measure CO and HC in Atlanta.
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California locations. Remote sensing measurements revealed that the average on-road
CO and HC emissions of those vehicles that refused inspection were more than double
those of the vehicles that volunteered for inspection. This study thus concluded that the
results from the roadside surveys may be biased low because the small fraction of high-
emitting vehicles is under represented in the self-selected sample. Using biased
information could significantly under-predict overall on-road fleet emissions or artificially
over-predict IM effectiveness. Further, this data collection method has higher costs, as it
has been reported that only about 25 vehicles per day can be tested with this
methodology (Wenzel, Gumerman et al. 2000b).
Ambient air quality data cannot separate emissions of mobile sources, such as
automobiles, from emissions of industrial or other sources. Finally, computer simulation
models have major limitations; they estimate emission factors from small samples of
laboratory derived emissions data, they have optimistic repair effectiveness
assumptions, and they employ little model validation using real-world emissions data
(Harrington, McConnell et al. 1998).
NRC (2001) cites several advantages of remotely sensed on-road vehicle
emission data for evaluating the IM programs. First, on-road vehicle emissions data is a
cost-effective source of evaluation data compared with the higher per-vehicle costs of
advanced dynamometer testing on a small sample of vehicles, the original evaluation
approach recommended by federal regulators. Second, on-road vehicle emissions data
can also capture trends that cannot be discerned through internal inspection records
alone, such as motorists avoiding the program and pre-inspection maintenance
behavior. Third, on-road vehicle emissions data can also be used for a variety of
purposes in addition to IM evaluation, including mobile source emission inventories,
clean-screen programs that exempt low-emission vehicles from subsequent IM testing,
and high-emitter programs that target polluting vehicles for off-cycle inspection and
repair.
Despite the apparent weaknesses, the four data types -- in-program IM data,
roadside emissions inspections data, ambient air quality data and computer simulation
data -- can be used as baselines for comparison purposes with the results of on-road
vehicle emissions data. This research uses primarily remotely sensed on-road vehicle
emissions data to evaluate the impact on tail-pipe emission reduction effectiveness of
the IM program due to the decision behaviors of drivers in the Atlanta airshed. The
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remote sensing data collection methodology of on-road vehicular emissions is explained
in further detail in section 4.4.1. Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 present three quasi-
experimental methodologies – reference, step and comprehensive – that have been
employed by previous researchers to measure the IM program emission reduction
effectiveness by using remote sensing data.
4.4.1: Remote sensing of on-road vehicular tail-pipe emissions:
On-road vehicle emissions are measured through remote sensing by estimating
the ratio of the pollutant (CO, HC, or NOx) to the amount of CO2 in the exhaust plume.
On-road vehicle emissions are thus a concentration ratio measurement rather than a
mass emission rate measurement. Remotely sensed concentration ratios are measured
in grams of pollutant per gram of fuel, while mass emission rates are measured in grams
per mile for a specific driving cycle. The remote sensing measurement takes place in
about one-half of a second. This is in stark contrast to dynamometer tests, which are
mostly employed in IM tests during which emissions are measured over a variety of
driving modes, such as IM240 takes 240 seconds.
Stedman (1989) first reported the use of remote sensing to measure pollutant
concentration ratios from on-road vehicle exhaust plumes. Spectroscopic measurements
detect the emissions in vehicle exhaust. Although absolute emissions concentrations in
the exhaust plume change rapidly as the plume disperses, the ratio of the CO, HC and
NO emissions to CO2 stays the same over the time of measurement. A computer
calculates the best slope of the ratio pollutant to CO2 by using multiple spectroscopic
readings taken in the approximately 1/2 second of total measurement time. Combustion
equations translate emissions measurements into percent, or weight of emissions per
weight of fuel used. Appendix A presents combustion equations that are used in
previous studies as well as in this dissertation to convert pollutant concentration ratios
into grams of pollutants per gallon of fuel used. The dependent variables in equations
1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 are measured in grams of pollutant per gallon. Further, two comparative
methodologies—fuel-sales per year based and VMT per year based -- are also
presented in appendix A. VMT data-based methodology is used in this dissertation to
convert the grams of pollutants per gallon (mass emission factors) into tons of pollutants
per year (mass emission rates).
The remote sensor uses a video frame of the measured vehicle’s license plate,
which is later matched with the vehicle registration data to get information about the rest
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of the parameters associated with the measured vehicle, such as VIN, MY, and address
of the owner. Further, the VIN can be decoded to get additional information about
various technological parameters of the vehicle.
It can be inferred from observing the high on-road emissions under particular
driving modes that emission control equipment on the vehicle has likely deteriorated or is
broken. There are also driving modes under which a “clean” normal-emitting vehicle
could produce high-emissions. These exceptional modes include: (1) cold start, when
the engine and catalytic converter have not reached operating temperature, (2) at low
load HC concentrations in the plume may be high, and (3) during the fuel enrichment,
when the vehicle purposely operates with extra fuel, such as under high-load conditions.
There are thus large uncertainties associated with separating high-emitters from normal-
emitters through just the use of remote sensing data.
Due to these uncertainties, remote sensing has been under utilized in IM
programs (NRC 2001). There are potentially three additional reasons for under utilization
of remote sensing data. First, there is lack of standardization in remote sensing quality
control and data reporting. A recent CRC project (Slott 2002), however, shows that a
standardized remote sensing protocol is in the offing. Appendix B in Slott (2002) details
how remote sensing sites should be described, what data should be obtained, and how
data should be reported. The AQL has started to collect the remote sensing data under
this protocol since 2000. Second, there is uncertainty associated with the quantitative
significance of a measurement made over only about a half second during which there is
no control over the driving mode of the vehicle. Third, there are issues about the
accuracy of the emission measurements. Researchers have estimated the accuracy of
the remote sensing measurements by comparing exhaust emissions measured on-board
a vehicle to those measured external to the vehicle using remote sensing equipment.
Lawson et al. (1990) and Ashbaug et al. (1992) showed that a remote sensor measures
CO within ± 5% and HC within ± 15%. The NOx measurements have recently increased
in accuracy within ± 5% error rate, as reported by Pokharel et al. (2001).
Using on-road vehicle emissions data, Wenzel et al. (2000a), EPA (2002) and
DeHart-Davis et al. (2002) suggest that there are three quasi-experimental methods to
determine on-road emission reduction effects caused by policy interventions such as
Inspection and Maintenance (IM) Programs.
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First, the “reference method” compares on-road vehicle emissions for the
vehicles registered in the IM program area with those registered in a non-IM program
reference area. The reference method, however, has a key limitation. The
straightforward comparison of emissions data in one area with those in a reference area
must be corrected for the physical and socio-economic differences between regions in
which emissions might vary regardless of the presence of an IM program.
Second, the “step method” compares vehicular emissions tested under a newly
instituted IM program with vehicular emissions in the same area that have yet to be
tested under the new program. The limitation of this method is the inherent
incompleteness of accounting for emission reductions. The emission reduction benefits
might not account fully for non-compliance with the program or for preemptive repairs
made in anticipation of the IM test.
Third, the “comprehensive method” tracks changes in emissions for vehicles that
pass the test (the quasi-experimental control fleet), those that initially fail and then pass
(the cooperative fleet), and those that fail and never pass, or avoid the IM program (the
non-cooperative fleet). This method is limited because it requires enormous data sets for
both IM and remote sensing on-road vehicle emissions to track the vehicle emissions
before and after the IM tests. Further, the comprehensive method must account for
seasonal variations to analyze the emission reduction effects.
In the past few years, many state-sponsored and independent research studies
have employed these three empirical methods to evaluate the effectiveness of IM
programs in the United States.70 They provide mixed evidence for IM programs’ success
in reducing on-road vehicle emissions. Pierson (1996) effectively summarizes IM
evaluation studies up to 1995; however, NRC (2001) reviews these evaluation studies
more comprehensively. The following sections discuss the key results and
methodological critiques of these studies, according to three empirical methodologies:
reference, step and comprehensive. The results of important studies using each of these
three methodologies are summarized in Table 4.3.
                                                 
70 Note that the effectiveness of IM programs in these three methods is calculated by comparing
the emissions concentrations of an experimental fleet with a control fleet of vehicles.
Effectiveness is thus measured as a unit-less percentage change in CO, HC and NOx emissions
of experimental fleets as compared to control fleets.
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Table 4.3: The IM effectiveness results of the prior studies according to three empirical
methodologies: reference, step and comprehensive
Prior Studies CO (% reduction) NOx (% reduction) HC (% reduction)
Reference Method
Zhang et al. (1993) 13% Not investigated Not significant or 0%
(Rodgers, DeHart-
Davis et al. under
review)
15% cars and 10%
trucks
Not investigated Not investigated
(DeHart-Davis,
Corley et al. 2002)
26% cars and 20%
trucks




5 to 9% Not significant or 0% Not significant or 0%





9% Not investigated 9%
Wenzel 1999b 7% Not investigated 11%
Wenzel et al. 2000b 10% 5% increase 4%
Wenzel (2003) 3 to 4% Not significant Not significant
4.4.2 Reference method studies
The reference method involves comparing on-road vehicle emissions data from
vehicles registered in an IM program area to vehicles registered in a non-IM program
“reference” area71. The reference area, by virtue of its lacking an IM program, serves as
a surrogate untested fleet, and thus can be used as a quasi-experimental control group.
The difference in fleet emissions between the IM program area being evaluated and its
reference area represents the emission reductions attributable to IM program
effectiveness. In addition, these emission differences can also be compared with other
reference areas or model predictions.
In a study to evaluate the Colorado IM program using the reference method,
Zhang et al. (1993) found no significant Hydrocarbon (HC) emissions difference between
cars from counties in Colorado with IM programs and cars from counties that did not
have IM programs. They did find, however, that the IM group had 13% lower CO, and a
lower percentage of CO gross emitters, than the non-IM group. They concluded that
Colorado program was effectively reducing CO emissions, but it was ineffective in
reducing HC emissions.
                                                 
71 The reference method may also be used to evaluate one IM fleet with another IM fleet.
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The Air Quality Laboratory (AQL) of Georgia Institute of Technology applied the
reference method to evaluate the effectiveness of the basic IM program in effect in
Atlanta in 1994. The 4-county IM area was compared with the surrounding 9-county non-
IM “reference” area of the broader Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
results of this evaluation indicated that the basic IM program in Atlanta was more
effective for cars than predicted by the MOBILE model, but less effective than predicted
for light duty trucks (Rodgers et al. under review). More specifically, the analysis
indicated that car and truck emissions for carbon monoxide (CO) were 15 and 10
percent higher, respectively, in the uninspected nine county reference fleet than in the
inspected four-county IM fleet.
IM program coverage in Atlanta was enhanced from a 4 county to a 13 county
area in October 1996.72 Later, the AQL also evaluated the enhanced IM program of
Atlanta airshed using the reference method (DeHart-Davis, Corley et al. 2002).  This
study compared on-road vehicle emissions of the 13-county IM program area in the
Atlanta MSA with two non-IM program “reference” cities of Augusta and Macon, and also
compared emissions differences in IM and non-IM fleet vehicles with those predicted by
a regulatory computer model. Assuming that on-road emissions differences represent
observed effectiveness and model-predicted emissions differences represent
effectiveness goals, this study found that the Atlanta enhanced IM program appears to
be achieving 83 percent of its targeted emissions reductions. More specifically, the study
estimated that the enhanced Atlanta IM program reduced CO emissions by 26 percent
for cars and 20 percent for trucks on average for the first two years of the program. The
authors accepted the confounding problems associated with the reliance of the
reference method on finding a representative non-IM fleet, which may differ in
characteristics for which controls are difficult to identify. Such potential characteristics
include discrepancies in maintenance trends, socioeconomic conditions and vehicle
quality.
  The validity of the reference method therefore depends upon selecting a
reference area without distinctive characteristics that could systematically bias the
                                                 
72 From 1986 to 1996, the Atlanta IM program boundaries covered four counties: Fulton, Dekalb,
Cobb and Gwinnett. The following 9 counties were added under the enhanced IM program from
January 1997 onwards: Cherokee, Clayton, Coweta, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Henry, Paulding,
and Rockdale.
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evaluation. The IM program area and reference area should be similar in all the relevant
parameters affecting vehicle emissions such as vehicle types, vehicle models, socio-
economic characteristics of vehicle owners, altitude, climate, and fuel (EPA 2002).  In
1997, nevertheless, EPA and Sierra Club researchers declared the reference method to
be the preferred method for IM program evaluation, and they even suggested that all IM
programs being evaluated should be compared with the reference Arizona IM program
(EPA 1998; Sierra-Research 1997). This EPA preference for the reference method has
been criticized by other researchers (Rothman 1998; Wenzel and Sawyer 1998a).
Wenzel and Sawyer’s (1998a) concerns included possible sample bias in recruitment
options and the errors in the conversion of concentrations to mass emission rates. They
also criticized the method of model-year stratification, in which vehicles are grouped by
model year, and argued that this method does not accurately group vehicles according
to the technologies used in a vehicle’s fuel delivery and computer control systems.
Rothman’s (1998) concerns included recruitment bias and use of the MOBILE model to
acquire evaporative emissions from a pressure test. The EPA retracted their preference
in 2001, and now officially allows the states with IM programs to also use the step and
comprehensive methods of evaluation, which are discussed below.
4.4.3 Step method studies
A second IM evaluation approach using remote sensing, known as the step
method, compares inspected with uninspected vehicles during the first year of a new or
upgraded program. The uninspected vehicles comprise an internal control group against
which to compare the emission reductions of the inspected vehicles. Because this
method applies to the early phases of a new or improved program, it can be used only
once to assess program effectiveness.
A recent remote sensing study of the Colorado enhanced IM program compared
odd (inspected) and even (uninspected) model year vehicles at the end of the first year
of a new biennial enhanced IM program (Stedman, Bishop et al. 1997). At that point in
program history, all odd model year vehicles should have been inspected, whereas all
even model year vehicles were not inspected. This timing rendered even model year
vehicles, the untested control group, to be compared with the odd model year vehicle
emissions. The comparison of odd and even model year emissions suggested that
Colorado’s enhanced IM program had reduced CO between 5 and 9% percent, while HC
and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) showed no improvement.
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More recently, the AQL also used the step method to estimate the benefit of an
enhanced IM program in the 13-county area of the Atlanta region. This study compared
emissions of vehicles that had been tested with those that had not been tested when the
IM program expanded in October 1996 to include the surrounding nine counties. This
study found that the IM program has resulted in an 11.5% reduction in CO and a 20.1%
reduction in HC emissions (Corley, DeHart-Davis et al. 2003).
Three factors limit the validity and generalizability of the step method study
results to evaluate IM program effectiveness. Measurement of on-road vehicle emissions
takes place in fewer locations, which avoids any confounding socioeconomic or physical
influences at different sites, but limits generalizability to the overall fleet. A second
limitation is that these studies measured vehicles transitioning from an annual basic IM
program to an enhanced IM program, rendering it an evaluation of incremental program
effectiveness and not a complete estimate of IM program performance. NRC (2001)
describes this method as suffering from a “limitation of inherent accounting
incompleteness” since emission reduction benefits do not account fully for non-
compliance with the program or for preemptive repairs made in anticipation of the IM
test. The third limitation is that the control group of untested vehicles may not be the
correct control, because confounding demographic and technological factors may not be
actually randomly distributed between tested and untested fleets of vehicles as required
by the design assumptions of the step method.
4.4.4 Comprehensive method studies
The comprehensive method averages the emissions of vehicles measured
before initial and after final IM testing, with the difference attributed to IM program
effectiveness. Emissions differences can also be generated for various sub-fleets, such
as vehicles initially failing and ultimately passing the IM test versus failing vehicles that
never receive a final pass. This approach enables a variety of IM-related analyses, such
as deterioration rates of IM repairs, the influence of pre-IM repairs on emissions
baselines, and a comparison with estimates based on IM records alone. The major
disadvantage of this approach is the enormous volume of on-road data required to
measure a representative sample of vehicles before and after IM testing. Sample size
requirements hinge on the probability of measuring on-road vehicles within a specific
time period of IM testing, a probability that fluctuates with testing frequency and the
distribution of sampling throughout the year.
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The earliest evaluation that used the comprehensive method to evaluate
California IM program is found in Lawson et al. (1990), which compared remotely sensed
1989 data with the California IM program data and found that (1) there were a number of
high-emitters that had passed their last biennial test, even within the past 90 days, and
(2) the size of the disparity was almost independent of the length of time elapsed since
the last biennial test. These results implied that either the biennial IM test was improperly
conducted or that the high-emitters became high-emitters very soon after their biennial
IM test.
Another remote sensing study in California in 1996 compared the on-road
emissions of 3.5 million vehicles 30 to 90 days before with up to 90 days after their basic
IM test (Klausmeier and Weyn 1997). For those vehicles that failed their initial smog
check and then passed, both CO and HC emission differences registered at 20 percent.
Normalizing this result to the entire fleet yielded an estimated nine percent emissions
reduction in HC and CO. A third evaluation, of the Arizona enhanced IM program in
1997, analyzed four million remote sensing measurements on 1.2 million vehicles in the
Phoenix IM area (Wenzel 1999b). The results indicated a seven percent reduction in CO
and an 11 percent reduction in HC.
A fourth study used the comprehensive method to estimate the effectiveness of
the California South Coast Air Basin’s enhanced IM program in 1999 (Wenzel,
Gumerman et al. 2000b). “Smog Check” IM records were used to delineate tested from
untested vehicles by the existence of an enhanced inspection within the past twelve
months. A comparison of these vehicle groups indicates a ten percent reduction in CO, a
four percent reduction in HC, and a five percent increase in NOx. In another study
focused on IM program in Phoenix, AZ, Wenzel (2003) reported 3 to 4% decrease in
CO, while NOx and HC were found to be not significantly reduced for experimental
groups before and after IM tests.73
There are potentially three key limitations of the comprehensive method. The first
limitation is the increased cost of the evaluation study because huge volumes of on-road
vehicles emissions data and IM program data must be collected and analyzed. A second
                                                 
73 A more disturbing finding of Wenzel (2003) concerned the fact that the use of comprehensive,
step and reference methods in the same study area – Phoenix AZ – provided results that were
not the same. Wenzel (2003) argues that the results from three methods are not comparable; but
then the question arises which method should be treated as more representative of estimating the
emission reduction effectiveness due to IM programs.
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limitation in the comprehensive method is the potential seasonal effects74 that result from
the year-round testing required to obtain adequately sized samples. A third limitation is
that users of this method have also tended to rely on a few high-volume sites, yielding a
large number of repeat vehicles that lower the fraction of unique vehicles that could be
reached at a greater number of sites.
Despite these limitations, the comprehensive method has four key advantages
over the reference and step methods of evaluation (EPA 2002: 47-48): (1) The initial
emissions reductions attributable to the program can be independently measured, and
can be compared with those measured by the program itself. (2) The repair
effectiveness over a short-term (i.e. up to 2 years after final IM testing) can be
independently measured. Short-term repair effectiveness can be compared with long-
term repair effectiveness as measured using multiple years of in-program data on the
same vehicles. (3) The effect of pre-test repairs on average emissions can be measured.
(4) Because large numbers of remote sensing measurements are made, the
comprehensive method allows the identification of vehicles that do not report for, or do
not complete, IM testing, yet are still being driven in the IM area.
As the literature review for all the three methods of evaluation indicates, the IM
program effectiveness in the Atlanta airshed has so far not been evaluated by using a
comprehensive method of evaluation. The two reference method studies of Atlanta
covered periods 1994-5 (Rodgers et al, under review) and 1997-8 (DeHart-Davis et al,
2002), while the step method study covered the period 1996-7 (Corley et al 2003). There
is wide discrepancy between the results of these three studies that measure IM program
emission reduction effectiveness in the Atlanta airshed: CO appears to be reduced
anywhere between 11.5% to 26% for cars (and 4.9% to 20% for trucks). Only Corley et
al. (2003) measured HC reduction at 20%, while no study has so far investigated the
impact of IM program on NOx emissions.75 This study estimates IM program
effectiveness for CO and HC emission reductions for each year between 1997 and 2001;
and for NO emission reduction between 1999 and 2001. The methodology is described
in chapter 5 and the results are presented in chapter 6. While the measurement of IM
                                                 
74 The seasonal effects include variation in temperature, pressure, humidity, fuel mixes, which are
not always precisely measured during remote sensing data collection.
75 It was not an explicit objective of Atlanta’s IM program to reduce NOx emissions during the
three study periods (that range between 1994 to 1998). NOx controls were added to Atlanta’s IM
program in 1999 (SIP 1999).
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program emission reduction effectiveness is an important issue, it is equally important to
study the underlying effects of drivers’ decision behaviors on vehicular emissions, which
is also attempted in this study. Next, studies that investigated decision behaviors of
drivers in response to IM programs are briefly reviewed.
4.5 IM programs and vehicle owners’ decision behavioral research studies
The motorist compliance rate has been the predominant decision behavioral
aspect of IM program intervention that has been studied in some detail by recent
researchers (Harrington, McConnell et al. 1999; 2000; 1998; Lawson 1993; 1995;
Lawson, Groblicki et al. 1990; Wenzel 1999b; Wenzel, Gumerman et al. 2000b).76 The
compliance rate refers to the percentage or fraction of vehicles that are required to
participate in an IM program that actually do so (NRC 2001: 190). Harrington et al.
(1998: 27-8) postulated that there could be four kinds of non-compliant vehicles: (1)
those that are not registered, (2) those that avoid the program by registering outside the
area, (3) those that are registered but never take the test, and (4) those that take the test
and fail but never complete the test cycle with a passing test. All of these four kinds of
non-compliant/non-cooperative behaviors with respect to IM program have been
extensively discussed in previous research (all but the first kind are empirically estimated
in this dissertation for the case study of Atlanta airshed).
The first kind of non-compliant drivers avoid the IM program by not registering
their vehicle at all. Since they do not have any record in the vehicle registration data, it is
very difficult to track them; and as far as I know, no empirical study has estimated
percentage of non-registered vehicles in an IM program area. Data available with the
traffic police authorities might shed some light on the extent of vehicles that are in
operation without valid registrations.
The second kind of non-compliant behavior of motorists concerns those who
register their vehicles outside the IM area but continue to drive in the area in states
having an IM program determined by county-line boundaries. Stedman et al. (1997), for
example, reported the migration of registration of high-emitters outside of Denver’s
centralized IM 240 program area, but they continue to be driven in the area. McClintock
                                                 
76 In addition to motorist compliance, behavioral studies related to IM program have also focused
on behavior of IM testing station personnel, automobile manufacturers, dealers and retailers, and
in a broad sense, the over-all driving behavior of motorists. I focus on motorist compliance in this
dissertation.
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(1999) reported similar migration of high-emitters in Ohio at the start of their IM 240
program.
The third kind of non-compliant behavior concerns those vehicle owners who
register their vehicles without duly passing an IM test. This is done either by fraudulent
repairs (i.e. tampering77 with vehicle emission control systems), bribing IM test stations78
or bribing vehicle registration authorities. The California Air Resources Board report
(CARB 1985) used random roadside pullover inspection data from vehicles in California
in 1985 and concluded that the IM smog check stations were adequately performing the
emissions test but were failing to identify most of the tampering, and that, in the Los
Angeles basin, tampering before and after the smog check were prevalent.
In another study using annual random roadside surveys of about 11,000 vehicles
in California, Lawson (1993) found no difference in emission rates in vehicles inspected
and not inspected under the California IM program. Over-all failure rates were about
40%, which is about twice the failures rates normally recorded in the biennial IM tests.
The emission rates and failure rates of the cars were again independent of where they
were in the biennial cycle. Nearly half of the high emitters seen in the roadside tests
went on to pass their subsequent biennial IM test on the first try.  Based on this
evidence, the author suggested that vehicles are being falsely passed and their
emissions are unaffected by the California IM program.
Additionally, using the same survey data, Cadle et al. (1994) and Lawson (1995)
showed failure rates no lower, or at best only marginally lower, for IM inspected vehicles
than for non-IM inspected vehicles. Further examination of the survey data showed the
lowest tampering rates and lowest emissions failure rates in test-only IM locations, and
highest failure rates in test-and-repair IM locations. These studies apparently confirmed
EPA’s hypothesis that tampering rates were higher in decentralized testing networks
than centralized networks. NRC (2001: 59 footnote 2), however, suggests that no
comprehensive study has yet been done to support or reject EPA’s hypothesis. The
                                                 
77 Tampering is defined as the malfunctioning of one or more emissions-control devices due to
either deliberate disablement or mechanical failure (NRC 2001: 224).
78 IM test-and-repair stations in decentralized testing networks have the incentive to pass the
otherwise failing vehicles to maintain a good rapproachment with their (regular) customers and
increase the long-term demand for their inspections. On the other hand, test-and-repair IM
stations also have the opposite incentive to fail more vehicles because it can increase their short-
term demand for emissions-related repairs. For detailed discussion of incentives for decentralized
IM testing networks, please see Hubbard (1998).
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NRC (2001:59) report asserts “testing fraud has been reported in both centralized and
decentralized testing networks. Since there are many more stations performing
inspections in the decentralized network, the number of stations cited for testing fraud
will likely be higher compared to a centralized program. However, the number of
inspections an individual station may be performing could be low whereas testing fraud
at a high-volume centralized testing facility may impact a large number of tests. The
committee could not find a rigorous comparison of these program types to state
definitively that the number of vehicles impacted by testing fraud is greater in a
decentralized program.”  So there is no conclusive evidence whether centralized or
decentralized testing network better avoids false passes of high-emitting vehicles, but
the evidence is clear that testing fraud occurs in both kinds of networks.
The fourth kind of non-compliant behavior concerns those high-emitters who fail
the initial IM test but never appear for re-inspection (also called “unresolved failures),
which has been reported by Wenzel (1999a), Wenzel et al. (2000b) and Ando et al.
(2000). In Colorado, for example, the percentage of unresolved failures in the enhanced
IM program increased from 23% to 27% between 1998 and 1999. Remote sensing data
in IM program areas has consistently shown these unresolved failures still operating
inside IM program areas.
NRC  (2001: 190) explicitly accepts that “the negative effect caused by this poor
compliance element has not been well documented.” NRC (2001: 193) therefore
recommends that all kinds of non-compliant behaviors need to be estimated in any
realistic evaluation of IM program. In this dissertation, I have listed 30 various non-
compliant alternative paths available to high-emitters, which are shown in figure 1.3 and
explained in section 1.3. Note that the four kinds of non-compliant behaviors discussed
in the previous literature are included in the analysis of this dissertation; and in
particular, an attempt is made to quantify the effect of drivers’ decision behaviors on
vehicular tail-pipe emissions (while controlling for other factors that affect emissions),
which has not been as exhaustively reported in previous research. Another important
issue mostly neglected in previous research concerns the fact that the outcomes of IM
program intervention have not been evaluated on the basis of multiple values/criteria,
such as fairness, which is explained in next section.
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4.6 Multiple decision criteria evaluation of IM programs: Operationalizing a meta-
decision model in the context of the Atlanta airshed
Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the decision behaviors of high-emitting
vehicle owners, it is clear that these high emitters continue to contribute inordinately to
the air quality problem and that improvement in this area would be cost-effective
because small total expenditures on less than 10% of the fleet would result in
considerable improvement in air quality for all the affected residents of the Atlanta
airshed. From these studies, one can infer that if the potential for cost-effective vehicular
emission reductions, designed on the assumption of a Polluter Pays Principle (PPP),
were the only value at issue, the IM program would potentially be an effective regulatory
strategy for improving air quality. It could be argued, however, that the PPP is not
applicable in this situation since it can be hypothesized that high emitting vehicle owners
cannot sustain further repair costs, because they have little disposable income.  The
enactment of a regulatory program, such as an IM Program, is not in itself enough to
induce the high-emitting vehicle owners to bear the repair costs, nor does the threat of
punishment elicit cooperation and timely repairs by high emitters.
The National Research Council (NRC 2001:5) recommends: “Further research is
needed to design the means to reduce high emitting vehicles in ways that are effective
as well as socially and politically acceptable [my italics]. States would have to evaluate
which policies are the most cost-effective and acceptable ways of obtaining emissions
reductions from high-emitting vehicles.” The NRC recommendation implies that there are
multiple evaluative criteria for judging policies to improve air quality.  While the cost-
effectiveness criterion may be the most important in some situations, the application of a
fairness criterion may suggest rule changes that would increase drivers’ cooperation with
the emissions laws. The NRC recommendation apparently leads one to apply multiple
criteria decision-making models (MCDMs) for evaluating the IM programs, which has so
far not been attempted in previous research. While a full multiple-criteria study is beyond
the empirical scope of this dissertation, I use two values – emission reduction
effectiveness and fairness – to evaluate the impact of IM program in the Atlanta airshed
between 1997 and 2001.
More specifically, as explained in section 3.4 on the generalized methodology of
MDMs, I use the case-study of IM program intervention in the Atlanta airshed to describe
the context-sensitive outcomes on two value scales: (1) I describe the effect on vehicular
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tail-pipe emissions due to the decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners under
the given regulatory incentive mechanism; and (2) describe the impacts/outcomes
measured on the value of the fairness due to the IM program intervention. Fairness is
defined as the null hypothesis that median household income of the vehicle owners’
residential census block groups is statistically equal for all IM eligible fleets, including
control, cooperative and non-cooperative fleets.79 Both of these questions/criteria/values
are explored in greater depth with empirical data in chapters 5 and 6. Once the results
from the descriptive analysis –i.e. level of action – are presented in chapter 6, I also
briefly talk about normative analysis part of MDMs in chapter 7; that is, how the incentive
mechanism design of IM program in Atlanta airshed could be changed to make it more
effective in reducing vehicular tail-pipe emissions (by increasing the cooperation of high-
emitting vehicle owners) and fairer in distributing the program costs as compared to the
results seen for the periods 1997 to 2001.
                                                 
79 This null hypothesis is a statistical representation of the GINI-coefficient decision rule that has




THE QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH DESIGN
5.1 The rationale for a quasi-experimental design
While controlled laboratory experiments provide experimenters the opportunity to
explicitly control the timing and the sample of intervention, natural experiments – also
called quasi-experiments – study the effects of an intervention that has been introduced
at a time for a population that is not in the control of the experimenter. Both controlled
experiments and quasi-experiments, however, share the methodological objective of
estimating the intervention effects on the “treatment” groups as compared to the “control”
groups of populations of interest (Cook and Campbel 1980).
Quasi-experimental studies are commonly employed in policy analysis to
estimate the effects of policy interventions on the objective variables (or outcomes) for
which the policies were introduced.80 The policy evaluation and implementation literature
is also replete with quasi-experimental studies. Meyer (1995) provides a broad review of
the previous quasi-experimental studies. This study employs quasi-experimental design
because it provides a cohesive methodology to investigate in detail answers to the three
major research questions that were introduced in chapter 1 (specifically sections 1.1 and
1.4). Quasi-experimental research designs not only provide a sound scientific
methodology to objectively estimate the effects of the policy interventions, but the results
also provide evidence for designing future policies, replicating the existing policy in other
areas, or modifying the existing policy interventions to enhance the effectiveness of
policies in meeting the multiple objectives/outcomes desired by policy-makers in
particular, and society in general.   At the same time, quasi-experimenters walk a very
tight rope because they do not enjoy the flexibility of controlling the timing and
                                                 
80 It is also possible to estimate through quasi-experimental designs the policy intervention effects
in a pilot study area for a policy, which may or may not be actually implemented on large
populations “after” the quasi-experimental study. Pilot policy interventions allow quasi-
experimenters to control the timing and sample of experimental intervention, but the intervention
effects are also measured “ex-post facto”.
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population/sample of interventions as do controlled lab experimenters. The control and
treatment groups of sampled subjects may thus not be as clearly demarcated in the case
of quasi-experiments as they are for controlled experiments. There are many other
pitfalls and threats to the validity of the quasi-experimental research designs, which are
extensively covered in previous literature (Cook and Campbell 1980, Rossi and Freeman
1993, Dunn 1998) and discussed later in this chapter in the context of the present study.
A brief introduction to the quasi-experimental research design of this study was
presented in section 1.4. Chapter 5 builds on section 1.4 and presents the research
design in full detail. In section 5.2, the broader concept of quasi-experimental research
design employed in this study is elaborated to operationalize the methodology to test the
hypotheses [introduced in section 1.3]. Section 5.3 introduces the remote sensing
sample of on-road vehicles that was collected by the remote sensing team of the Air
Quality Labs in the Atlanta MSA between 1997 and 2001. In section 5.4, the process of
constructing a mixed-pooled time-series database is described and the sample statistics
of the variables used in this study are presented.   The database is constructed, first, by
matching the remote sensing sample of the on-road vehicles with the vehicle registration
data to get information about the vehicular parameters and the vehicle owners. Second,
the remote sensing sample is also matched with the IM program data to track the
emissions’ testing records of the sampled vehicles. Third, climate data is used to
ascertain the ambient atmospheric conditions on the days of the remote sensing
measurements. Fourth, census data is employed to geo-code the addresses of the
sampled vehicle owners at the census block-group level for getting information about
socio-economic contextual parameters of the vehicle owners.
Section 5.5 presents the data analysis methodology, which is further subdivided
in three subsections. Section 5.5.1 presents the methods to estimate the probability of
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-emitting vehicle owners in
the Atlanta airshed, extending the results from the observed sample to the Atlanta MSA.
Section 5.5.2 presents the mixed pooled time series generalized linear regression
models to evaluate the impact on vehicular tail-pipe emissions due to the vehicle
owners’ decision behaviors, while controlling for other significant parameters. Section
5.5.3 presents multinomial logistic regression models that are employed to explain the
systematic variation in socio-economic and technological contextual conditions that
affect the probability of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-
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Environmental policy intervention
to regulate the tail-pipe emissions
from high-emitting vehicles, includes
“enhanced” IM program that began in
January 1997 in Atlanta
Quasi-experimental control
and treatment groups of
vehicle owners
• Control group [Normal
emitting vehicle-owners
inside IM program area]
•  Treatment groups [ (1)
Cooperative high-emitting
vehicle owners, (2) Non-
cooperative high-emitting
vehicle owners
• Other groups [Outside
Atlanta fleet]
Technologies for tail-pipe emission
control systems [AIR, OXY, TWC,
EGR, CLL, TAC, PCV]
Context specific parameters
• Vehicular characteristics
[vehicle age, vehicle type,
mileage, fuel regime, vehicle
manufacturer, country of
vehicle manufacturer]




road grade and time of
measurement]
Socio-economic and demographic
contextual conditions of vehicle
owners measured at census block
group level [per capita income,
median household income, population
age and gender composition, % of
white, black and other races]
Environmental outcomes
[Tail-pipe vehicular emissions
of CO, HCs and NOx]
Figure 5.1: A conceptual schema of quasi-experimental research design
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emitting vehicle owners. Finally, section 5.6 explores threats to internal, statistical,
construct and external validity of the quasi-experimental research design.
5.2 The conceptual framework
Figure 5.1 synthesizes the conceptual framework of the quasi-experimental
research design, various aspects of which have been discussed in detail in chapters 1 to
4. The “enhanced” IM program is the environmental policy intervention in the Atlanta
airshed, which leads to two broad groups of vehicle owners: the control and treatment
groups. The control group of vehicle owners include “initial test initial pass” vehicles
[Q1].81 Other control groups are the IM-ineligible fleet [Q2], waived fleet [Q3], rest-of-GA
fleet [Q4] and the missing fleet [Q5]. The treatment groups of vehicle owners include
cooperative and non-cooperative fleets. Cooperative fleets include retest-pass [Q6] and
migrated pass [Q7] vehicle owners. Non-cooperative fleets include retest-fail [Q8],
migrated fail [Q9], missing fail [Q10] and missing passed [Q11].
Tail-pipe vehicular emissions are complex functions of human decision behaviors
that emerge after the IM policy intervention is introduced [represented by 11 Q
variables]. In addition, vehicular characteristics [represented by 31 R variables] and
physical and temporal parameters at the time of measurement [represented by 7 S and
4 T variables] are also hypothesized to affect the production of tail-pipe vehicular
emissions.
Human decision behaviors are also hypothesized to be affected by both group-
level socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions [represented by 17 W
variables] as well as individual level parameters captured by vehicular characteristics
[represented by 31 R variables] and temporal parameters [4 T variables].
5.3 Remote sensing sampling of on-road vehicles in Atlanta (1997-2001)
Remote sensing data captures CO, HC and NOx tail-pipe emissions from on-
road vehicle fleets, which are measured in percentage concentrations of CO2. Section
4.4.1 in chapter 4 presents the general methodology of remote sensing of vehicular
exhaust emissions. Appendix A presents atmospheric chemistry and transportation
                                                 
81 Since the initial test initial pass group of vehicle owners [Q1] may also include cooperative and
non-cooperative vehicle owners, as described in the limitations of this study later in chapter 5, the
[Q1] group may contain vehicles from the treatment groups. Further, in a narrow sense, vehicles
in [Q1] also go through IM testing, so it can be argued that [Q1] should also be categorized as a
treatment group. The use of the phrase “control group” for [Q1] should be interpreted in light of
these limitations. The limitations show that the research pursued in this study has a “quasi-
experimental” and not an “experimental” design.
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research methods used to convert the emission concentration ratios into mass emission
factors (grams of pollutant per gallon) and mass emission rates (tons of pollutant per
year).
The raw remote sensing data between 1997 and 2001, collected by AQL,
contains a total of 1.42 million observations measured at various locations in the Atlanta
MSA. The license plates of the observed vehicles were matched by AQL researchers
with the vehicle registration databases to get information about vehicular characteristics,
such as VIN, make, model, model year. Further, the AQL team used a VIN decoder to
get information about the technological parameters of the vehicles.
In the initial data-cleaning process of the raw data, I dropped the observations
from the annual samples for which either the license plates were not clearly readable
from the pictures of the license-plates taken by the remote sensors, or the license plates
did not match with Georgia’s vehicle registration databases. First, 285,040 observations
with the un-readable license plates were dropped because no further information either
about the vehicular characteristics or the vehicle owner can be ascertained. Second,
240,887 observations for license plates that were not found to be registered anywhere in
the 159 counties of the state of the Georgia during that calendar year were dropped
because access to vehicle registration databases of Georgia’s neighboring states or the
entire USA was not available.
The first reason –un-readable license plates-- to drop the observations may
affect the randomness of the selected sample82 because it is likely that very large trucks,
vehicles with accidents and very new vehicles may not have the license plates at their
normal rear-end positions where cameras of remote sensors are programmed to take
pictures. Similarly the second reason – non-availability of vehicle registration data
outside the Georgia state – probably limits the results83 of this study in three ways: (1)
High-emitting vehicle owners who avoid the vehicle registration altogether and drive
illegally inside the IM program area (as shown in figure 1.3) are not observable because
their “fake” license plates do not match with Georgia’s vehicle registration database. (2)
                                                 
82 A t-test shows that 285,040 observations on the vehicles in the sample with no readable license
plates have 0.0875% higher CO and 3.45 PPM higher HC concentrations than 1,138,284
observations on vehicles in the sample with readable license plates.
83 A t-test shows that 240,887 observations on the vehicles in the sample with license plates not
matched in the Georgia vehicle registration database have 0.0267% higher CO and 23.42 PPM
higher HC concentrations than 897,397 observations on vehicles in the sample with readable
license plates.
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High-emitting vehicle owners who register out of Georgia and still drive inside the
Atlanta’s IM program area remain unobservable because information about the vehicles,
such as VIN, which is crucial to the research design, is not available. (3) A fraction of the
on-road fleet always comes from vehicles that are traveling through Atlanta area but are
not registered in the state of Georgia. This is called as “out-of-state” fleet. Out-of-state
vehicles are dropped from the sample because, first, no further information is available
about them; and, second, out-of-state vehicles may or may not be subjected to the IM
program regulations, which depends on the area of their registration. It should, however,
be noted that any realistic tail-pipe vehicular emissions inventory should take into
account the “out of state” vehicles, but emissions inventory building is not the focus of
the present research.
The remaining “Georgia registered” samples observed for each of the five
calendar years between 1997 and 2001 were sorted by VIN, observation date and time
and then a new variable [unique: VIN = lag (VIN)] was computed to check whether a
(unique-by-VIN) vehicle has been observed multiple times during a calendar year. If a
vehicle was observed multiple times during a year, its last observation in the sample was
retained.84 This way, the sample is reduced to observations on “unique” vehicles during
a calendar year, which facilitates its tracking in IM program data.85
Once annual samples of the raw data are cleaned as described in the previous
two paragraphs, the remaining samples from each year are pooled together, which, in
rest of the dissertation, is called as “mixed-pool time-series” sample data. The sample
data has a total of 777,408 observations, of which 668,559 (85.9% of total sample) are
unique (by VIN) vehicles. Of the total sample, 109,249 (14.1%) vehicles in the sample
are observed at least twice, 17,320 (2.2%) are observed at least three times and 2,631
(0.3%) are observed at least four times in different calendar years between 1997 and
2001. The probability of observing the same vehicle again through a remote sensor
drops exponentially in this sample.
                                                 
84 The last observation is retained to get the latest information within a calendar year about the
vehicle’s emissions. A t-test shows that 89,021 observations on the vehicles observed twice or
more in an evaluation year in the sample have 0.0134% higher CO and 8.21 PPM higher HC
concentrations than 777,408 observations on the vehicles uniquely observed in a given year in
the sample.
85 Note that this does not preclude multiple observations of the same vehicle from being retained
in the sample if and only if it is observed in more than one calendar year.
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Figure 5.2: Observations as a percent of total sample at remote sensing sites in
Atlanta (1997-2001)
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample data (1997-2001)




CO (%) CRCO 775606 -1.52 14.75 .4796 1.07563 4.460
HC (PPM) CRHC 741869 -5000.00 55900.00 180.0408 1062.96255 13.082
NO (PPM) CRNO 136486 -249.00 6961.00 522.0066 761.36372 2.429
CO (gm/gal) YCO 466640 2.88 4013.13 213.0044 396.0363 3.577
HC (gm/gal) YHC 466640 .05 1524.35 18.65089 52.19493 9.457
NO (gm/gal) YNO 89408 .04 269.19 24.73932 31.14795 2.225
Quasi-experimental fleet types representing vehicle owners’ decision paths
Control fleet Q1 777408 .00 1.00 .2701 .44402 1.035
In-eligible fleet Q2 777408 .00 1.00 .5213 .49955 -.085
Waived fleet Q3 777408 .00 1.00 .0023 .04761 20.910
Rest-of-Georgia Q4 777408 .00 1.00 .1018 .30234 2.634
Missing fleet Q5 777408 .00 1.00 .0378 .19064 4.849
Retest pass Q6 777408 .00 1.00 .0189 .13613 7.069
Migrated pass Q7 777408 .00 1.00 .0086 .09249 10.626
Retest fail Q8 777408 .00 1.00 .0037 .06106 16.256
Migrated fail Q9 777408 .00 1.00 .0011 .03347 29.808
Missing fail Q10 777408 .00 1.00 .0033 .05778 17.192




R1 777408 -2 40 5.40 4.620 1.356
Vehicle type R2 733080 0 1 .38 .485 .508
FORD R3 777408 .00 1.00 .1694 .37512 1.763
GM R4 777408 .00 1.00 .1974 .39807 1.520
CHRYSLER R5 777408 .00 1.00 .0878 .28305 2.912
HONDA R6 777408 .00 1.00 .0785 .26889 3.136
TOYOTA R7 777408 .00 1.00 .0727 .25962 3.292
NISSAN R8 777408 .00 1.00 .0554 .22878 3.887
MAZDA R9 777408 .00 1.00 .0257 .15831 5.992
MITSUBISHI R10 777408 .00 1.00 .0124 .11059 8.818
MERCEDES R11 777408 .00 1.00 .0110 .10418 9.388
VOLVO R12 777408 .00 1.00 .0100 .09948 9.851
VW R13 777408 .00 1.00 .0076 .08668 11.362
ISUZU R14 777408 .00 1.00 .0082 .09016 10.910
Other
Manufacturers
R15 777408 .00 1.00 .2639 .44075 1.071
USA R16 777408 .00 1.00 .6069 .48844 -.438
JAPAN R17 777408 .00 1.00 .1594 .36609 1.860
CANADA R18 777408 .00 1.00 .0952 .29353 2.758
GERMANY R19 777408 .00 1.00 .0298 .17013 5.527
MEXICO R20 777408 .00 1.00 .0234 .15114 6.307
SWEDEN R21 777408 .00 1.00 .0150 .12147 7.986
KOREA R22 777408 .00 1.00 .0089 .09393 10.456
UK R23 777408 .00 1.00 .0034 .05842 17.001
Other countries R24 777408 .00 1.00 .0579 .23355 3.786
AIR R25 716710 0 1 .25 .432 1.161
TWC R26 716715 0 1 .96 .185 -5.011
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Table 5.1 (Continued)
EGR R27 714765 0 1 .82 .385 -1.659
CLL R28 716714 0 1 .97 .178 -5.266
TAC R29 716714 0 1 .14 .345 2.103
OXY R30 716711 0 1 .03 .162 5.845
PCV R31 716715 0 1 1.00 .052 -19.020
Physical conditions at the time of remote sensing measurement
Ambient
temperature (F)
S1 777408 17.00 97.00 67.9168 13.83790 -.536
Relative
humidity (%)
S2 777408 14.00 100.00 59.3126 17.94219 .268
Atmospheric
pressure (Hg)
S3 777408 28.49 30.22 29.0190 .16671 1.324
Speed (MPH) S4 777408 .30 74.60 37.7163 8.69647 .151
Acceleration
(MPH/sec)
S5 777408 -13.30 13.30 .7076 .57110 .198
Road gradient
(degrees)
S6 775273 -6.00 7.50 .7752 3.17212 -.125
Sine (road
gradient)
S6 775273 -.997495 .997495 .2282989 .6679658 -.494
Generation of
instrument
S7 777408 0 1 .22 .414 1.350
Temporal parameters
1997 T1 777408 .00 1.00 .2507 .43341 1.150
1998 T2 777408 .00 1.00 .1836 .38718 1.634
1999 T3 777408 .00 1.00 .1982 .39864 1.514
2000 T4 777408 .00 1.00 .2047 .40348 1.464
2001 T5 777408 .00 1.00 .1628 .36917 1.827
Socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions of vehicle owners measured at




W1 519416 .00 200001.00 59836.824 25739.8725 1.408
Per capita
income ($)
W2 519416 .00 120932.00 27679.681 13973.8174 2.231
Median home
value ($)
W3 519416 .00 914800.00 163263.164 102789.2268 2.649
% Employed W4 519416 .00 94.9 67.859 9.5147 -1.432
% White W5 519416 .00 100.00 65.281 30.6740 -.897
% Black W6 519416 .00 100.00 26.504 30.6491 1.242
% Hispanic W7 519416 .00 83.60 6.107 9.3910 3.285
% Asian W8 519416 .00 39.20 3.480 4.4745 1.998
% Other races W9 519416 .00 62.10 2.926 4.9218 3.787
% male W10 519416 .00 99.70 49.160 4.1050 .325
% female W11 519416 .00 94.60 50.820 4.1091 -1.045
% age 18-24 W12 519416 .00 98.60 8.833 5.3475 4.346
% age 25-34 W13 519416 .00 60.80 17.700 8.4881 1.101
% age 35-44 W14 519416 .00 46.20 18.199 4.0068 -.046
% age 45-54 W15 519416 .00 34.10 13.930 4.4618 .482
% age 55-64 W16 519416 .00 32.50 7.712 3.5455 .932
% age 65 + W17 519416 .00 100.00 8.158 6.1354 3.428
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Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of the mixed-pool remotely sensed sample
data collected between 1997 and 2001. Annual distribution of the remotely sensed
sample data can be elicited from the mean values of five temporal variables: 1997 [T1],
1998 [T2], 1999 [T3], 2000 [T4] and 2001 [T5]. 25.07% of the sample was observed in
1997, 18.36% in 1998, 19.82% in 1999, 20.47% in 2000 and 16.28% in 2001. This
shows that the sample is collected almost evenly for each year in the study period.
Figure 5.2 shows 73 remote sensing sites that were used to collect the sample
data between 1997 and 2001. This figure shows that remote sensing data has been
collected inside the 13 IM program counties during the five years of the study period.
Figure 5.2 also shows % of observations as a part of total sample collected at each
remote sensing site from 1997 to 2001. This map shows that majority of the remote
sensing sites are located in the four-county area of Fulton, Dekalb, Gwinnent and Cobb
(where both the basic and enhanced IM program has been implemented), and more
than two-third observations of the total sample were collected there. The selection of a
remote sensing site is an extremely important design parameter in this research. Though
ideally remote sensing data should be collected on every road of the Atlanta MSA, this is
neither feasible nor technologically possible. Remote sensing sites can only be chosen
where traffic flows in single lanes. The majority of the remote sensing sites are located at
entrances to major interstates/high-ways or their exits. Data from surface roads and
smaller arterial roads is, however, also available in the sample, which is mostly collected
in Atlanta city’s outskirts.
In 1997, the remote sensing data was collected for 21 days spread over all the
year. Similarly, the 1998 data was collected on 15 days, 1999 and 2000 data on 18
days, and 2001 data on 17 days. Furthermore, hourly sampling time in all years of the
sample data was between 6 am in the morning and 6 pm in the evening. Ideally, the data
should be collected on each of the 365 days of a year and 24 hours of a day. Data
collection costs, however, do not permit meeting this ideal.
Five remote sensing instruments were used by AQL to collect the sample data. 2
of these 5 instruments are known as “first generation smogdog devices” (FG-SMD),
while the remaining three instruments are known as “second-generation remote sensing
devices” (SG-RSD). FG-SMD were used between 1997 and 2000 while SG-RSD were
used between 1999 and 2001. FG-SMD data (1997-2000) measures CO and HC
emissions concentrations, but, unfortunately, the first generation SMD data do not
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contain variables measuring NOx, speed and acceleration of the vehicles. AQL started
collecting the remote sensing data through second-generation RSD instruments in 1999.
The second-generation RSD data (1999-2001) contains variables measuring CO, HC,
NOx, speed and acceleration of the vehicles. This research uses both FG-SMD and SG-
RSD data to enhance the temporal coverage and sample size of the study. A variable
“generation of remote sensing instrument” [S7] is coded zero for observations collected
by first generation instruments and 1 for 2nd generation instruments. This variable is
included in the regression models to minimize the instrumentation effects in measuring
the vehicular tail-pipe emissions.
5.4 Variable operationalization and database construction
5.4.1: Vehicular characteristics:
Vehicles in the sample are classified according to the following characteristics:86
vehicle age (observation year minus model year) [R1], vehicle type [R2], vehicle
manufacturer [R3 to R15]87, country of vehicle manufacturing [R16 to R24] and emission-
control technology type [R25 to R31]. Descriptive statistics on these variables [R1 to R31]
are presented in table 5.1. These vehicle characteristics, among others, are included in
the CAFÉ data released by AQL; and are primarily ascertained either through matching
the RSD observed license plates with the license plates in the vehicle registration
databases, or through decoding the VIN of a vehicle.
Vehicle Registration data, provided by Georgia Department of Motor Vehicles (GA-
DMV), captures the registration patterns of vehicles in the state of Georgia from 1997 to
2002. The key variables of interest are the VIN, the model year, the make and model
name of the vehicle, the date of registration, the address of registration, and, only in
1998 and 1999 data, the vehicle registration expiration date and the birthday of the
vehicle owner (which is the same for the day and month arguments of both variables).
This database changes every day as vehicles migrate in and out of Georgia, or new
vehicles get registered and old ones scrapped. AQL does not have access to registration
data for each day; rather, data on a tri-monthly basis is provided.  The remote sensing
                                                 
86 In addition, data on vehicle make and model is also available but it is not included in the
analysis to reduce complexity. Further, fuel type is another important characteristic of vehicles in
the sample but is not included in the analysis because IM program only targets gasoline-fueled
vehicles. Non-gasoline vehicles (such as diesels and electrics) constitute less than 0.5% of the
sample and are included in the following fleet types: in-eligible fleet, rest-of-Georgia fleet.
87 Data on vehicle manufacturers for the year 1998 is not currently available.
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 Figure 5.3: The remote sensing sample distributed by vehicle age and observation year
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sample for each year is matched with the 4 vehicle registration databases of that year to
get information about the variables of interest.
Table 5.1 shows that mean age of the vehicles in the sample is 5.4 years.
Distribution of the sample by vehicle age and observation year is presented in figure 5.3.
62% of the total sample contains passenger cars, while the remaining 38% contains
trucks, vans, mini-vans and SUVs.
Descriptive statistics in table 5.1 show that 16.94% of the vehicles in the sample
were manufactured by Ford, 19.74% by GM, 8.78% by Chrysler, 7.85% by Honda,
7.27% by Toyota, 5.54% by Nissan, 2.57% by Mazda, 1.24% by Mitsubishi, 1.10% by
Figure 5.4: The remote sensing sample distributed by vehicle age and vehicle
manufacturer.
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Mercedes, 1% by Volvo, 0.76% by VW and 0.82% by Isuzu. Vehicle manufacturer
information about 18.36% of the sample observed in 1998 is not available, while other
manufacturers (such as BMW, Rolls Royce, etc.) produced the remaining 8.03% of the
total sample. The variable, other manufacturers, represents 26.39% of the sample,
which includes 18.36% missing information. Figure 5.4 shows distribution of the sample
by manufacturer and vehicle age.
As shown in table 5.1, 60.69% of the sample represents USA as the country of
the vehicle manufacturing (or country of the final assembly), while Japan is the second
highest at 15.94%, Canada at 9.52%, Germany at 2.98%, Mexico at 2.34%, Sweden at
1.5%, Korea at 0.89%, UK at 0.39% and other countries at 5.79%.
Table 5.1 shows that 25% of the total remote sensing sample vehicles are
equipped with AIR, 96% with TWC, 82% with EGR, 97% with CLL, 14% with TAC, 3%
with OXY and almost 100 % with PCV emission control systems. Seven emission control
technologies are distributed more or less similarly in all the five years of observation,
except that AIR seems to decline from about 7% in the 1997 sample to less than 4% in
the 2001 sample and TAC from about 5% to 2.5% during the same period.
While mileage of a vehicle is theoretically a strong explanatory variable of
changes in vehicular emissions, it is extremely unfortunate that the odometer data in the
vehicle registration database is poorly reported. Due to the lack of reliability, the variable
odometer as measured in the registration databases is dropped. At the time of
aggregating the Atlanta fleet-wide emissions in terms of mass emission rates, a VMT-
based methodology is used, which is explained in Appendix A. The VMT-based
methodology uses more reliable but aggregate mileage data, as released by BTS, US-
DOT for the state of Georgia for the study period. Dropping the vehicle level odometer
data causes potential omitted variable bias in predicting on-road vehicular tailpipe
emissions, which is a major limitation of this research design.
5.4.2: Contextual conditions at the time of measurement:
As shown in table 5.1, road grade at remote sensing measurement sites varied
from –6.00 degrees (i.e. 6 degrees downhill slop) to 7.50 degrees (i.e. 7.5 degrees uphill
slop). The mean gradient at the remote sensing sites is 0.77 degrees. The sine of road-
grade measures the vertical axis of the angle of slope of the road, which is used in
regression models. Speed and acceleration of the vehicles was directly measured by the
second-generation remote sensors only. For the sample values of the first generation
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remote sensors, the missing values are filled by estimating average speed and
acceleration for each remote sensing site. For the overall sample, as shown in table 5.1,
vehicles were measured traveling between the minimum speed of 0.30 MPH to a
maximum of 74.60 MPH. The sample mean is 37.72 MPH. The sample vehicles were
decelerating up to 13.30 MPH/Second and accelerating up to 13.30 MPH/second at the
time of observation. The sample mean stands at acceleration of 0.71 MPH/second.
The atmospheric variables – temperature, humidity and pressure – were
estimated for each day and hour of observation by linking the sample data with the Local
Climatological data (1997 to 2001) released by National Climatic Data Center (NCDC),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The climate data contains
three-hourly observations of meteorological variables measured at NCDC weather
station in Hartsfield International Airport, Fulton County, Atlanta. The three-hourly
climate data observations are used to impute one-hourly observations for each day of
the remote sensing data collection (a total of 89 days in five years) by estimating a linear
trend at a point. There are two trends obvious in 89 days (spread over five years) of the
sample: First, temperature in Atlanta is cooler in the winter months, milder in spring and
fall, and hotter in summer months. Second, almost every day of observation,
temperature was lower in the morning hours, rose by the afternoon to the day’s peak,
and then started to decline after 5 pm. Similarly, there are two trends common in the
relative humidity data: First, Atlanta is a relatively humid place (with sample mean of
59.31%). Second, humidity is normally higher in the early morning hours, declines by
afternoon and then starts to rise again by later afternoon. There are quite a few
exceptions to the normal trend, with some days of observation having 100% humidity
and others consistently less than 40%.  The atmospheric pressure is also estimated for
each hour and day of observation. As shown in table 5.1, pressure ranges from 28.49
minimum to 30.22 maximum and a mean of 29.01 inches of Mercury at the Atlanta
Hartsfield International Airport for 89 days of observation.
 5.4.3: Fleet types as decision variables:
As described in section 1.3, and shown in the terminal nodes of figure 1.3, 11
fleet types of the vehicles in the sample, which reflect the cooperative and non-
cooperative decisions taken by vehicle owners in response to the regulatory IM program
intervention in the Atlanta airshed, are estimated. This is essentially accomplished by
tracking the IM testing records of the remotely sensed sampled vehicles. Inspection and
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Maintenance (IM) and exemption data (1997-2001) is provided by Georgia Department
of Natural Resources (Ga-DNR), Georgia Environmental Protection Division (Ga-EPD).
The IM database contains about one to two million observations of vehicles tested each
year, depending upon the rule regime of the IM program as explained in section 4.3. The
key variables in the IM database are the time and place of the IM test, the measurement
levels of CO, HC and NOx, the VIN, the model year, make and technology type of the
vehicle and, most importantly, the test-type (i.e. initial or re-test) and over-all test results
(i.e. fail or pass). The IM exemption data provides information about the VIN and model
year of the vehicles that were exempted from the IM test.
11 fleet type variables for each annual sample were coded. The annual samples
are used at this stage because it facilitates their matching with IM program data and lets
us track the changes in the IM program rules from year to year. Table 5.1 presents the
summary sample statistics for 11 fleet types. The remote sensing sample between 1997
and 2001 contains on average 27.01% vehicles in the control fleet [initial test initial
pass], 52.13% vehicles in the IM in-eligible fleet, 0.23% vehicles in the waived fleet,
10.18% vehicles in the rest of Georgia fleet and 3.78% vehicles in the missing fleet. The
five fleets mentioned in the preceding sentence serve as multiple control groups in this
research design. The remaining six fleets are categorizations of vehicles in different
treatment groups; the cooperative fleets include vehicles in retest pass and migrated
pass fleets, while non-cooperative fleets include vehicles in retest fail, migrated fail,
missing fail and missing pass groups.88  Table 5.1 shows that the retest pass fleet
contains 1.89% vehicles of the total sample and the migrated pass fleet contains 0.86%
vehicles. The sample mean for retest fail vehicles is 0.37%, migrated fail vehicles is
0.11%, missing fail vehicles is 0.33% and missing pass vehicles is 3.14%.
Figure 5.5 shows the remote sensing sample distribution by fleet type and
observation year. Due to the IM program shift from a biennial program to an annual
program in 2001, it is noticeable in figure 5.5 that the ineligible fleet is drastically reduced
                                                 
88 Due to the non-discernable changes in vehicle ownership, it is difficult to decide whether
vehicles in missing pass fleet are cooperative or non-cooperative. I designate them non-
cooperative because these vehicles were required by IM program rules to appear in IM test, but
they are missing from IM testing records. I do not include them in the missing fleet because they
have been found to have IM test records in the previous IM cycle, in which they passed the initial
test. The designation of missing pass fleet as non-cooperative fleet is based on the assumption
that the vehicle owners observed on-road are the same as at the time of vehicle’s last IM test in
the previous year/cycle. This assumption needs to be tested.
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in 2001 as compared to previous years while the control group of vehicles is increased.
Notice that the configuration of the rest of the fleet types does not appear to change due
to this change of rule, which is interesting because it suggests that the behavioral
parameters ascertained through the remote sensing data are robust and generalizable.
The majority control group of vehicles are relatively younger in age, though older
Figure 5.5: The remote sensing sample distributed by 11 fleet types and observation
year
Figure 5.5: The remote sensing sample distributed by 11 fleet types and observation
year
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vehicles are also initial test initial passes. More importantly, cooperative and non-
cooperative vehicles belong in all vehicle age groups, and not just older vehicles.
5.4.4: Tail-pipe vehicular emissions:
Table 5.1 shows that the mean CO emissions of the sample in concentration
units are 0.4796%, mean HC emissions are 180 PPM and mean NO emissions are 522
PPM. Converted as emission factors, as described in appendix A, mean CO, HC and
NO emissions for the sample stand at respectively 213 gg-1, 18.65 gg-1 and 24.73 gg-1.
Figure 5.6 shows vehicular tail-pipe emissions distributed by vehicle age and
observation year. Panel A in figure 5.6 shows CO distribution and indicates that CO
vehicle emissions are an increasing function of vehicle age, and as vehicle age
increases above 14 years, the standard error also increases. Panel A also shows that
CO emissions are decreasing for each year of the sample, while holding vehicle age
constant. Panel B in figure 5.6 shows mean HC emissions by vehicle age and
observation year.  Panel B shows that HC emissions also increase by vehicle age; their
uncertainty interval also rises after vehicles are 10 years or older.  HC emissions also
appear to have decreased significantly from their 1997 sample level to 2001 level, while
holding vehicle age constant. Panel C shows NO emissions as a function of vehicle age
and observation year. NO emissions increase exponentially up to the age of 15 years
and then appear to decrease at a lower slope.  The standard errors also increase
significantly after 15 years of vehicle age. The NO emissions by observation year,
holding vehicle age constant, show confounding sample statistics. While emissions
appear to decrease from 2000 to 2001, it appears that NO increased from 1999 to 2000.
This confounding result may be due to smaller sample size in 1999 second generation
data, which is only 1.075% of the total sample. It is also possible that NO emissions
actually increased from 1999 levels to 2000 levels, while holding vehicle age constant.
Mean NO emissions in 2001, however, appear to be lower than both 1999 and 2000
levels.
Figure 5.7 shows the annual trend of CO, HC and NO emission factors by
11 fleet types during the study period 1997 to 2001.  While CO, HC and NO emission
factors have decreased from 1997 to 2001, the vehicles in the five experimental fleets
–retest pass, migrated pass, retest fail, migrated fail, and missing fail –emit higher CO,
HC and NO emissions than the control group vehicles. Only the missing passed fleet of
vehicles emits similar emissions as the control group vehicles. Vehicles in the ineligible
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Figure 5.6, Panel A: CO
Figure 5.6, Panel B: HC
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Figure 5.6, Panel C: NO
Figure 5.6: Vehicular tail-pipe emissions of CO, HC and NO distributed by vehicle














Figure 5.7: Annual trend of CO, HC and NO emission factors by 11 fleet types
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Figure 5.8: The effects of remote sensing instrument-generations on mean CO
and HC emissions in the sample
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fleet are also similar to the control group, but the waived group vehicles emit on average
higher emissions than the control group vehicles.
78% of the sample was collected by first generation instruments [nos. 1 and 2]
between 1997 and 2000, while 22% was collected by second generation instruments
[nos. 418, 503, 511] between 1999 and 2001. While pooling together the data measured
by these five instruments of two different generations, it is important to be cautious about
the instrumentation effects of the quasi-experimental research design. Figure 5.8 shows
that CO and HC emissions measured by first and second generation instruments differ
significantly from each other, with second generation instruments measuring consistently
less CO and HC emissions, while holding vehicle age constant in the sample. NO
emissions were only measured by three second-generation instruments. This is a very
confounding picture for CO and HC emissions because the instrumentation effects are
interacting with other covariates, especially the observation year/temporal effects. A
better way to capture the instrumentation effects is by comparing the instruments of the
two generations for same observation years [i.e. 1999 and 2000], which is done in the
regression models. In order to take account of the instrumentation effects, the variable
“generation of remote sensing instrument” is therefore included in the regression
models.
5.4.5: Socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions of vehicle owners:
Census data (2000) released by US census bureau, and formatted by Geolytics
Inc., captures demographic and socio-economic patterns.89 This study uses census
block-group ecological level data for the state of Georgia. The addresses of vehicle
owners tracked in vehicle registration data are geo-coded at the census block-group
level to access various socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions of the
vehicle owners. In particular, the following variables, which are broadly grouped in three
categories, are of special interest [as explained in section 1.4]. (1) Economic variables:
the median household income [W1]; the per capita income [W2]; the median home value
[W3]; % employed [W4]. (2) Social variables: % of white population [W5], % of black
population [W6], % of Hispanic population [W7], % of Asian population [W8], % of other
races’ population (such as native Americans, pacific Americans) [W9]. (3) Demographic
variables: % of male population [W10], % of female population [W11], % of population
                                                 
89 The 2000 census data is available from Geolytics at www.geolytics.com. Geolytics extracted
this data from SF1, SF2 and SF3 files released by US census bureau (www.census.gov).
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between the ages of 18 and 24 years [W12], % of population between the ages of 25 and
34 years [W13], % of population between the ages of 35 and 44 years [W14], % of
population between the ages of 45 and 54 years [W15], % of population between the
ages of 55 and 65 years [W16], and % of population 65 years and above [W17].
66.8% of the remote sensing sample was successfully geo-coded, which affects
the randomness of the mixed pool sample.90 More importantly, GA-DMVS introduced
higher reporting standards and validity tests in the vehicle registration data since June of
1999 (which they call GRATIS data), and it is noticeable that the successful geo-coding
rate for 1997 and 1998 sample is relatively lower (52.46% and 59.93% respectively),
while for GRATIS data of 1999, 2000 and 2001 is relatively higher (72.84%, 76.57% and
77.08% respectively).
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of economic, social and demographic
variables for the geo-coded sample. The mean of the median household income in the
block-groups of sampled drivers stands at $ 59,836.82, while mean per capita income is
$27,679.68. On average 67.8% of the population in drivers’ block-groups were
employed, and mean of the median home value stood at $163,263.16.
Figure 5.9 shows median household income distribution in the sample: Panel A
plots income versus vehicle age; and, as expected, income decreases as vehicle age
increases. Panel B plots income as distributed by vehicle age in clusters of control and
treatment vehicle groups. Vehicles of all ages in the treatment group are owned by
relatively poor people as compared to the control group. Panel C plots income for control
and treatment groups of vehicle owners in each of the five years of data observation.
Vehicle owners in the treatment groups come from relatively poorer areas in all five
years of observation as compared to the control group vehicle owners. Panel D shows
that the migrated fail group of vehicle owners is the poorest, followed by migrated pass,
                                                 
90 Out of 777,408 observations in the mixed pooled sample, 519,416 (66.8%) vehicles were geo-
coded and 257,992 (33.2%) were not geo-coded. There is always a trade-off between the criteria
of “accuracy” and the “coverage” in successfully geo-coding the addresses.  Accuracy at 80%
(and above) was chosen for this study, which sacrificed higher coverage of geo-coded sample. If
the accuracy is reduced to 50%, the geo-coding rate increases from 66.8% to 78%. Due to the
large sample size available for this study, accuracy was chosen over coverage. In turn, the t-tests
show that the geo-coded sample is slightly different from the non-geo-coded sample. While CO
and HC emission concentrations are slightly higher for non-geo-coded sample observations, NO
is same for both geo-coded and non-geo-coded samples.  Of the six treatment vehicle groups,
retest fail, migrated fail and migrated pass means are the same for both geo-coded and non-geo-
coded samples, while retest pass, missing pass and missing fail means are slightly higher for
geo-coded sample.
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Figure 5.9, Panel A
Figure 5.9, Panel B
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Figure 5.9, Panel C
Figure 5.9, Panel D
Figure 5.9: Median household income in blockgroups of vehicle owners’ addresses
distributed by vehicle age (panel a), experimental groups (panel b), observation year
(panel c), and vehicle groups (panel d)
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missing fail and retest fail groups. Note that vehicle owners in the retest pass groups
appear to be slightly richer than the ones in retest fail group.
5.5 Data analysis methodology
5.5.1 The probability of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of
high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed
As the bold-faced terminal nodes in figure 1.3 show, and as explained in section
1.3, the sample of the on-road data that is selected for a given year is subdivided into 11
vehicle fleets: (a) 5 groups may be considered as separate control groups that includes
control (initial test initial pass), IM ineligible inside 13 county area, waived, rest of
Georgia and missing fleets. (b) 2 groups may be considered as cooperative fleet types,
which include retest-pass, and migrated pass groups. (c) 4 groups may be considered
as non-cooperative fleet types, which include retest-fail, migrated fail, missing fail and
missing pass fleets.
These three broad classifications have severe limitations, the most important of
which are the following: (1) the control (initial test initial pass) group of vehicles includes
vehicle owners who pre-emptively repaired emission control systems of their vehicles
before appearing in the initial IM test in a given year. This would include non-cooperative
vehicles (path no. 23 in table 1.1) if vehicle owners carried out fraudulent repairs; and
cooperative vehicles (path no. 12 in table 1.1) if vehicle owners carried out actual
repairs. (2) The migrated pass group of vehicle owners may be acting to preemptively
avoid the IM program by registering their vehicles outside the IM program area, but note
that they are observed driving inside the IM program area. (3) The missing pass group of
vehicle owners includes those who sold their vehicles after passing the IM test to other
vehicle owners inside the IM program area (which may cause them to miss the IM test
due to different birthdays of vehicle owners), for which reason not all of them can be
classified as non-cooperative types. On the other hand, the missing pass group, by
definition, is a non-cooperative type, because as per IM rules they were eligible to
appear in the IM test, but their VIN records are not found in the IM data of the evaluation
year. (4) The three classifications do not estimate the extent of vehicles that simply avoid
registration inside the state of Georgia and are still driven inside the IM program
boundaries without valid license plates. (5) These classifications do not capture the
vehicles that are registered out of the state of Georgia, such as Alabama or Tennessee,
but are still driven inside the Atlanta IM program boundaries. (6) Both IM and remote
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sensing data methodologies contain the possibility of a matching error due to the
incorrectly reported VIN and model year variables. This matching error is probably
represented in the category of “missing fleet” vehicles, but this is not certain.
Given these six serious limitations, utmost caution is needed to interpret the
statistics that reduce 11 fleet types to 3: control, cooperative and non-cooperative. Due
to these limitations, the empirical results for all eleven fleet kinds are reported. On the
other hand, the theoretical underpinnings in decision theory require a reduction of the 11
fleet types into 3 types for estimating the overall impacts of IM program intervention on
the decision behaviors of vehicle owners. Next, the formal operationalization of linking
empirical data to theoretical questions is presented, but again, the results need to be
interpreted in the light of limitations listed above.
The percentage of cooperative vehicle owners in the sample is measured by
taking a ratio of the vehicles in the cooperative fleets to the vehicles in all of the
treatment groups. Formally, as also shown in equation 1.6:
(5.1): % (cooperative types) = 100*[Q6 + Q7]/[ Q6 + Q7 + Q8 + Q9 + Q10 + Q11]
Conversely, the percentage of non-cooperative vehicle owners in the sample is
measured by taking a ratio of the vehicles in the non-cooperative fleets to the vehicles in
all of the treatment groups. Formally:
(5.2): % (non-cooperative types) = 100*[Q6 + Q7 + Q8 + Q9]/[ Q6 + Q7 + Q8 + Q9 + Q10 +
Q11]
5.5.2 The impact on vehicular tail-pipe emissions due to vehicle owners’ decision
behaviors
Phase II of this research design empirically explores the following question: What
is the impact on the vehicular emissions due to the cooperative and non-cooperative
decision behaviors of high-emitters in the Atlanta airshed, while controlling for other
important parameters that affect the vehicular tail-pipe emissions? Multiple statistical
decision theory models, employing multivariate generalized linear and non-linear
regressions are used to test hypotheses concerning the impacts of cooperative and non-
cooperative strategies of high-emitters on on-road vehicular emissions. More
importantly, changes in the impacts are measured over time between 1997 and 2001, for
which purpose the classical quasi-experimental methodology of mixed pooling of data is
employed.
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5.5.2.1 Mixed-pooled generalized linear regression models
First, mixed-pooled generalized linear (GL) regression models are used to study
the effect of cooperative and non-cooperative behavioral strategies of high-emitters on
CO, HC, and NOx, exhaust emissions over time. Mixed-pooled generalized linear
models have following initial mathematical form, as also shown in equations 1.7-1.9:
5.3: YCO = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
5.4: YHC = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
5.5: YNO = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
Where Y variables show CO, HC and NO emission factors in grams per gallon, Q
variables show 10 fleet types grouped by decision behavior. The control fleet is the
reference group. R variables show vehicular characteristics including their emission
control technological systems. A Ford car made in USA of zero years of age is the
reference group.91 S variables show the physical and atmospheric contextual conditions
at the time of remote sensing measurements and T variables show the observation year.
1997 is the base year. The interaction terms (T x Q) track over time the changes in the
emission factors of the 11 fleet types during the study period. Column 2 in table 5.1
shows the relevant symbol for each individual variable shown in equations 5.3 to 5.5.
Section 5.6.3 elaborates in detail the classical assumptions associated with the
generalized linear models and presents the detection and correction methods that are
employed to correct the violations of these classical assumptions. Since evidence for
heteroskedasticity is found in the data, as well as non-linearities in vehicular emissions
are observed in sample statistics, first an attempt is made to correctly specify the
functional form of the models -- such as through Box-Cox regressions.
In order to estimate the non-linearities in the functional form between the
dependent and the independent variables, best non-linear fits for the dependent
variables are estimated. More specifically, following Box-Cox (1964) transformation
parameters (λ) are estimated by using the maximum likelihood estimation techniques:92
(5.6): YCO(λ) = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
(5.7): YHC(λ) = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=25 δtTt + ∑t=25∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
                                                 
91 In addition, variables age-square and age-cube are added to capture the non-linear trends in
vehicular tail-pipe emissions as a function of vehicle age.
92 It is possible to estimate λ for independent parameters too, but that would require all
independent parameters to have positive values. Due to computational complexity, this task is left
for the future research.
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(5.8): YNO(λ) = α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑s=17 φsSs + ∑t=45 δtTt + ∑t=45∑q=211 ΔtqTtQq + ε1,
Where εi ~ N (0, σ2) and the dependent variables YP [for P = CO, HC and NO] are
subject to a Box-Cox transform93 with parameter λ. The significance and direction of
independent parameter values on Box-Cox transformed dependent variables are tested
through likelihood ratio tests. More importantly, the estimated value of the parameter λ
guides the researcher to approximately estimate the non-linearities through transformed
values of dependent variables in the linear GLM models. Specifically, as extensively
discussed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), a linear form of dependent variable is
retained if λ is (approximately) equal to 1, a logarithmic transformation of the dependent
variable is carried out if λ is (approximately) equal to 0, and an inverse multiplicative
transformation of the dependent variable is carried out if λ is (approximately) equal to –1.
Formally:
(5.9): y(λ) = {y-1 if λ =1, ln(y) if λ=0, and (1-1/y) if λ=-1}
As inferred from the Box-cox regression results shown in tables 6.2-6.4, the log-
linear models are run for equations 5.3 to 5.5 by transforming the dependent variable
into its natural logarithm equivalents. Secondly, heteroskedasticity is corrected by
employing multiple methodologies. First, heteroskesdasticity is corrected by using
White’s (1980) robust variance estimator methods. Second, weighted least squares
(WLS) regression model is used to generate more efficient standard errors and correct
for heteroskedasticity. Third, robust regression techniques (Berk 1990) are employed to
counter-test the significance and direction of the independent parameters, as estimated
in White’s robust and WLS methods.
Figure 5.10 shows the 6 graphs of the residuals versus the fitted values: 3 each
for OLS with a robust errors model and the other 3 each for log-linear with robust errors
models, which were employed, among other models, to estimate equations 5.3 to 5.5.
The graphs showing OLS models clearly indicate that the assumption of
homoskedasticity is violated in all the three equations estimated by OLS model,
especially the equation for HC seems specially affected by heteroskedasticity (which
explains relatively low R2 values [8.52%] for OLS models predicting HC emission
factors). The graphs showing log-linear model, however, present a much-improved
                                                 
93 A Box-Cox transform function is defined as follows: Yλ = [Yλ - 1]/ λ.
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Panel (a): OLS model predicting CO emission factors (equation 5.3)
Panel (b): Log-linear model predicting CO emission factors (equation 5.3)
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 Panel (c): OLS model predicting HC emission factors (equation 5.4)
Panel (d): Log-linear model predicting HC emission factors (equation 5.4)
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Panel (e): OLS model predicting NO emission factors (equation 5.5)
Panel (f): Log-linear model predicting NO emission factors (equation 5.5)
Figure 5.10: Graphs of the residuals versus the fitted values for OLS and log-linear
models predicting CO (panels a and b), HC (panels c and d) and NO (panels e and f)
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picture and the errors appear to be distributed around its mean more evenly as
compared to the OLS models. The log-linear model for HC especially showed vast
improvement in terms of its explanatory power, the adjusted R2 being 49.31%. However,
the log-linear models with robust errors still show non-constant error variance, for which
reason the results from WLS models are estimated.
Results from the robust regression models are also reported in chapter 6 and are
used to counter-validate the inferences drawn from log-linear with robust errors and
WLS models. In addition, the Chow test is undertaken by adding interaction terms of
time variables [Tt] with the decision variables [Qq] in equations 5.1-5.3. The Chow test
permits the testing of hypotheses whether or not the impact of decision behaviors on
vehicular exhaust emissions is structurally consistent across time, provided all the other
independent parameters are held constant.
5.5.3 The contextual conditions of cooperative and non-cooperative decision
makers
The contextual conditions of decision makers (i.e. vehicle owners in 11 fleet
types) are ascertained through two kinds of models: First, linear ecological regression is
employed to test the differences in the median household income of vehicle owners’
block-groups as per 11 fleet types. In order to finely test the spatial distribution of median
household income for 11 fleet types, while controlling for other vehicular parameters as
well as social, demographic and economic variables, the following ecological regression
equation is estimated:
(5.10): W1 =  α0 + ∑q=110 βqQq + ∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=214κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt + ε1
Secondly, a multinomial variable “fleet type” [F] is created, which is coded 0 for
control group, 1 for the IM ineligible group, 2 for the waived fleet, 3 for the rest of
Georgia fleet, 4 for the missing fleet, 5 for the retest pass fleet, 6 for the migrated pass
fleet, 7 for the retest fail fleet, 8 for the migrated fail fleet, 9 for the missing fail and 10 for
the missing pass fleet. In order to test the hypotheses about the social, economic and
demographic contextual conditions of different groups of decision-makers/vehicle
owners that affect the probability that a vehicle owner will be in one of the 10 groups
relative to the control group, the following multinomial logistic regression equation 5.11 is
estimated. The control group is the base category, while white male drivers of US-
manufactured Ford vehicles under the ages of 18 years are treated as the reference
group in equation 5.11.
141
(5.11.1): Pr (In-eligible)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]ineligible
(5.11.2): Pr (waived)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]waived
(5.11.3): Pr (rest-of-GA)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]rest-of-GA
(5.11.4): Pr (missing)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]missing
(5.11.5): Pr (retest-pass)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]retest-pass
(5.11.6): Pr (mig-pass)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]mig-pass
(5.11.7): Pr (retest-fail)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]retest-fail
(5.11.8): Pr (mig-fail)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]mig-fail
(5.11.9): Pr (miss-fail)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]miss-fail
(5.11.10): Pr (miss-pass)/Pr (control) =  e **[∑r=129 γrRr + ∑w=115κwWw + ∑t=14 δtTt]miss-pass
5.6 Threats to validity and limitations of the research design
This section discusses the major limitations and key assumptions of the
proposed quasi-experimental research design. Cook and Campbell (1979) is considered
a standard text for designing quasi-experiments, and they consider it useful to evaluate
the impact of the limitations and key assumptions of a study based on potential threats
to four types of validity (Cook and Campbell 1979:chapter 2). This section discusses the
limitations and key assumptions of this study in the light of their potential threat to the
internal, statistical, construct and external validities of this quasi-experimental research
design.
5.6.1 Threats to internal validity and corresponding limitations
Since this research design utilizes remotely sensed on-road vehicle emissions
data to quantify the impact of cooperative and non-cooperative behavioral strategies of
vehicle owners on on-road vehicular emissions, it relies on the quality of measurements
made by the remote sensing instruments of the AQL. A key threat to the internal validity
of this study is the potential for measurement error due to the use of multiple instruments
in collecting the on-road data. The WLS regression models show that the
instrumentation effect is significant. The results of this study should be interpreted in the
light of this major limitation.
Another difficulty in using remote sensing data is the problem of negative values
for CO, NOx and HC measurements on emission concentrations, which, theoretically,
are not possible. The negative values are generated during the estimation process of
CO, NOx and HC by a remote sensing device when combustion equations employ
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regression methods and the error values are larger than the absolute measurements of
these pollutant concentrations. These negative values pose a serious problem for
converting emission concentrations into emissions factors (expressed as grams per
gallon, as explained in appendix A). Further, for the purposes of estimating non-linear
models such as Box-Cox transforms (as explained in section 5.6.2), it is absolutely
necessary that the dependent variable be strictly positive. There is no best solution to
resolve the problem of negative values for CO, HC and NOx in this case. One way to
resolve this problem will be to treat all the negative values as equal to zero. This will,
however, bias the coefficients of the regression models, which is not desirable. Another
possibility is to add all the measurements with a constant for making them greater than
zero, which will also bias the coefficients in non-linear models. In order to avoid these
biases, as well as measuring the parametric effects on vehicular tail-pipe emissions in
more meaningful units of grams per gallon, observations that have negative values on
CO, HC and NOx emissions concentrations were dropped from the sample. Did this bias
the sample? One could argue “no”, because, first, negative values of emissions are not
possible in theory, especially as per the second law of thermodynamics; second, if
observations based on other validity criteria, such as non-matching in Georgia’s vehicle
registration database, can be dropped to get meaningful information about the
parameters of the models, it doesn’t make much difference to consider negative values
on CO, HC and NOx as invalid observations; third, the sample size, even after dropping
the observations with negative values from the sample remains sufficiently large, as
shown in CO, HC and NOx descriptive statistics in table 5.1, which are measured in
grams per gallon. Despite these theoretical caveats that justify removal of negative
valued observations, empirical scrutiny shows that the mixed sample is biased because
vehicles with higher mean age are more likely to be included in the sample without the
negative values.94
The key threat to internal validity of this research design is the issue of sample
selection, as described in previous paragraph, as well as due to the following reasons.
                                                 
94 Of the 777,408 observations in the mixed pool sample (1997-2001), CO %, HC PPM and NO
PPM respectively had strictly positive values on 673,728 (86.7%), 511,611 (65.8%) and 119,528
(15.4%) observations; negative or zero values on 101,878 (13.1%), 230,208 (29.6%) and 16,958
(2.2%) observations; and missing values on 1802 (0.2%), 35,539 (4.6%) and 640,922 (82.4%)
observations. The null hypothesis that the vehicle age is same for the sample with and without
the negative values is rejected by a t-test for all the three pollutants. Vehicle age is higher for the
sample without the negative values.
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The remote sensing data has over 1.42 million observations between 1997 and 2001,
and the AQL data collection team has made conscious efforts to select a broad variety of
sites for making the data broadly representative of the Atlanta fleet. Still it is possible that
the site selection could bias the results of this study. Second, license plates were not
readable for 20% of the 1.42 million vehicles in the raw sample that biases the results.
Third, 21.2% of the 1.13 million readable license-plate sample was dropped because it
was not found in the Georgia registration database, which biases the results. Fourth,
removal of observations with negative values, as discussed in the previous paragraph,
biases the sample. Fifth, while estimating emission factors in grams per gallon, 30.7% of
positive CO and 8.8% of the positive HC observations are dropped because CO and HC
is not measured for a vehicle at the same time. A two-sample t-test shows that this
biases the sample as vehicles with observations on both CO and HC are slightly higher
in their age as compared to the vehicles with non-conjoint observations on CO and HC.
The remote sensing sample captures vehicles from all the 13 counties during the
five years of the study period. Yet there remain differences in geographical and age
distributions of on-road and registered vehicle fleets. The sample selection thus poses
an important limitation to the internal validity of this research design.
5.6.2 Threats to statistical validity and corresponding limitations
The generalized linear models presented in equations 5.3-5.5 are based on six major
assumptions (Greene 2000):
1. Y = Xβ + ε, where X is a MxK matrix of Q + R + S + T + Q*T variables, M shows
the number of observations and K = 1, 2, ….90 shows the number of parameters.
2. X is a M x K matrix with rank K
3. E [ε/X] =0
4. E [εε′/X] = σ2IT
5. X is a known M x K matrix of constants
6. ε/X ~ N [ 0, σ2IT]
Assumption 1 is violated if X is a non-linear function of Y or it is not correctly
specified. As explained in section 5.5.2, the non-linear functional form is tested through
Box-Cox regression models. Furthermore, the assumption of a correctly specified model
is tested for omitted variable bias by using the Ramsey (1969) test. This test estimates
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the regression Yi = Xb + Zit + ui, where either Zi = (Yi-hat2, Yi-hat3, Yi-hat4) or Zi = (x1i2,
x1i3, x1i4, x2i2, x2i3, …, xmi4)  and it performs a standard F test for t = 0. The LINK test is also
used to test the omitted variable bias. Both Ramsey and LINK tests show that there is
omitted variable bias in the five regression models of equations 5.3 and 5.4, but there is
no omitted variable bias in estimators of equation 5.5. Vehicle mileage, vehicle make
and model are some of the important variables omitted from these regression models.
The odometer data for measuring the vehicle mileage is not reliable, while the variables
on vehicle make and model are consciously omitted to keep the regression models
computable.
The second assumption that X is a M x K matrix with rank K is also known as an
assumption of non-multicollinearity among the independent variables. This assumption is
tested by estimating the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each of the independent
variables in X by using the following formula provided by Chatterjee et al. (2000): VIF (xj)
= 1 / (1 – Rj2), where Rj2 is the square of the multiple correlation coefficient that results
when xj is regressed against all the other explanatory variables. If VIF of an independent
variable appears to be exceeding the value of 30 (Chatterjee et al. 2000: 242-4), then
that variable is considered to be multi-collinear with other covariates, and possibly can
be removed from the equation. No variable in equations 5.3 to 5.5 was found to be multi-
collinear (i.e. VIF > 30), except age-square and age-cube that are included to model the
non-linear effects of vehicle age on vehicular tail-pipe emissions.
If the third assumption that E [ε/X ] =0 is violated then the intercept of the
regression equation will be biased, but the regression coefficients will remain unbiased
(Green 2000). Violation of the fourth assumption that E [εε′/X ] = σ2IT can be tested by
using the Durbin-Watson d statistic, which is measured as follows:
d = [∑j =1n-1 (e-hati+1 – e-hati)2]/ [∑j =1n e-hati)2
If the value of d statistic is significantly below 2, then there will be evidence of
positive autocorrelation. In theory, mixed pool designs do not normally have the problem
of autocorrelation. However, the park test shows that the log of the squared residuals is
significantly explained by the temporal parameters in estimating equations 5.3-5.5, which
suggests that errors are correlated across time.
The fifth assumption that X is a known M x K matrix of constants concerns the
fact that there is no measurement error in the model and that the measurement values of
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the independent variables are fixed. This assumption limits the inference power of
regression results from the samples to the population parameters.
The sixth assumption that ε/X ~ N [ 0, σ 2IT] is violated if there is evidence of
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Figure 5.10 shows an eyeball test for
heteroskedasticity. Formally, this assumption is tested using Cook-Weisberg (1983) test
for heteroskedasticity. This test models Var (ei) = σ2 exp (zt) where z is either a variable
suspected to be causing heteroskedasticity or equal to the fitted values Xb. The test is of
t = 0. This test estimates the model (e-hati2) = a + zit + vi and then forms the score test S
equal to the model sum of squares divided by 2. Under the null hypothesis, S has the χ2
distribution with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number of columns of z.   Since
the assumption of homoskesdaticity is violated in the measured models, as explained in
section 5.5.2, models with White’s robust errors are estimated and Berk’s robust and
WLS regressions are used to counter-validate the White’s robust models. The log-linear
models appear to drastically reduce heteroskesdicity, but the Cook-Weisberg test still
shows heteroskesdacity. The results from WLS regression models are thus most valid.
5.6.3 Threats to construct validity and corresponding limitations
The decision variables, such as those representing groups/fleets of vehicles as
per decision behaviors of drivers in response to IM intervention, are constructed to test
the central research hypotheses. These constructs are used to (1) compare cooperative
with non-cooperative decision behaviors, (2) evaluate the impact on vehicular tail-pipe
emissions due to the decision behaviors, and (3) determine the socio-economic
contextual condition of cooperative and non-cooperative decision makers.
While it is not possible to observe each individual’s strategy through a ubiquitous
camera, these variables are constructed within the confines of the new information made
available by remote sensing data. The validity of these constructs comes from the fact
that the vehicles observed on-road are tracked in the IM program data and then a
decision is made on the basis of the track record of that vehicle owner in the IM program
data whether s/he appears to be in the control or treatment (cooperative or non-
cooperative) fleet, as extensively discussed in section 1.3. The limitations in the
empirical observation of these constructs are discussed in section 5.5.1.
The validity issues related to the remotely sensed measured constructs pose a
serious limitation to the results of this study because remote sensors only measure in a
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split second the emission levels of a car in a pre-selected site.  Furthermore, the
pollutants are not measured in absolute terms, rather they are measured as ratios and
are derived from the knowledge-base of atmospheric chemistry, physics and other earth
and natural sciences. The CO, HC and NOx constructs transformed into mass emission
factors (in grams/gallon) and mass emission rates (in tons per year) represent
meaningful policy and scientific concepts well-represented in the discourse in the
research area of this dissertation, which is why they are used.
Another potential issue of construct validity in this research concerns the use of
census block-group level socio-economic and demographic variables, such as median
household income and the set of variables symbolized as W in section 5.5.3. The validity
of socio-economic constructs [W variables] can be far greater if they were measured at
household or individual level. Such measurement is unfortunately not possible at this
time due to both financial resource constraints as well as privacy rights issues of the
research subjects. The ecological fallacy issue with respect to the multiple-level
contextual analysis is discussed in some detail in section 1.4.
The interpretation of results associated with coefficients of W constructs is
cautiously undertaken by explicitly stating that these constructs do not represent the
vehicle owner; rather they represent the census block-group of vehicle-owner’s address.
If vehicle-owners were registered with false addresses, the validity of these constructs
would be further doubtful, further limiting the results of this study.
5.6.4 Threats to external validity and corresponding limitations
Due to the correlation of on-road vehicle emissions with a host of confounding
and un-observed effects, such as weather variability at the specific sites of emission
measurements, large variability in individual driving behaviors/patterns, different vehicle-
maintenance behaviors, and transportation infrastructure quality, it is not easy to
generalize the conclusions of this study beyond the Atlanta airshed. However, the results
of this study are comparable to the similar studies in other ozone non-attainment urban
airsheds, because the generalized linear and non-linear models of this research are
using a large set of control parameters [as shown in equations 5.3-5.5]. It is thus
possible to compare the results of this study with other relevant studies, which also
employ similar control parameters.
This research will externally validate the recent results obtained by Pokharel et
al. (2000), which suggest that the variables “speed”, “acceleration” and the “road grade”
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can be used to systematically estimate a variable called “vehicle specific power”, which
in turn can be used as a proxy variable to estimate the impact of on-road vehicle-load
conditions on the vehicular emissions.  Similarly the results estimating the lack of IM
program effectiveness in reducing the vehicular emissions due to drivers’ decision
behaviors is of considerable interest to the research community. For example, a recent
National Research Council (2001) study recommended more independent evaluation






Chapter 6 presents a discussion of some important results of the empirical
research design that was elaborated in previous chapters, especially chapter 5. First, the
estimated probability of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of high-
emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed is discussed in the next section. The
empirical results are employed to test H1 that was posed in section 1.3.
Second, section 6.3 presents, in relatively greater detail, the results of the
investigation that aims at measuring the impact of vehicle owners’ actions/decisions on
the environmental outcomes, which are CO, HC and NO tail-pipe vehicular emissions in
this case. Since this is a complex undertaking and involves interpretation of estimated
equations (5.3-5.5) with up to 90 parameters, I focus on analyzing the ceteris paribus
impact of human decision behaviors on environmental outcomes.
More specifically, sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3 present respectively the impact of
human decision behaviors on CO, HC and NO emission-factors. In the process, the
results of H2 are also presented. For the sake of brevity, the remaining details about the
controlling parameters can be seen in the tables of chapter 6 that summarize the results
of empirical models. Section 6.3.4 presents the impacts of vehicle owners’ actions on
vehicular emissions that are measured as mass emission rates, which are estimated
through the methods presented in appendix A.
Section 6.4 presents the results from the third and final phase of the empirical
study. First, in section 6.4.1, the socio-economic and demographic contextual conditions
of the cooperative and non-cooperative decision makers are compared with each other
and the other control groups in the study. Second, in section 6.4.2, the outcomes of an
environmental policy intervention, which is the IM program in this case, are measured on
the value of fairness. The results of H3 are also discussed in this section. Furthermore, it
is also discussed in section 6.4.2 whether cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle
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owners, ceteris paribus, come from similar income level neighborhoods. In this context,
the results of H4 are also presented in this section. Chapter 7 discusses the implications
of these results.
6.2: Probability of cooperative and non-cooperative decisions
Table 6.1 presents the probability of cooperation in each of the five years of
study, as estimated by measuring equation 5.3. These results should be strictly
interpreted in the light of limitations extensively discussed in section 5.5.1. Overall,
41.22% of the vehicle owners in the total treatment sample appear to be cooperative,
and conversely 58.78% non-cooperative. Except for the base year of 1997, the
probability of cooperation is between 36% and 41% during the period 1998 to 2001.95 H1,
that the probability of cooperation is zero is rejected, which means that the prediction of
classical game and/or rational choice theory does not hold. It is also noticeable that the
probability of cooperation is not 100%, which means that the prediction of those
sociology and political science theories that suggest all people put their group level
interest above their selfish interest also does not hold.
Table 6.1: Probability of Cooperation = [Q6 + Q7]/[ Q6 + Q7 + Q8 + Q9 + Q10 + Q11]
Probability
(Cooperation)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Full sample
(N=777,408)










82.02% 39.74% 40.84% 41.77% 38.12% 42.17%
(N=36,433)
Probability of non-cooperation = [1 – probability of cooperation]
Most strikingly, the results confirm the findings of earlier controlled lab
experimental studies (as reviewed in chapter 2, especially section 2.3.1), which also
found the probability of cooperation between 40% and 60% of the group optimum under
voluntary mechanisms. The surprising aspect of these results thus resides in the
                                                 
95 The 1997 result, which shows probability of cooperation at 83.75%, is an outlier in the temporal
trend because no vehicles in the 1997 remote sensing sample were found in four treatment
groups: migrated pass, migrated fail, missing fail, missing pass. 1997 is an exception because it
was the first year of the “enhanced” IM program and no vehicles in these four categories were
matched with “basic” IM program data that was collected in Atlanta in 1995 and 1996.
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similarity of human decision behavior under the contexts of voluntary and regulatory
mechanisms, on the one hand; and laboratory and real-world situations, on the other
hand.
Ledyard’s (1995) prediction – that there are 50% Nash players, 40% respond to
incentives while the behavior of the remaining 10% is inexplicable – also appears to be
partially supported by the results.  In this case, 59% to 63.36% of the annualized
samples appear to be non-cooperative, which is a little higher than Ledyard’s prediction
of 50%.
But how would game theory/RCT explain the observed 40% cooperative players
under IM program’s regulatory mechanism?  Presumably, it would be said that these
players did not have complete information about all the alternative courses of actions
available to them and that they are responding to the incentive structure of regulatory
punishment on its face value set up under IM program and thus appear to be
cooperative. On the other hand, it can be argued from the perspective of political science
theory, which takes players as good citizens, that cooperative players are also rational
but in a different sense than presumed by game theory. These players know about the
alternative/non-cooperative courses of action but they consciously choose to be
cooperative because it promotes the greater good of the society of which they are a part.
The debate between alternative theories about human decision behavior could thus be
continued indefinitely. As argued before, it is extremely important to see these
cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors under their specific contexts.
Before presenting the individual and group-level socio-economic and demographic
contexts of cooperative and non-cooperative decision-makers in section 6.4, the impacts
of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors of vehicle owners on vehicular
emissions are presented in section 6.3.
6.3: The impact of cooperative and non-cooperative decisions on vehicular tail-
pipe emissions
The impact of cooperative and non-cooperative decisions on vehicular emissions
in the Atlanta airshed between 1997 and 2001 is estimated by the empirical
measurement of equations 5.3-5.5. Tables 6.2 to 6.4 present the estimated empirical
parameters for equations 5.3 to 5.5 respectively. Table 6.2 shows the predicted
parameters of the OLS with the robust errors model, Box-Cox regression model, the log-
linear with robust errors model, the log-linear weighted least squares (WLS) model and
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the log-linear robust regression model when all the independent variables, as shown in
equation 5.3, are regressed against CO (grams/gallon) observed in the mixed pool
remote sensing data. Similarly, Table 6.3 shows results of 5 regression models for the
mixed pool remote sensing samples, when HC is regressed against all the independent
variables. Finally, Table 6.4 shows results of 5 regression models for mixed pooled
remote sensing samples between 1999 and 2001 when NO is regressed against all the
independent variables.
Each table 6.2-6.4 shows adjusted R2 and root MSE statistics for each model
except Box-Cox and robust regression models because they present log-likelihood
estimators. F/LR-test statistic for each of the five models in the three tables is also
reported. The null-hypothesis for the F/LR-test states: all the independent variables in
the estimated model do not jointly explain in a significant manner the variation in the
dependent variable. F/LR test statistic in tables 6.2 to 6.4 shows that the null hypothesis
is rejected in all the 15 models presented in these three tables, which means that these
models are not irrelevant. The parameter “lambda”, as shown in tables 6.2 to 6.4, reports
a Box-Cox transform estimator, which is empirically estimated for Box-Cox non-linear
regression models but assumed exogenously constant for the other four models. Finally,
each coefficient value is reported against the independent variables for each of the five
regression models in all the three tables 6.2 to 6.4. Under the coefficient values,
numbers in brackets show the estimated standard errors of those coefficient values;
while stars above the coefficients values indicate the statistical significance of those
variables.
There was no evidence of multi-collinearity found in the OLS models. All the OLS
models however showed evidence for heteroskedasticity as the Cook-Weisburg test for
each OLS model rejected the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. The inferences
from the OLS models are therefore not very reliable. Since the Box-Cox regression
model for each CO, HC and NO predicted a lambda value near 0, the log-linear models
present more valid results as compared to the OLS with robust errors model. Further,
the results from WLS and Robust regression models are used to cross-check the
inferences drawn in the log-linear with robust-standard errors model. Thus, the
significance, direction and size of the effect of each parameter is comparable across
these five models for each pollutant CO, HC and NO.
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Parameters in the OLS with robust errors model present the change in absolute
CO, HC and NO emission factors (in grams per gallon) as unit change in the
independent parameter is introduced, while log-linear, WLS and robust regression
models present % change in emission factors.96 Since Lambda values in Box-Cox
regression models are close to zero, they can also be interpreted in terms of percentage
change.97
Next, the predicted impacts of cooperative and non-cooperative behavioral
strategies of high-emitters on CO, HC and NOx emissions, while controlling for other
independent parameters, are presented.
6.3.1: Impacts on CO emissions
Table 6.2 presents the estimated parameters for equation 5.3. The parameters
are estimated by five models, for the reasons explained in chapter 5. The equation
estimated by the log-linear WLS model has the most powerful F-statistic as compared to
the other four models. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 is 92.73% for the log-linear WLS
model as compared to 21.66% and 16.48% respectively for the equation estimated by
log-linear and OLS models with robust errors. In the case of the majority of the
parameters, the significance and direction of the estimators is in agreement for the five
models. There are however some parameters on which the predicted significance and
direction differ among the five models, which is mentioned in the discussion below;
otherwise it is assumed that the models are in agreement. The predicted magnitude of
the estimators is different in OLS, box-cox, log-linear, WLS and robust regression
                                                 
96 The constant in the estimated equations 5.3-5.5 represents the mean emission factor in
grams/gallon for the reference group of vehicles, which is a 1997 model year passenger car
manufactured by Ford in the USA that was observed inside the 13 county area in 1997 and
belongs to the initial test/initial pass control fleet. The constant should be adjusted for more
realistic interpretation by exogenously specifying the parametric constraints representing the
technological parameters and physical conditions at the time of measurement.
97 Formally, the coefficient values should be raised by a power equal to the inverse of the
estimated lambda value in the Box-Cox model, which gives Box-Cox regression estimates in
terms of change in emission factors in response to a unit change in the independent parameters.
In the case of Box-Cox regression on HC emission factors, a likelihood ratio test could not reject
the null hypothesis that lambda is equal to zero. So results in table 6.3 show very similar values
for Box-Cox and log-linear predicted coefficients, though their standard errors remain different. In
case of HC, Box-Cox coefficients can thus be interpreted as % change. But, in the case of CO
and NO, the lambda value is slightly different from zero. In the case of CO and NO, the LR test
rejects the null hypothesis that lambda is equal to zero. Box-Cox regression results for CO and
NO should thus be interpreted accordingly, i.e. by powering the coefficient values by the inverse
of estimated lambda.
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models because each model assumes a different functional specification of the
estimated equation, a different weighting of the error terms and a different methodology
to ascertain the estimators.
Table 6.2: Regression models predicting the effect of vehicle owners’ decision behaviors


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































KOREA 6.9760 0.0621*** .0768*** 0.0314 0.0754***
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Adj-R2 16.48% NA 21.66% 92.73% NA
Root MSE 346.88 NA 1.2305 2.4366 NA
F or LR test
statistic
(88,430025)
494.27 102492.69 1353.22 61671.17 1544.17
Lambda 1 -.052861 0 0 0
(1) Statistics in brackets () are the standard errors of coefficients
(2) Coefficient value with one * shows significance at 90% confidence level and 10%
probability of type-I error; two ** at 95% confidence level and 5% probability of type I
error; and three *** at 99% confidence level and 1% probability of type I error.
(3) The Log-linear WLS model is run with no constant parameter. Rather, the weight variable
is added as an explanatory variable, whose coefficient is reported in place of the
constant.
The change over time in the production of CO emission-factors for the reference
group vehicles is estimated through coefficients on time variables in 5 regression models
presented in table 6.2. The log-linear model coefficients on time variables show that the
reference group vehicles emitted 16.26%, 40.56%, 46.48% and 67.27% less emissions
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in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively than their average 1997 levels, while holding
constant vehicular characteristics and other physical conditions.98 The coefficients on
time variables also represent, ceteris paribus, temporal change in overall CO tailpipe
emission factors.  It would be fallacious to say that the coefficients on time variables
represent IM program effectiveness, however, because the tailpipe emissions may also
decrease due to other causes, such as changes introduced in reformulated gasoline or
faster fleet turnover rate, that can also decrease the vehicular tailpipe emissions from
year to year.
Given this temporal trend of decreasing CO emission factors between 1997 and
2001, the ceteris paribus effect of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors
on CO emission factors can be analyzed by a deeper scrutiny of coefficients on 10
decision variables and 40 interaction terms. The chow test rejects the null hypothesis
that there is no structural change over time in CO emission factors, which is caused by
decisions of vehicle owners in both control and treatment vehicle groups.99
Of the two cooperative fleets, the retest pass fleet vehicles were emitting 34.43%
more CO emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1997. The coefficient is significant
in all of the five models. The log-linear with the robust errors model suggests that retest
pass vehicles did not emit significantly less emissions from 1998 to 2001 than their 1997
levels. Only in 2000, the three log-linear models suggest about 10% to 12% reduction in
CO emission factors for the retest pass vehicles.
The second cooperative fleet type, referred to as the migrated pass fleet, emitted
11.07% more CO emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1998. The estimators on
migrated pass interaction terms show that this difference was not reduced during 1999
to 2001 from its 1998 levels.
Of the four non-cooperative fleet vehicles, retest-fail vehicles are among the
dirtiest CO high-emitters in all five years of the study. In 1997, retest-fail vehicles emitted
41.05% more CO emissions than the control fleet vehicles. The interaction estimators
                                                 
98 In the discussion below, for the purposes of brevity, I do not repeat the phrase “while holding
constant vehicular characteristics and physical conditions” with every sentence, which depicts
ceteris paribus effects. It is considered as assumed unless otherwise stated.
99 Formally, the null hypothesis of the chow test states βq, δt , Δtq = 0, where q = {2,3,…,11} and
t={2,3,…,5}. F-test statistic for (50,430025) degrees of freedom is estimated at 84.40 [Prob > F =
0.0000] for the OLS with robust errors model and 185.59 [Prob > F = 0.0000] for the log-linear
model in table 6.2. Both OLS with robust errors and log-linear models thus reject the null
hypothesis of the chow test.
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involving retest fail vehicles clearly show, especially for the log-linear model, that the CO
emission factors of retest-fail vehicles in 2000 and 2001 are statistically not different
from its 1997 level. In 1998 and 1999, as per WLS model, retest fail vehicles emitted
23.94% and 34.85% higher CO emission factors than their 1997 level difference. Retest
fail vehicles thus also emitted higher emissions than the retest pass vehicles in all the
five years of the study. Further, instead of decreasing the emission factors for the retest-
fail vehicles, their emissions either did not decrease, or even increased.
The second non-cooperative fleet, migrated fail vehicles are also among the
dirtiest CO high-emitting vehicles. In 1998, migrated fail vehicles, on average, emitted
55.40% more CO than the control fleet vehicles. This difference did not decrease during
1999 to 2001.
The third non-cooperative fleet, missing fail fleet vehicles, are also significantly
higher in CO emissions than the control fleet vehicles. In 1998, missing fail fleet
vehicles, on average, emitted 26.67% higher CO than the control fleet vehicles. This
difference did not significantly decrease during 2000 to 2001. However, in 1999, missing
fail vehicles were emitting 25.59% higher CO emissions than their 1998 levels.
The fourth non-cooperative fleet, missing pass vehicles, did not produce
significantly higher CO emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1998. The log-linear
model suggests that this difference remained at 0% during the years 1999 to 2000 and
showed an 11% reduction in 2001. The log-linear WLS model however shows a 7.22%
increase in CO emissions of missing pass vehicles in 1999 as compared to their 1998
levels.
For CO emission factors, the null hypothesis [H2] states: The difference between
the CO emissions of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners is not significantly
different than zero. While it is possible to test this hypothesis for each year of the study,
here I present the results for 5 years of the study period, taken together. This null
hypothesis is tested by employing an F-test after estimating the equation 5.3 for each of
the five regression models. Here the results from log-linear with robust errors model are
reported. Formally, the null hypothesis is stated as follows:100
                                                 
100 Note that equation 6.1 does not have 4 parameters that represent migrated pass fleet [Δ2,7]
among the cooperative types; and migrated fail fleet [Δ2,9], missing fail fleet [Δ2,10] and missing
pass fleet [Δ2,11] among the non-cooperative types in the year 1997. No vehicles in the 1997
remote sensing sample were found in these four treatment groups. 1997 is an exception because
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(6.1) [β6 + β7 + Δ2,6 + Δ3,6 + Δ4,6 + Δ5,6 + Δ3,7 + Δ4,7 + Δ5,7]/9  = [β8 + β9 + β10 + β11 + Δ2,8 + Δ3,8
+ Δ4,8 + Δ5,8 + Δ3,9 + Δ4,9 + Δ5,9 + Δ3,10 + Δ4,10 + Δ5,10  + Δ3,11 + Δ4,11 + Δ5,11]/17, where 9 and
17 respectively represent the number of parameters for cooperative and non-cooperative
vehicle groups in estimated equation 5.3, as presented in table 6.2.
For equation 6.1, the F-test statistic with (1,430025) degrees of freedom is
estimated to be 4.63 [Prob > F = 0.0315]. The log-linear model cannot reject the null
hypothesis [H2]. We can thus state that, on average, there is no statistical difference
between the CO emission factors of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles in the
Atlanta airshed. This is a surprising result because I expected cooperative vehicles to
emit on average less CO emissions than those of non-cooperative vehicles.
The explanation for this surprising result resides in three factors: First, the
standard errors of CO emissions for cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles are so
large that the F test does not distinguish any difference between their means. Second,
the repairs on emission control systems for CO might not be durable enough, and the
cooperative vehicles, which pass the retests, actually have faster deterioration of repairs
on their emission control systems. Third, the empirically estimated cooperative vehicle
owners may be actually non-cooperative types because the apparently cooperative
vehicles might have been falsely passed in IM emissions retests or they might have
employed fraudulent repairs on emissions control systems before appearing in retests
and securing pass in emissions test.
6.3.2: Impacts on HC emissions
Table 6.3 presents the estimated parameters for equation 5.4. The log-linear
WLS model has the most powerful F-statistic as compared to the other three models.
The adjusted R2 is 84.12% for the log-linear WLS model as compared to 49.31% and
8.52% respectively for the log-linear and OLS models with robust errors.
In table 6.3, the coefficients on time variables show that vehicles emitted 16.75%,
42.21%, 57.81% and 105.15% less HC emissions in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001
respectively than their average 1997 levels. Thus, overall, HC emissions have been
drastically reduced from 1997 to 2001, which can be attributed to some combination of
IM program effectiveness, changes in reformulated gasoline, as well as faster fleet turn-
over rates in the Atlanta airshed during the study period.
                                                                                                                                                  
it was the first year of the “enhanced” IM program and no vehicles in these four categories were
matched with the “basic” IM program data that wad collected in Atlanta in 1995 and 1996.
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Table 6.3: Regression models predicting the effect of vehicle owners’ decision behaviors




































































































































































































































































































-3.8399*** 0.0618** 0.0617* 0.0839** 0.0548**
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AIR 0.9194*** 0.0578*** 0.0577*** 0.0590*** 0.0582***
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Adj-R2 08.52% NA 49.31% 84.12% NA
Root MSE 45.959 NA .96919 1.9217 NA
F or LR test
(88,430025)
557.44 287906.67 4116.27 24751.48 4989.16
Lambda 1 -.0001259 0 0 0
1) Statistics in brackets () are the standard errors of coefficients
2) Coefficient value with one * shows significance at 90% confidence level and 10% probability of
type-I error; two ** at 95% confidence level and 5% probability of type I error; and three *** at
99% confidence level and 1% probability of type I error.
3) The Log-linear WLS model is run with no constant parameter. Rather, the weight variable is
added as an explanatory variable, whose coefficient is reported in place of the constant.
Given this temporal trend of decreasing HC emission factors between 1997 and
2001, the ceteris paribus effect of cooperative and non-cooperative decision behaviors
on HC emission factors is computed by the coefficients on the interactions terms in table
6.3. The chow test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no structural change over time
in HC emission factors, which is caused by decisions of vehicle owners in both control
and treatment groups.101
                                                 
101 Formally, null hypothesis of the chow test states βq, δt, Δtq = 0, where q = {2,3,…,11} and
t={2,3,…,5}. F-test statistic for (50,430025) degrees of freedom is estimated at 125.47 [Prob > F =
0.0000] for the OLS with robust errors model and 459.67 [Prob > F = 0.0000] for the log-linear
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Of the two apparently cooperative fleets, retest pass fleet vehicles were emitting
12.03% more HC emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1997. The coefficient is
significant in all of the five models. There was no difference in HC emissions of retest
pass vehicles between 1997, 1998 and 1999. The log-linear with robust errors model
suggests that retest pass vehicles emitted 6.77% more emissions in 2000 than their
1997 levels. In 2001, the HC emissions of retest pass fleet vehicles increased even
further by 37.18% as compared to their difference of 12.03% in 1997.
The log-linear model suggests that migrated passed vehicles emitted 11.8%
higher HC emission factors than the control fleet vehicles in 1998, 2000 and 2001, while
the difference was reduced by 8.67% in 1999.
Of the four non-cooperative fleet vehicles, the retest-fail vehicles emitted 11.75%
more HC emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1997. The interaction estimators
involving retest fail vehicles show that the HC emission factors of retest-fail vehicles in
1998 and 1999 are statistically not different from their 1997 levels. In 2000 and 2001,
one of the most important results of this study, the interaction terms involving retest fail
fleet vehicles show that the difference in the HC emission factors of retest fail vehicles
with the control fleet vehicles increased by 33.82% and 60.72% respectively over their
1997 levels. Thus, against the temporal trend of decreasing HC emissions, the retest fail
vehicles are emitting HC emissions at an increasing rate. The last two results are
important because they justify further attempts to more effectively address the problem
of chronically high-emitting vehicles. The same applies to migrated fail and missing fail
vehicles.
In 1998 and 1999, migrated fail and missing fail vehicles, on average, emitted
similar HC emissions as the control fleet vehicles. However, as the log-linear model
shows, the difference between the HC emissions of the migrated fail vehicles and the
control fleet vehicles was 33.82% and 60.72% higher in 2000 and 2001 as compared to
the 1998 level (when there was no difference). Similarly, the difference between the HC
emissions of the missing fail vehicles and the control fleet vehicles was 35.71% higher in
2001 as compared to the 1998 level (when there was no difference). The HC emissions
from the migrated fail and missing fail vehicles are thus also increasing over time,
against the temporal trend of decreasing HC emission factors for control group vehicles.
                                                                                                                                                  
model in table 6.3. Both OLS with robust errors and log-linear models thus reject the null
hypothesis of the chow test.
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The fourth non-cooperative fleet, missing pass vehicles, as per the log-linear
model, produced 4.07% higher HC emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1998. The
log-linear model suggests that missing pass vehicles emitted about 4% higher HC
emissions in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as compared to the control fleet vehicles, but this
difference disappeared in 2001.
For HC emission factors, the null hypothesis [H2] states: The difference between
the HC emissions of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners is not significantly
different than zero. While it is possible to test this hypothesis for each year of the study,
here I present the results for 5 years of the study period, taken together. This null
hypothesis is tested by employing an F-test after estimating equation 5.4 for each of the
five regression models. Here the results from log-linear model are reported. Formally,
the null hypothesis is stated as follows:102
(6.2) [β6 + β7 + Δ2,6 + Δ3,6 + Δ4,6 + Δ5,6 + Δ3,7 + Δ4,7 + Δ5,7]/9  = [β8 + β9 + β10 + β11 + Δ2,8 + Δ3,8
+ Δ4,8 + Δ5,8 + Δ3,9 + Δ4,9 + Δ5,9 + Δ3,10 + Δ4,10 + Δ5,10  + Δ3,11 + Δ4,11 + Δ5,11]/17, where 9 and
17 respectively represent the number of parameters for cooperative and non-cooperative
vehicle groups in estimated equation 5.4, as presented in table 6.3.
For equation 6.2, the F-test statistic with (1,430025) degrees of freedom is
estimated to be 18.01 [Prob > F = 0.0000]. The log-linear model rejects the null
hypothesis of equation 6.2 and predicts there is a statistical difference between the HC
emission factors of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles. In order to estimate the
direction and magnitude of this difference, the alternative hypothesis that cooperative
vehicles emit less HC emissions than the non-cooperative vehicles by a factor of (1-k)%
was tested. Formally,
(6.3) [β6 + β7 + Δ2,6 + Δ3,6 + Δ4,6 + Δ5,6 + Δ3,7 + Δ4,7 + Δ5,7]/9  = k*[β8 + β9 + β10 + β11 + Δ2,8 +
Δ3,8 + Δ4,8 + Δ5,8 + Δ3,9 + Δ4,9 + Δ5,9 + Δ3,10 + Δ4,10 + Δ5,10  + Δ3,11 + Δ4,11 + Δ5,11]/17, where k is
a rescaling parameter between the value of 0 and 1.
While the null hypothesis presented in equation 6.3 was rejected by the log-linear
model for the values of k between 0.54 and 1, it was not able to reject the null
                                                 
102 Again, equation 6.2 does not have 4 parameters that represent migrated pass fleet [Δ2,7]
among the cooperative types; and migrated fail fleet [Δ2,9], missing fail fleet [Δ2,10] and missing
pass fleet [Δ2,11] among the non-cooperative types in the year 1997. No vehicles in the 1997
remote sensing sample were found in these four treatment groups. 1997 is an exception because
it was the first year of the “enhanced” IM program and no vehicles in these four categories were
matched with the “basic” IM program data that was collected in Atlanta in 1995 and 1996.
166
hypothesis for the value of k at 0.53 and below at 95% confidence level. It can therefore
be concluded that the cooperative vehicles emitted at least 47% less HC emissions as
compared to non-cooperative vehicles during the study period in the Atlanta airshed.
6.3.3: Impacts on NOx emissions
Table 6.4 presents the estimated parameters for equation 5.5. The log-linear
WLS model has the most powerful F-statistic as compared to the other four models. The
adjusted R2 is 80.40% for the log-linear WLS model as compared to 23.21% and 20.07%
for the log-linear and OLS models with robust errors.
Table 6.4: Regression models predicting the effect of vehicle owners’ decision behaviors






































































































































































































-2.0689 0.0265 0.0622 0.0539 -0.1199
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Adj-R2 20.07% NA 23.21% 80.40% NA
Root MSE 27.501 NA 1.2631 2.4543 NA
F or LR test 264.87 24394.71 380.37 5075.27 421.97
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(69, 86518)
Lambda 1 .1507582 0 0 0
1) Statistics in brackets () are the standard errors of coefficients
2) Coefficient value with one * shows significance at 90% confidence level and 10% probability of
type-I error; two ** at 95% confidence level and 5% probability of type I error; and three *** at
99% confidence level and 1% probability of type I error.
3) The Log-linear WLS model is run with no constant parameter. Rather, the weight variable is
added as an explanatory variable, whose coefficient is reported in place of the constant.
In table 6.4, the coefficients on time variables show that the vehicles emitted
similar NO emissions in 2000 compared to average 1999 levels; but NO emissions
decreased by 28.01% in 2001. Given this temporal trend of decreasing NO emission
factors from 1999/2000 level to 2001, the ceteris paribus effect of cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors on NO emission factors is computed by the coefficients
on the interactions terms in table 6.4. The chow test rejects the null hypothesis that there
is no structural change over time in NO emission factors, which is caused by decisions
of vehicle owners in both control and treatment groups.103
Of the two apparently cooperative fleets, retest pass fleet vehicles were emitting
35.42% more NO emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1999. The coefficient is
significant in all the five models at a 99% confidence level. The models are in agreement
with respect to 2000 and 2001 retest pass fleets; there being no decrease in NO
emissions of retest pass vehicles from their 1999 levels. The log-linear WLS model
predicts that there was no statistical difference between NO emissions of the migrated
pass, retest fail, missing fail and control group vehicles between 1999 and 2001.
The fourth non-cooperative fleet, missing pass vehicles, produced 17.18% higher
NO emissions than the control fleet vehicles in 1999. According to the three log-linear
models, there was no significant change in NO emissions of missing pass vehicles in
2000 as compared to their difference in 1999. In 2001, however, missing pass vehicles
emitted 31.75% less NO emissions than their 1999 level difference of 17.18%. Missing
pass vehicles thus emitted higher NO emissions as compared to the control group
vehicles in 1999 and 2000, but the difference disappeared in 2001.
                                                 
103 Formally, the null hypothesis of the chow test states βq, δt, Δtq = 0, where q = {2,3,…,11} and
t={4,5}. The F-test statistic for (32,86518) degrees of freedom is estimated at 40.78 [Prob > F =
0.0000] for the OLS with robust errors model and 48.78 [Prob > F = 0.0000] for the log-linear
model in table 6.3. Both OLS with robust errors and log-linear models thus reject the null
hypothesis of the chow test.
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For NO emission factors, the null hypothesis [H2] states: The difference between
the NO emissions of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle owners is not significantly
different than zero. While it is possible to test this hypothesis for each year of the study,
here the results for 3 years of the study period, taken together, are presented. This null
hypothesis is tested by employing an F-test after estimating equation 5.5 for each of the
five regression models. Here the results from the log-linear with robust errors model are
reported. Formally, the null hypothesis is stated as follows:
(6.4) [β6 + β7 + Δ4,6 + Δ5,6 + Δ4,7 + Δ5,7]/6  = [β8 + β9 + β10 + β11 + Δ4,8 + Δ5,8 + Δ4,9 + Δ5,9 + Δ4,10
+ Δ 5,10 + Δ 4,11 + Δ5,11]/12, where 6 and 12 respectively represent the number of
parameters for cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle groups in estimated equation
5.5, as presented in table 6.4.
For equation 6.4, the F-test statistic with (1,86518) degrees of freedom is
estimated to be 0.07 [Prob > F = 0.7879]. The log-linear model cannot reject the null
hypothesis [H2] of equation 6.4 and predicts that there is no statistical difference
between NO emission factors of cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles during the
period 1999 to 2001.
6.3.4: Human decision behaviors and CO, HC and NO mass emission rates from
1997 to 2001
The methods to convert mass emission factors (g/g) into mass emission rates
(tons per year or tons per day) are presented in detail in appendix A. As explained in
appendix A, reduced regression models were used to estimate emission rates for CO,
HC and NO as impacted by the decision behaviors of vehicle owners as well as
regulatory mechanism designers. Full models, as presented in sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and
6.3.3, were not used because fuel economy data for each manufacturer, country of
vehicle manufacturing, vehicle type and model year of the vehicles in the study sample
is presently not available. Further, as explained in section 5.4.1, the odometer data is
either not available or not reliable as reported in the vehicle registration data. For these
reasons, aggregate VMT data for the state of Georgia was used; and, in estimating
mass emission rates, it was assumed that every vehicle observed in the Atlanta 13
county area travels on average the same distance (in miles) per year. Given these
important assumptions, panel A, B and C in table A.3 present estimated CO, HC and NO
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mass emission rates respectively for 11 vehicle groups during the five years of the study
period.
From a big-picture perspective, CO tail-pipe emission rates from Georgia-
registered on-road vehicles, which were observed driving inside the 13-county area,
declined from 0.492 million tons per year in 1997 to 0.281 million tons per year in 2001.
Similarly HC emission rates declined from 62,660 tons per year in 1997 to 6,170 tons
per year in 2001. NO emission rates, on the other hand, increased from 46,600 tons per
year in 1999 to 49,034.66 tons per year in 2001. CO and HC emissions are decreasing
because fleet turnover rate is relatively high in the Atlanta area and younger/newer
vehicles are relatively quickly incorporated in its vehicle fleets. The most disturbing
finding concerns the increase in NO emissions, because NO is one of the most
important ground-level Ozone pre-cursor criteria pollutants. NO emissions are increasing
because of the increased use of trucks/SUVs in Atlanta, GA, as shown in table A.2.
The vehicles in the treatment groups of this study do not appear to be
significantly reducing overall emissions, and in some cases, are rather increasing them.
It is only the vehicles in the control groups that appear to be reducing CO, HC and NO
emission rates. But then, was the IM policy intervention targeted at the vehicles in the
control groups? Since cooperative vehicle owners [as explained in chapters 1 and 5] can
preemptively repair the emission control systems, and be included in the control [initial
test/initial pass] fleet of vehicle owners, it makes sense to analyze CO, HC and NO
emission rates for each of the 11 fleet types separately. This will also facilitate the
analysis in terms of estimating the effects on vehicular tail-pipe emissions due to
changes in IM program rules, such as the shift from a biennial to an annual program in
2001.
The overall effectiveness of IM program in Atlanta between 1997 and 2001 is
calculated by considering the change in total emissions from year to year in the vehicle
fleet groups that were eligible to appear in the IM program for an evaluation year. Of the
11 fleets considered in detail here, 2 fleets were not eligible, including the IM ineligible
fleet and the rest-of-GA fleet. The rest of the 9 fleets were eligible. The total CO, HC and
NO emissions produced by IM eligible fleets in each year of evaluation are shown in
table A.3. Further, CO, HC and NO emissions produced by cooperative and non-
cooperative fleets are also shown for each year in table A.3.
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Summary of the IM program’s emission-rate reduction effectiveness is as follows,
as presented in table A.3: CO emission rates for odd model year IM eligible vehicles
observed in 1997 increased by 2.92% in 1999; and, even model year IM eligible vehicles
observed in 1998 decreased by 24.01% in 2000. If combined for both odd and even
model years observed in 1999 and 2000, CO emission rates decreased by 37.31% in
2001. Similarly, HC emission rates for odd model year IM eligible vehicles observed in
1997 decreased by 35.01% in 1999; and, even model year IM eligible vehicles observed
in 1998 decreased by 12.51% in 2000. HC emission rates for both odd and even model
year vehicles observed in 1999 and 2000 decreased by 79.12% in 2001. Furthermore,
NO emission rates for both odd and even model year vehicles observed in 1999 and
2000 decreased by 11.32% in 2001.
6.4: Contextual conditions of vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed
The contextual conditions of vehicle owners are estimated through two models.
First, a multinomial logistic regression model is employed to test the differences in the
socio-economic, demographic and technological contextual conditions of vehicle owners
in control and treatment groups of vehicle owners. Section 6.4.1 elaborates the results
from this model. Second, an ecological regression model is employed to test the
differences in the distribution of median household income of vehicle owners’ block-
group level neighborhoods. Section 6.4.2 presents the results from this model. The
results of the hypotheses H3 and H4 are also presented there.
6.4.1: Socio-economic, demographic and technological contextual conditions of
vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed 1997-2001
Table 6.5 presents results from the multinomial logistic regression model that
predicts the odds of vehicle owners to be in one of the four control or six treatment
vehicle groups as compared to the control (initial test/initial pass) group vehicles. The
odds are predicted for 17 parameters on socio-economic and demographic contextual
conditions of vehicle owners and 29 parameters on technological characteristics of their
vehicles. The model was run on the geo-coded sample of 482,809 vehicle owners
observed in Atlanta between 1997 and 2001. The model has a pseudo-R2 of 55.47%.    
The economic context of the vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed is captured by
four economic parameters of vehicle owners, which are measured at the vehicle owners’
census block-group levels: median household income, per capita income, median home





census block-group increased by $ 1,000, the odds of a vehicle owner to be in the
ineligible fleet increased by 0.32%, while the odds to be in retest pass, migrated pass,
retest fail, migrated fail, missing fail and missing pass fleets decreased respectively by
0.92%, 4.69%, 0.85%, 5.80%, 2.27% and 0.99%. This shows that, overall, vehicle
owners in the treatment groups of high-emitting vehicle owners come from relatively low
income neighborhoods, while the control groups of normal emitting vehicle owners come
from relatively higher median household income neighborhoods.
Similarly, as the median home value of the vehicle owner’s census block-group
increased by $ 10,000, the odds of a vehicle owner being in the ineligible fleet increased
by 0.20%, while the odds to be in retest pass, migrated pass, retest fail, migrated fail,
missing fail and missing pass fleets decreased respectively by 1.12%, 2.90%, 1.88%,
5.91%, 1.42%, and 0.77%. This result confirms that the vehicle owners of the control
group live in relatively expensive homes than those in the treatment groups.
Surprisingly, as the % of employed people in census block group of vehicle
owner’s address increased by 10%, the odds of a vehicle being in the ineligible fleet
decreased by 2.75%, but the odds of a vehicle being in the retest-fail fleet increased by
9.54%. More expectedly, as the % of employed rose by 10%, the odds of a vehicle being
in the retest pass and migrated fail groups were equal, but the odds decreased by
16.22%, 6.66% and 3.19% respectively for a vehicle to be in migrated pass, missing fail
and a missing pass fleet.
The social context of the vehicle owners in Atlanta is primarily evaluated by
analyzing the racial composition of the vehicle owners’ neighborhoods at their census
block-group levels. The odds of vehicle owners being in one of the four control or six
treatment vehicle groups as compared to the initial test initial pass group vehicles are
estimated for five parameters on race. Each of the five parameters represents
respectively % of Afro-American, Hispanic, Asian and “other-races” in the census block-
groups of vehicle owners, while the % of whites is treated as a reference group.  
All the races had equal odds of being in retest pass and retest fail groups, but the
odds of Afro-Americans as compared to Whites increased significantly by 2.73% and
3.19%. In migrated fail group, however, the odds are significantly higher to find Whites
than Afro-American, Hispanic and Asian races.  Afro-Americans are thus blatantly
defying the law, as represented by their concentration among the retest fail group of
vehicle owners. On the other hand, Whites’ concentration in the migrated fail group
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shows that they have higher odds to be apparently compliant with the written laws but
they are actually non-cooperative.
The demographic context of the vehicle owners in Atlanta is evaluated by
analyzing the demographic composition of the vehicle owners’ neighborhoods through
seven parameters. One of these seven parameters measures % of female as compared
to male populations, while the other six parameters compare populations of 18 years
and older with 18 years and younger. Populations of 18 years and older are divided in
six groups of 10 year intervals. 
As the % of female population in the census block-group of vehicle owner’s
address increase by 10%, the odds of a vehicle being in ineligible fleet increase by
31.67%. On the other hand, in the case of five out of six treatment groups -- retest-pass,
retest fail, migrated fail, missing fail and missing pass fleets -- the odds are significantly
lower for females than males by 35.84%, 39.29%, 24.55%, 50.34% and 33.40%
respectively.  The migrated pass fleet has equal odds to contain males and females.
Overall, thus, the evidence is strong that vehicle owners living in neighborhoods with
higher % of females are more cooperative, while the vehicle owners living in
neighborhoods with higher % of males are more non-cooperative.
  As the % of the people between the ages of 18 and 24 years increase by 10%,
the odds of finding an ineligible fleet vehicle increase by 27.58%, while the odds
decrease for finding a retest pass, migrated pass, retest fail, migrated fail, missing fail
and missing pass group vehicle by 28.23%, 17.80%, 34.15%, 17.99%, 35.33% and
22.44% respectively. Similarly patterns are observed for the neighborhoods with higher
% of the 25- to 34-year old people. On the other hand, the neighborhoods with high % of
population between the ages of 55 and 64 years have increased odds by 85.63% and
49.55% to respectively contain migrated pass and migrated fail vehicles. Overall,
neighborhoods with higher % of people under the age of 34 years are more cooperative
while areas with higher % of 35 year and older people have higher odds to contain non-
cooperative vehicle owners.
The technological context of the vehicles can be predicted by parameters
measured at various levels of detail and resolution. The multinomial logistic model
includes only those technological contextual variables, which both significantly explain
the variation in the tail-pipe emissions and provide a measure of meaningful policy
discourse. The technological variables include vehicle age, vehicle type, vehicle
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manufacturer, country of vehicle manufacture and the specific technology of emission
control systems on-board the vehicles.  All of these technological parameters
significantly explain variation for at least one of the eleven vehicle groups, the dependent
variable of the multinomial logistic regression model.
The parameter on vehicle age captures the evolving technological context of
vehicles. The multinomial model predicts that as the vehicle age increases by one year,
the odds of a vehicle being in the ineligible and the rest-of-GA fleets were 59.46% and
12.39% lower respectively as compared to the control group vehicles. On the other
hand, with each additional year of vehicle age, the odds of a vehicle being in one of the
treatment groups -- retest pass, migrated pass, retest fail, migrated fail, missing fail and
missing pass groups -- increased significantly by 28.44%, 12.82%, 16.74%, 21.29%,
10.99% and 10.20% respectively. This result shows that high-emitting vehicle owners in
the treatment vehicle groups own, on average, older vehicles than those of the control or
other vehicle groups not directly targeted by the IM policy intervention.
6.4.2: Income distribution of vehicles and their owners
This section presents results about the distribution of median household income
of the vehicle owners in four control and six treatment groups of vehicle owners, while
holding constant technological contextual parameters of vehicles, as well as other
economic, social and demographic contextual parameters of the owners of those
vehicles. These results are estimated by applying an ecological regression model, as
formally presented in equation 5.10.
Table 6.6 presents three regression models that attempt to estimate equation
5.10. The OLS with robust errors model has an adjusted R2 of 77.76%, while the log-
linear with robust errors model has the adjusted R2 of 77.56%. The log-linear robust
regression model counter-validates the results of the log-linear and the OLS with robust
errors models.
According to the OLS with robust errors model, as presented in table 6.6, there is
no statistical difference in the block-group level median household income of the vehicle
owners who are in the ineligible and waived fleets as compared to the control group
vehicle owners. The log-linear model suggests, however, that vehicle owners in the IM
ineligible fleet had 0.31% lower income than those in the control group. The household
income of the owners of control groups of vehicles, especially initial test/initial pass,
waived and ineligible vehicle groups, is thus not statistically different. However, as
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expected, vehicle owners in the rest-of-GA fleet had $ 8,114.91 [15.14%] lower median
household income than those in the control group. Unexpectedly, vehicle owners in the
missing fleet had $ 691.39 [1.31%] lower median household income than those in control
group, which suggests that vehicles in the missing fleet do not just represent a data
matching error, and there may be a systematic undercurrent of avoiding the emissions
testing upfront by IM test eligible vehicles.
Table 6.6: Regression models predicting the geo-coded vehicle owners’ median household








































































































































































































































































































































































Adj-R2 77.76% 77.56% NA
Root MSE 12,118 0.1985 NA




Lambda 1 0 0
1) Statistics in brackets () are the standard errors of coefficients
2) Coefficient value with one * shows significance at 90% confidence level and 10% probability of
type-I error; two ** at 95% confidence level and 5% probability of type I error; and three *** at
99% confidence level and 1% probability of type I error.
  Of the two cooperative fleets in six treatment vehicle groups, vehicle owners in
the retest pass fleet had $ 387.32 [0.40%] lower median household income than those in
the control group. The second cooperative fleet, migrated pass vehicle owners had
$6,158.16 [10.82%] lower median household income than control group vehicle owners.
Surprisingly, vehicle owners in the retest fail fleet, one of the major non-
cooperative vehicle groups, showed no statistically significant difference in their median
household income compared with those of control group vehicle owners. The lowest of
all were migrated fail vehicle owners, who averaged $ 6,448.11 [12.85%] less than the
control group vehicle owners.104 As expected, vehicle owners in the missing fail and
                                                 
104 It is unclear whether migrated pass and migrated fail vehicle owners actually come from lower
income areas because their geocoded addresses, as reported in vehicle registration databases,
represent a time after they had undertaken [pseudo] migration. Their addresses from the IM
program data are not available.
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missing pass fleets had respectively $ 1371.85 [2.71%] and $ 601.18 [0.99%] lower
median household income than those in the control group.
As presented in section 1.3, the third null hypothesis [H3] of the study states: The
odds are equal that high-emitting vehicle owners live in the same income level
neighborhoods as do the normal emitters. This null hypothesis is tested by employing an
F-test after estimating equation 5.10 for each of the three regression models. Here the
results from OLS and log-linear with robust errors models are reported. Formally, the null
hypothesis is stated as follows:
(6.5) [β6 + β7 + β8 + β9 + β10 + β11]/6 = 0 where 6 represents the number of parameters for
treatment vehicle groups in estimated equation 5.10.
For equation 6.5, the F-test statistic with (1,482750) degrees of freedom is
estimated to be 594.97 [Prob > F = 0.000] for the OLS with robust errors model and
525.36  [Prob > F = 0.0000] for the log-linear with robust errors model. Both the OLS and
the log-linear with robust errors models strongly reject the null hypothesis of equation
6.5. The OLS models predict that there is a statistical difference between the median
household income of the vehicles in the six treatment groups as compared to the
vehicles in the control group. In order to estimate the direction and magnitude of the
difference between the median household income of the treatment and control groups of
vehicles, the alternative hypothesis that treatment group vehicle owners live in lower
household income neighborhoods as compared to the control group vehicle owners by a
difference of d dollars was tested. Formally,
(6.6) [β6 + β7 + β8 + β9 + β10 + β11]/6 = d
While the alternative hypothesis presented in equation 6.6 was rejected
by the OLS with robust errors model for the values of d between 0 and –2,333, it was not
able to reject the alternative hypothesis for the value of d at –2,334 and below at 95%
confidence level. It can therefore be concluded that the treatment group vehicle owners,
on average, reside in neighborhoods that have $2,334 lower household income as
compared to the vehicle owners in the control group. Similarly, the log-linear model
predicted that treatment group vehicle owners live in neighborhoods with at least 4.4%
lower household income than the control group vehicle owners. Since IM policy
intervention is explicitly targeted at the high-emitting vehicle owners in the six treatment
groups, it can be concluded that IM policy is unfair because it targets the treatment
183
group vehicle owners, who live in relatively lower income neighborhoods, and requires
them to pay the costs of repairing emission control systems on their vehicles.
The fourth null hypothesis [H4] of the study states: The odds are equal that
cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners live in the same income level neighborhoods
as do the non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners. This null hypothesis is tested by
employing an F-test after estimating equation 5.10 for each of the three regression
models. Here the results from OLS and log-linear with robust errors models are reported.
Formally, the null hypothesis is stated as follows:
(6.7) [β6 + β7]/2 = [β8 + β9 + β10 + β11]/4 where 2 and 4 respectively represent the number
of parameters for cooperative and non-cooperative vehicle groups in the estimated
equation 5.10.
For equation 6.7, the F-test statistic with (1,482750) degrees of freedom is
estimated to be 43.26 [Prob > F = 0.000] for the OLS with robust errors model and 17.36
[Prob > F = 0.0000] for the log-linear model. Both the OLS and the log-linear with robust
errors models reject the null hypothesis of equation 6.7. These models predict that there
is a statistical difference between the median household income of the vehicle owners in
the cooperative groups as compared to the non-cooperative vehicle groups. In order to
estimate the direction and magnitude of the difference between the median household
income of the cooperative and non-cooperative groups of vehicles, the alternative
hypothesis that cooperative group vehicle owners live in higher household income
neighborhoods as compared to the non-cooperative group vehicle owners by a factor of
[1+k]% was tested. Formally,
(6.8) [β6 + β7]/2 = [1+k]*[β8 + β9 + β10 + β11]/4
While the alternative hypothesis presented in equation 6.8 was rejected by the
OLS with robust errors model for the values of k between 0 and 0.32, it was not able to
reject the alternative hypothesis for the value of k at 0.33 and above at 95% confidence
level. It can therefore be concluded that the cooperative group vehicle owners, on
average, reside in neighborhoods that have 33% higher household income as compared
to the vehicle owners in the non-cooperative groups. Similarly, the log-linear model
predicts that the cooperative vehicle owners live in neighborhoods with 15% higher
household income as compared to the non-cooperative group of vehicle owners. The
results of H4 thus suggest that decision-makers living in higher income areas are
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expected to be more cooperative with the environmental regulations as compared to the
decision-makers in lower income areas.
Next, the implications of the results are presented in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
7.1 Substantive environmental policy implications
7.1.1 Normative analysis of Atlanta’s IM program
Despite increase in vehicle miles traveled between 1997 and 2001, the data has
shown that CO and HC vehicular tailpipe emissions are decreasing over time, but NO
emissions are increasing. The decrease in CO and HC vehicular tailpipe emissions can
be partially attributed to IM program effectiveness (as discussed in section 6.3), but
changes in gasoline mixes and faster fleet turnovers (parameter vehicle age) are also
partially responsible for decrease in CO and HC emissions. On the other hand, the
increase in NO emissions is a disturbing finding and immediate policy action is required
to change this trend. A strong reason for the increase in NO emissions is attributed to
rising stocks of Trucks/SUVs in the Atlanta area. Secondly, the lack of control over high-
emitting vehicle owners is also a significant factor in the increased production of NO tail-
pipe emissions.
Even though the IM program can identify most of the high-emitting vehicle
owners, it is not as effective in reducing emissions from their vehicles as might be
achieved by an alternative design of the IM program. The data results show that the
emission factors of high-emitting vehicles have either stayed at the same levels or even
increased; they did not decrease as was originally mandated under the objective of the
IM regulatory mechanism.
The descriptive level analysis of the IM program in the Atlanta area shows that if
outcomes of policy intervention are measured on the value/objective of tailpipe emission
reductions, we get mixed results. On the one hand, the IM program has effectively
reduced CO and HC emission by 37.31% and 79.12% respectively from 1999-2000
levels to 2001. On the other hand, at least 58% of high-emitting vehicle owners have
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been able to defy the IM program, and their vehicles, on an individual basis, continue to
emit about 3 times higher emissions than the control group vehicles.
If outcomes of the IM program intervention are also measured on the scale of
fairness, the data shows that the IM program is targeting vehicle owners who live in
areas with relatively less median household income than those who are not targeted by
it. On the other hand, the benefit of clean air, if effectively produced by IM program
intervention, will be shared by both high-emitting and the normal-emitting vehicle owners
in the Atlanta airshed. The policy intervention aimed at attaining a positive outcome for
the entire society, cleaner air by maintaining high emitting vehicles, results in unfair
allocation of environmental clean-up costs: it is unfair because the IM intervention by its
design aims at detecting and repairing high-emitting vehicles, which are owned by
people with lower median household income levels than the owners of vehicles that are
not targeted by the IM program. Is it possible to design a policy mechanism that is both
fair and more effective?
If fairness is accepted as a worthy objective by the policy designers, it is perhaps
possible that the IM program could be made more effective in reducing tailpipe
emissions.105 But how could it happen? How can we get from here –a less effective and
less fair predicament – to there – a more effective and fairer future?
Next, three possible policy options based on three theoretical frameworks are
briefly outlined: the first option is based on the assumption that the current theory of
environmental regulation will continue to prevail; the second option is based on the
assumption that game theoretical predictions hold; and the third option is based on the
assumption that collaborative and communicative theories of policy and planning hold.
From a meta-theoretical perspective, these three theories and their relevant policy
options are not contradictory; they can be pursued simultaneously.
First, given the current theory and practice of environmental regulation, it is
important that coordination among various state authorities, statutes and laws be
improved, and that the enforcement of the existing laws be increased. While the IM
program rules rely on the strategy of regulatory punishment by denying vehicle
                                                 
105 The hypotheses H3 and H4 were written with the intention of treating “fairness” as a “stand-
alone” value, an objective worthy of pursuit in itself due to its intrinsic value in human societies.
However, the results of the empirical study show that the pursuit of fairness can also affect
changes in effectiveness, the other criterion of evaluation in Atlanta’s case study.
187
registration inside the 13 county-area to the program avoiders and non-cooperative
vehicle owners, there are both enforcement failures106 as well as loopholes in the vehicle
registration laws, which allow high-emitters to avoid the IM program punishment
strategy. Vehicles belonging to the retest fail fleet are unresolved failures but are still
found being driven and registered inside the 13 county IM program boundaries.
Similarly, missing fail and missing pass group vehicles should appear for emissions
testing, but they continue to avoid the IM program regulations. Furthermore, vehicles
belonging to the migrated fail category are perfect examples of avoiding the regulatory
punishment strategy through perfectly legal means due to the current loopholes in the
vehicle registration laws.
If policy-makers and legislators want to decrease the non-cooperative and
program avoidance behavior in the Atlanta Airshed and improve the enforcement of IM
program regulations, the following two changes in the vehicle registration laws and IM
program rules will be required. First, a vehicle that fails an initial IM test inside the 13-
county area should not be allowed to register anywhere in the state of Georgia. This
change would reduce the percentage of migrated fail vehicles from the on-road fleets in
the Atlanta airshed. Possibly, there will be opposition to the proposed change of vehicle
registration law from the counties outside the IM program boundary area because it is in
their revenue interest to maximize the number of vehicle registrations in their counties.
Car dealers are another influential lobby that is likely to oppose the change in the vehicle
registration laws. It is not in their interest to increase governmental intervention in the
transaction processes associated with vehicle registrations. On the other hand, this
study provides substantial evidence that migrated fail vehicles are producing tailpipe CO,
HC and NO emissions at least 3 times higher than the control group vehicles. The
proposed change in the vehicle registration laws will thus improve the air quality in the
Atlanta airshed by reducing the percentage of the migrated fail vehicles from on-road
fleets.
Secondly, the missing fail and missing pass groups of non-cooperative vehicles
can be reduced by introducing a change in the current IM program rules. The new rule
would require a vehicle inside the 13-county area to undergo emissions testing at every
                                                 
106 Vehicles in retest fail, missing fail and missing pass groups represent enforcement failures,
while migrated fail vehicles represent the vehicle owners who exploit loopholes in the vehicle
registration laws.
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change of ownership. This rule will both improve the air quality and provide more up-to-
date information to IM program managers about the history of vehicles in the IM program
area, especially the tracking of high-emitting vehicle owners would become much easier
task. Furthermore, a follow-up evaluation study in the future would be able to distinguish
the actual non-cooperative types in the missing pass group from those new vehicle
owners who are not required by the IM program rules to test the vehicle for emissions’
compliance.
A game theorist might argue, it is not certain that the proposed changes in the
vehicle registration laws and IM program rules will be sufficient to ensure compliance by
high-emitting vehicle owners. For example, if the vehicle registration law is modified to
disallow an IM failure from getting registered anywhere in the state of Georgia, the non-
cooperative drivers can still register outside the state of Georgia (say in Tennessee) and
still drive in the Atlanta Airshed. This implies that a concerted and coordinated action at
the regional or national level will be required to completely stop the program avoidance
behavior.
Game theory suggests that the current incentive structure for the high-emitting
vehicle owners induces program avoidance behavior, because it is less costly to register
a car outside the IM program boundaries than taking it again and again to the IM testing
stations. Instead, a clean air fund could be initiated through a very small tax on normal
emitting vehicle owners [because they would enjoy the benefit of clean air] and repair
subsidies can be issued to the high-emitting vehicle owners that show reliable receipts
for repairing the emission control systems on their vehicles from the state-certified repair
centers. Other forms of rebates can also be considered to induce a change in the
behavior of non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners, such as incentives to vehicle
manufacturers to issue subsidized warrantees of up to 200,000 miles on emission
control systems for the vehicles produced by them. Thus, a change in the incentive
structures through a detailed mechanism design may induce non-cooperative drivers to
start cooperating with the environmental laws.
A qualitative study should directly elicit the cognitive perspective of the non-
cooperative vehicle owners. This study may involve intensive focus groups involving
representatives of high-emitting vehicle owners from various socio-economic
backgrounds to discuss new policy alternatives for encouraging cooperative behavior
and improving air quality in the Atlanta Airshed. This suggestion is based on the
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assumption that discussion and negotiation with actual people may bring a new set of
policy alternatives to the forefront, and allow progress beyond the current policy of
regulatory punishment through the vehicle registration laws and the proposed policy of
changes in incentive structures through repair-subsidies and manufacturer warranties.
To put it simply, a normative underpinning for the policy intervention would be
required. It will have to be recognized by the policy makers that fairness is an important
value against which the outcomes of policy interventions should be measured. Whether
fairness is recognized as an important value by the policy-makers/designer is an
example of a meta-decision problem. At the same time, a contextual change in vehicular
technologies and fuel-inputs might perhaps one day eradicate the need for an IM
program. In the short to medium run (at least for the vehicles up to model year 2007), it
seems that a mechanism will be required to efficiently maintain constantly aging vehicles
in the current fleets.
Some form of policy intervention will therefore be needed to detect and repair the
high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta fleet during the next twenty-five years
(assuming 2007 model years would be scrapped around 2029). It is in the purview of the
policy makers to change the regulatory mechanism and make it more fair and effective.
This change can be brought about by changing the current vehicle registration laws and
IM program rules, re-designing the incentive structures for high-emitting vehicle owners
and carrying out direct discourse with the representatives of high-emitting vehicle
owners.  Adaptive mechanisms, discussed in next section, present a formal method to
bring about changes in policies that aim at balancing outcomes of policy interventions on
multiple scales of values in a context-sensitive design.
7.1.2 Designing adaptive environmental policy mechanisms: revisiting voluntary,
regulatory and market mechanisms
 Consider the framework of a multi-stage principal-agent (P-A) decision game for
comparing the outcomes of voluntary, regulatory and market mechanism designs with
one another as well as designing adaptive policy mechanisms. The P-A framework
allows evaluation of current incentive mechanisms faced by the environmentally
regulated. It also facilitates the design of alternative mechanisms for aiding the decisions
of environmental regulators/policy makers. The P-A game thus provides a theoretical
framework to model the incentive mechanisms for both ex post evaluation of previous
environmental policies and ex ante design of alternative incentive mechanisms.
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The environmental regulator is modeled as Principal, which sets the rules of the
game in period t. Agents react to these rules in period t + 1. Some agent types follow the
rules of the game by pursuing cooperative strategies that enable the environmental
regulator to meet environmental standards as envisioned in the enforced regulations.
Other agent types try to avoid or circumvent the rules of the game by pursuing non-
cooperative strategies that enable them to free-ride in consuming environmental goods
as well as to avoid the regulatory punishment strategy that is enforced by the Principal
for maximizing the prevalence of cooperative strategies. In period t + 2, the
environmental regulator evaluates the implementation of the regulatory standards and
either continues to implement the previous rules or changes the rules of the game, to
which agents react in period t + 3. The multi-stage principal-agent game continues until
there is no need for environmental regulation.
Formally, a mechanism is defined as an institution with rules governing the
procedure for making a collective choice. The environmental regulatory mechanism is
denoted as τR, while the adaptive mechanism is denoted as τA. A voluntary mechanism
is denoted as τV,, and a market mechanism is denoted as τM.  In real-world practice, it
would be very difficult to sharply segregate voluntary, market and regulatory
mechanisms from each other. A voluntary mechanism may operate side by side with a
market; or a regulatory mechanism may intervene in a market mechanism; or a
regulatory mechanism may leave voluntary choices to the decision-makers. An adaptive
mechanism does not need to introduce sharp boundaries between voluntary, regulatory
and market mechanisms; rather it can be initiated under any existing circumstances, as
described in section 2.4.
Suppose there are m agents in the game, denoted by set M = 1,…, i,…,m; while
Principal is the m+1st player.  The m agents must make a collective choice from the set X
(for example, clean air or no clean air). The collective choice is, however, assumed to be
realized by each agent’s individual strategy and type. Each agent’s strategy set is
denoted by Si, and there are (S1,…,Sm) sets of strategies played by m agents in the
game.
The P-A game is modeled as a game with incomplete information (Harsanyi
1995) because each player’s strategy and payoff will depend on which particular type of
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her represents her in the game. In other words, the P-A game allows multiple types of a
player to play in different time periods, even though only one type of player plays at a
single moment of time. For each player i in M, let the number of her different types be z
(i). The set of all her types is denoted as:
ΘI = (ϑi1, ϑi2,…, ϑig,…,ϑiz ).
The total number of different types in the game will be:
Z = ∑mi=1 z (i).
For any type ϑI, the number of her pure strategies is called K (i). The set of all her
pure strategies is written as Si = (si1,…, sik, …., siK(i)). Since ϑi is observed only by agent i,
the game setting is characterized by incomplete information. It is assumed that agents’
types are drawn from a commonly known prior distribution. Denoting a profile of agents’
types by ϑ  = (ϑ1,…., ϑm), the probability density over the possible realizations of all
profiles of agents’ types [ϑ ∈ Θ1 x … x Θm] is represented as φ(.). The probability density
φ(.), the sets Θ1 x … x Θm and the utility functions ui (x, ϑ i) are assumed to be individual
beliefs of the agents and specific value of each agent i’s type is observed only by i.107
Each agent i is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer.108 The Bernoulli
utility function of type ϑ i is ui (x, ϑi). The ordinal preference relation over pairs of
alternatives in X that is associated with utility function ui (x, ϑi) is denoted ≥i (ϑi). Agent i’s
set of possible preference relations over X is given by:
Ri = { ≥i : ≥i = ≥i (ϑi) for some ϑi ∈ Θi}.
Definition 1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ1 x … x Θm _ X that, for each
possible profile of the agents’ types (ϑ1,…., ϑm), assigns a collective choice f (ϑ1,…., ϑm)
∈ X.
                                                 
107 It is possible that agent i’s type is observed by agent j and thus agents’ preferences over
outcomes depend not only on their own observed types but also on types observed by others
(e.g. agent i’s preferences over whether or not to cooperate with the environmental regulations
may depend on agent j’s knowledge of possible strategies). Though it is possible to model the
influence of other people’s knowledge on an agent’s actions and strategies, this dissertation is
restricted to the case in which each individual acts according to his/her own knowledge and type
(also known as the case of private values).
108 As discussed in chapter 3, other forms of utility functions under uncertain states of the world
can also be assumed, or interactively constructed for specific decision makers.
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Definition 2: The social choice function f : Θ1 x … x Θ m _ X is ex post efficient (or
Paretian) if for no profile ϑ = (ϑ1,…., ϑm) is there an x ∈ X such that ui (x, ϑi) ≥ ui ( f (ϑ),ϑi)
for every i, and ui (x, ϑi) > ui ( f (ϑ),ϑi) for some i.
The social planner (Principal) faces the problem that ϑi’s are not publicly
observable, and it is not known which type of an agent is playing the game. It is
therefore very difficult to decide which social choice function (or incentive mechanism
design) should be chosen or preferred as efficient. One way to elicit the agent types of
ϑi’s is to use direct revelation mechanisms. Free riders, or non-cooperative types, will
however have the incentive not to truthfully tell their type under the direct revelation
mechanism designs. Let’s suppose that there are two kinds of strategies played by
agents: cooperative strategies are denoted by Sc and  non-cooperative strategies are
denoted by Snc. If an agent pursues a cooperative strategy, it is inferred that her
cooperative type is active in the game and her other types are inactive. The possibility of
preference reversal is not excluded: if Principal changes the incentive mechanism from
τR to τA, it is possible that the type of agent pursuing non-cooperative strategies may find
cooperative strategies to be of higher expected utility and reverse her preferences by
changing her active type in the game.
Once the active agent types are measured through an indirect methodology, the
next task of the social planner is to design a mechanism such that agents will play the
equilibrium strategies and yet implement the Pareto efficient social function. This task
could be modeled in two steps. First, a currently enforced mechanism under the given
environmental regulation τR is estimated to ascertain the existing social choice function,
which is also known as the outcome function in game-theoretical language and formally
represented as g: S1 x ….x Sm _ X. In the second step of policy prescription, an
alternative mechanism τA is proposed that will change the incentive structures and the
equilibrium strategies of agents given both their types observed in the previous stages of
the game and the desirable values enshrined in measuring the outcomes of agents’
actions.  The change in the incentive structure and strategies of agents will lead to an
altered social choice or outcome function that would be realized in period t +1, and so
on. Formally, a mechanism is defined as follows:
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Definition 3: A mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) is a collection of m strategy sets ( S1,…,
Sm) and an outcome function g: S1 x ….x Sm _ X.
The observed actions of each agent type in the study sample are summarized by
the strategy set Si, and the rule for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice
function is given by the outcome vector-valued function g (.). Moreover, the mechanism τ
combined with possible agent types (Θ1 x … x Θm), probability density φ (.) and Bernoulli
utility functions (u1 (.), …, um (.)) defines a Bayesian game of incomplete information.
Assuming (u-i (s1, …, sm,  ), ϑi) = ui (g (s1, …, sm,  ), ϑi), the Bayesian game is defined to
contain the following elements: [M, {Si}, { u-i (.),(Θ1 x … x Θm), φ (.)]
The Bayesian game of incomplete information generated by a mechanism τ
shows that a strategy for agent i is a function si: Θi _ Si, which depicts agent i’s choice
from Si for each possible type in Θi. In other words, a mechanism implements social
choice function f (.) if there is an equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism that
yields the same outcomes as f(.) for each possible profile of types ϑ = (ϑ1,…., ϑm). The
formal definition is as follows:
Definition 4: The mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) implements the social choice function
f(.) if there is an equilibrium strategy profile (s1* (.), …, sm* (.)) of the game induced by τ
such that g (s1* (ϑ1), …, sm* (ϑm)) = f (ϑ1,…., ϑm) for all (ϑ1,…., ϑm) ∈ Θ1 x … x Θm.
One of the most persistent and most discussed problems in decision theory
concerns the choice of which decision rule should be chosen to define a social choice
function f(.), because there is no universally agreed upon meta-criteria to identify and
weight the parameters of a social choice function. Different parameters and their weights
may lead to different equilibriums in a P-A game.
Let’s suppose that the social planner decides on a dictatorial basis to implement
a social choice function that, for example, in the context of this study, minimizes
emissions per gallon of burned gasoline fuel and fairly distributes the repair costs for the
drivers of the Atlanta airshed. In this case, a multi-criteria social choice function or
outcome function has been reduced by the dictator to a bi-criteria social choice function.
Effectiveness represents one criterion which is measured as minimum emissions per
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gallon; and fairness represents the second criterion which is measured as a uniform
distribution of repair costs over all income levels of the agents in this game.
The question remains: which equilibrium concept should be employed to solve
the decision game.109 Current research in game theory has come up with multiple
solutions (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Two of the most commonly employed concepts
are dominant strategy equilibrium, and Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
A strategy is a weakly dominant strategy for an agent in a game if it gives her at
least as large a payoff as any of her other possible strategies for every possible strategy
that other agents might play. In an incomplete information setting, strategy si: Θi _ Si is a
weakly dominant strategy for agent i in mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) if, for all ϑi ∈ Θi
and all possible strategies for agents j ≠ i, s-i = [s1 (.), …, si-1 (.),si+1 (.), …, sm (.)]:
E ϑ -i [ ui (g (si (ϑi), s-i (ϑ-i)), ϑi) / ϑi] ≥ E ϑ-i [ ui (g (siˆ, s-i (ϑ-i)), ϑi) / ϑi] for all siˆ ∈ Si.
Where E ϑ-i represents the expectation taken over realizations of ϑ-i ∈ Θ -i. The above
condition leads to the following formal definition of the dominant strategy equilibrium:
Definition 5: The strategy profile (s1* (.), …, sm* (.)) is a dominant strategy equilibrium of
mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) if, for all i and all ϑi ∈ Θi,
ui (g (si* (ϑi), s-i), ϑi) ≥ ui (g (si` (ϑi), s-i), ϑi) for all si` ∈ Si and all s-i ∈ S-i.
Further, a mechanism with dominant strategy equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 6: The mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) implements the social choice function
f(.) in dominant strategies if there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium of τ, s* (.) = (s1*
(.), …, sm* (.)), such that g (s* (ϑ)) = f (ϑ) for all ϑ ∈ Θ.
The dominant strategy equilibrium concept is robust due to the following
assumptions and expectations: First, it can be asserted that a rational agent who has a
dominant strategy will indeed play it. Unlike the Nash equilibrium concept, an agent need
                                                 
109 This meta-theoretical question is distinct from the theoretical question: which equilibrium
should be chosen as optimal if one solution concept, such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium, predicts
multiple equilibrium solutions for a game.
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not correctly forecast other agents’ play to justify her play of a dominant strategy.
Second, agent i’s beliefs regarding the distribution of ϑ-I do not affect the dominance of
her strategy si* (.). Third, a mechanism designer need not know the probability density φ
(.).
Next, the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined.
Definition 7:  The strategy profile (s1* (.), …, sm* (.)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
mechanism τ  = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) if, for all i and all ϑi ∈ Θi,
E ϑ-i [ ui (g (si* (ϑi), s-i*(ϑ-i)), ϑi) / ϑi] ≥ E ϑ-i [ ui (g (siˆ, s-i* (ϑ-i)), ϑi) / ϑi] for all siˆ ∈ Si.
Definition 8: The mechanism τ = ( S1,…, Sm, g (.)) implements the social choice function
f(.) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M, s* (.) = (s1*
(.), …, sm* (.)), such that g (s* (ϑ)) = f (ϑ) for all ϑ € Θ.
The Bayesian implementation concept is a strictly weaker idea than the idea of
dominant strategy implementation. Every dominant strategy equilibrium is necessarily a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (and not vice versa), which implies that any social choice
function that is implementable in dominant strategies is also implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. This is because Bayesian Nash equilibrium implementation requires
that every agent i gets her highest payoff averaging over all possible types ϑ-i’s payoffs
that might arise for the other agents.  On the other hand, dominant strategy equilibrium
requires that every agent i gets her highest payoff for every possible payoff of ϑ-i.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium thus permits implementation of a wider range of social choice
functions than the dominant strategy equilibrium concept. There are, however, two
strong assumptions that need to be met to implement the Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
First, this concept assumes that the agents as well as the mechanism designer know the
density function of agents’ types φ  (.). Second, agents have mutually correct
expectations about each others’ strategy choices.
Having formally outlined the concepts of dominant strategy and Bayesian Nash
equilibriums in a principal-agent game of incomplete information, the following
propositions are presented to describe adaptive mechanism designs, and to contrast
them with other mechanisms.
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Proposition 1: Incentives under regulatory mechanisms. Suppose there is a mechanism
τR that is implemented under the rules of the game designed by a principal (who is the
environmental regulator) to implement a collective choice social function f (.). This
mechanism assumes the polluter pays principle. Further, suppose that the expected
utility of pursuing a non-cooperative strategy weakly dominates the expected utility of
pursuing a cooperative strategy for agent i [ui (snc, g (.)) ≥ ui (sc, g (.))], then the outcome
function g (.) will be Pareto inferior because the non-cooperative strategies of the agents
lead to less effective implementation of the collective social choice function.
Proposition 2: Contextual conditions of agents. Suppose some agent types (ϑi) pursue
cooperative strategies (Sc) and other agent types (ϑj) pursue non-cooperative strategies
(Snc). Further, suppose that the expected utility of pursuing a non-cooperative strategy
weakly dominates the expected utility of pursuing a cooperative strategy for agent i [ui
(snc, g (.)) ≥ ui (sc, g (.))]. Furthermore, suppose that some agents are expected utility
maximizers and non-cooperative while others are altruistic and cooperative. Then the
contextual conditions, such as the income level of agents’ neighborhoods, the gender
and aging configuration of agents’ neighborhoods, and the racial profile of agents’
neighborhoods, systematically differ between those agents’ types who pursue
cooperative strategies and those who pursue non-cooperative strategies.
Proposition 3: Incentives under adaptive mechanisms: Suppose there is an alternative
adaptive mechanism τA that is implemented under the rules of the game designed by a
principal (or a mechanism designer) to implement a collective choice social function f (.).
This alternative mechanism assumes that transfers of money can be carried out by a
social planner from some agents to the other agents. Further, suppose the mechanism is
designed in such a way that the expected utility of pursuing a cooperative strategy
weakly dominates the expected utility of pursuing a non-cooperative strategy for agent i
[ui (sc, g (.)) ≥ ui (snc, g (.))], then the multi-criteria outcome function g (.) will be Pareto
superior for τA than τR because the cooperative strategies of the agents lead to more
effective and fairer implementation of the collective social choice function.
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7.2 Decision theoretical implications
7.2.1 The modifications in the expected value hypothesis of rational decision
theory
The results from phase I of this study confirm the earlier findings from controlled
laboratory studies that people neither behave perfectly cooperatively nor perfectly non-
cooperatively. The evidence in this study shows that about 42% of high-emitting vehicle
owners cooperate while about 58% do not cooperate and pursue a strategy that
attempts to avoid the community-mandated environmental laws. The findings are
presented with utmost caution, as the empirical data that is needed to estimate the
factors that may result in under or over-estimation of probability of cooperation is not
currently available.
Despite these limitations, this study partially confirms the game theoretical
expected value hypothesis that rational agents attempt to free ride in public goods
decision games. This is obvious from the strategic behavior of the 58% non-cooperative
vehicle owners observed in the Atlanta airshed. The upshot is that rest of the 42%
people in the Atlanta airshed appear to be cooperating with the vehicle emission control
laws, which is not predicted by the game theoretical framework. This however does not
mean that predictions of game theory do not hold because we can perhaps never control
for all the assumptions that are built into the game theoretical framework. Game theory,
for example, assumes that rational agents have complete information about all the
possible sets of actions and strategies (as listed in Figure 1.3). It is however possible
that many vehicle owners do not have information about the loopholes in the current
vehicle registration laws, which they can use to avoid the IM program regulations.
On the other hand, one cannot reject the social psychology theoretical
hypothesis that cooperative vehicle owners could have pursued any of the available non-
cooperative strategies, but they are cooperative enough to promote the provision of
environmental goods even if it means higher costs for them. The 42% cooperation rate
in this study affirms this hypothesis, but at the same time, social psychology theory fails
to account for the non-cooperative strategic behavior of 58% of the high-emitting drivers.
One interesting rival hypothesis is provided by social justice and/or
environmental justice theory. It is possible that these 58% of the non-cooperative high-
emitters do not have enough income to incur the repair costs. This rival hypothesis
cannot be directly tested as income data at the individual or household level is not
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available. In this study, the analysis included the contextual conditions, such as the
income level of the vehicle owner’s neighborhoods at the census block level, which
indirectly tested the environmental justice hypothesis [H3 and H4], the results of which
are presented in section 6.4. The environmental justice hypothesis is confirmed in this
study, as non-cooperative players come from lower income areas than the cooperative
players. Furthermore, the environmental regulation targets people living in lower income
areas to pay the costs of pollution clean-up, the benefits of which are to be shared by
everybody in the airshed, including the people living in higher income areas who are not
required to pay the pollution clean-up costs.
The expected value hypothesis thus needs to be modified in the light of the meta-
question: Which values are used by the human decision makers [both regulators and
regulated in this case] to measure the outcomes? Under strictly competitive and zero-
sum contextual conditions, it is possible that the Darwinian instinct of maximizing the
selfish interest might be the only value on which players measure the outcomes of their
decisions. On the other hand, humans do not always live under strictly competitive and
zero-sum contextual conditions: sometimes cooperation pays, as in case of protecting
environmental resources. Furthermore, decision behaviors that affect our environments
are not necessarily zero-sum. They can be both positive sum and negative sum. Positive
contribution and cooperation by one decision maker can contribute more
common/environmental benefits towards the entire society than the per capita cost of
contribution, which is an example of a positive-sum game. Also, negative contribution
and non-cooperation, such as bio-terrorism, can be negative-sum [higher collective cost
than the individual cost], which may potentially destroy our environment not only for
current generations, but also create conditions that future generations may never come
into being.
The EV/EU hypothesis is thus neither provable nor disprovable under all
contextual conditions of human decision makers because it is not clear which values we
want to use to measure the outcomes of our decisions. Furthermore, different contextual
conditions also strongly influence real-world human decisions. The problem is that the
contextual conditions are dynamic in character and remain beyond the grasp of decision
makers involving outcomes in future states of the world. If the EV/EU hypotheses are
modified to allow for the explicit resolution of meta-decision problems, such as meta-
level agreement on values on which the outcomes of actions are measured, it is shown
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in this study that the EV/EU hypotheses proposed by game theory converge with the
social psychology and political science hypotheses about human decision making. Meta-
decision models thus provide one important methodology for convergence among the
descriptive and normative decision theories.
7.2.2 Bridging descriptive with normative decision theories in meta-decision
models
Meta-criteria heuristics act as principle determinants of meta-choices. If we
accept context-sensitivity as a meta-criteria heuristic for environmental management
decision problems, then the set of alternatives and criteria in a decision problem is
chosen in the light of the context of a decision problem, and these sets are open to
change as context changes. Similarly, context determines the choice of the decision rule
and the weights to be assigned to the set of decision criteria.
Formally, meta-decision models require input of meta-criteria heuristics, which
can be denoted by a set, H, written in the pragmatics of language. For example, H may
contain the following three elements: context-sensitivity, process orientation and
adaptability. The meta-choice decision problem, such as the choice of the sets of
alternatives [A], values [z], outcomes [f(z)] and weights [w] is resolved in the light of the
constraints specified in H.
The set of alternatives is thus drastically reduced from an infinite set to a finite
set depending upon the context of the decision problem. Similarly, the criteria set is
delimited by H.  A and z sets, however, are not fixed; rather they are adaptive and
change within the long-term space-time horizon. At the same time, the sets A and z are
evaluated at a certain moment in space-time in the light of constraints imposed under
meta-criteria heuristics.
The third implication of H is its effect on the meta-choice decision problem of
choosing a weighting methodology to ascertain the weights among mostly
incommensurate decision criteria chosen in the set z with respect to the alternatives in
the set A. In Section 3.3, the weighting methodology that is employed in the 12 most
widely applied decision algorithms was discussed, and it was concluded that each of
these decision algorithm requires exogenous determination of weights, albeit a different
methodology and sometimes a different heuristic is used to characterize their exogenous
weighting assumptions. One solution to the meta-choice decision problem of choosing a
weighting methodology will be to ascertain the weights as per the methodology of each
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decision algorithm and then compare the proposed solutions of each of these
alternatives.
Another idea, seldom pursued in previous research, is to conduct a sensitivity
analysis of all possible permutations and combinations of weighting functions for each
element of the criteria set z with respect to each element of the alternative set A.
Further, if we choose “robustness” as an additional component of context, then
sensitivity analysis will choose a particular policy alternative that is robust across all the
decision criteria under a majority of the weighting combinations. Employment of
sensitivity analysis does not however mean that the meta-choice decision problem of
weighting methodology is resolved. The weighting problem is rather an “un-decidable”
decision problem, requiring an exogenous choice.
The fourth implication of the set of meta-criteria heuristics in meta-decision
models concerns the meta-choice decision problem of choosing a decision
algorithm/rule to evaluate the environmental management decision problem ϕ (A, f). 12
decision algorithms (a subset of about 135 decision algorithms discussed in previous
literature) are briefly presented in appendix A. Next to be discussed is how the set of
meta-criteria heuristics can influence the meta-choice of a decision algorithm.
Assuming that context-sensitivity is used as a meta-criteria heuristic, the MDM
permits employment of all those decision rules which are applicable and measurable in
the given context of the environmental decision problem. The decision algorithm of cost-
benefit analysis cannot be employed in the context of air quality management decisions
because the damage function accruing from vehicular emissions to humans, animals,
plants and broader eco-systems cannot be empirically measured for all present and
future space-times and concatenated to the scalar outcome of net present monetary
values. Due to lesser informational requirements, the decision algorithm of cost-
effectiveness is perhaps more appropriate in evaluating the policy alternatives in air
quality management problems. This algorithm, however, will also require statistical
assumptions for empirically measuring the cost-functions, especially in the case of ex
ante evaluation of policy alternatives.  In brief, the choice of the meta-criteria heuristics
set H determines the choice of decision algorithms that are employed to evaluate an
environmental management decision problem.
There remains, however, a complex problem in that different decision algorithms
may recommend conflicting policy alternatives as optimal choices. Despite the issue of
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non-transitivity, in proposition 5, the construction of consensus, democratic and possible
resolution spaces is proposed as a temporary measure to resolve complex
environmental management decisions in the given environmental and social contexts.
Formally, the decision problem ϕ (A, f) is bounded by the set of meta-criteria
heuristics H and reduced to a decision problem of the form ϕ` (A`, f`), where A` is a
subset of A and f` is a subset of f. Next, the decision problem ϕ` (A`, f`) can be evaluated
by the set of multiple decision algorithms K, which is finite and assumed to be common
knowledge.
Proposition 5: Sensitivity analysis of multiple decision rules in environmental
management decision problems. There are n decision rules { K1, K2, …, Kn} in a compact
and closed set of decision algorithms K. Each element Kk (where k = 1, 2,…n) as a
decision algorithm generates rankings over the finite set A`, such that A`ik > A`jk {for i =
1,2,…l and j = 1,2,…l and i ≠ j and k = 1,2,….n}, i.e. Ai is preferred over Aj according to
the decision rule Kk. It is possible that according to the decision rule Kl (where l = 1,
2,…n) Aj is preferred over Ai, mathematically A`il > A`jl {for i = 1,2,…l and j = 1,2,…l and i
≠ j and l = 1,2,….n and l ≠ k}. Let us define a subset of consensus resolution alternatives
A`` ∈ A`, such that A`` is the optimal solution for ALL of the decision algorithms K1 ∩ K2
∩,……..Kv. The consensus resolution set A`` is required to be strictly transitive for all
decision algorithms and it is possible in normal practice that A`` will be found empty.
Secondly, let us define a subset of democratic resolution alternatives A``` ∈ A`, such that
A``` is the optimal solution for a MAJORITY of the decision algorithms K1 ∩  K2
∩,……..KW, for w ∈ v. The democratic resolution set A``` is not required to be strictly
transitive for all decision algorithms and it is possible in normal110 practice that A``` will
have at least one element. Thirdly, let us define a subset of possible resolution space
A````∈  A`, such that A```` is the optimal solution for at least ONE of the decision
algorithms K1 U K2 U,……..Kv. Given these definitions, meta-choice decision problem in
environmental management can be defined as a problem of choosing between a
consensus, a democratic or a possible resolution space. There is no algorithmic solution
                                                 
110 Under exceptional circumstances, it is possible that the democratic decision rule will not have
one element, such as 5 out of 10 decision rules might prefer one alternative and the remaining 5
might prefer the other one. A simple answer would be to employ an odd number of decision rules.
Subtler is the meta-problem of choosing an additional decision rule that follows the meta-criteria
heuristics of the decision problem.
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to decide if A`` > A``` > A````, or if A```` > A``` > A``, i.e. whether a consensus solution is
preferred over a democratic solution or any possible solution is preferred over a
consensus solution. My proposition, based on the meta-criteria heuristics set H,
however, is as follows: In environmental management decisions, we should prefer
consensus resolution space over the democratic resolution space whenever possible
(i.e. when A`` is not empty), and democratic resolution space over the possible
resolution space, otherwise. Mathematically, A`` > A``` > A````.
7.3 Methodological implications
7.3.1 Linking conventional with natural contexts in statistical decision models
involving risky and uncertain outcomes
While knowledge about uncertain future states of the world remains elusive on
many important issues of interest to environmental policy, it is clear from this study that
in human decision behaviors – the conventional contexts – intertwine and interact with
their environments – the natural contexts. We can not separate the study of our natural
context, such as that studied by atmospheric chemistry, physics and biology, from a
serious investigation of our conventional contexts, such as policy mechanisms, political
governance regimes, societal institutions, and above all, our individual decision
behaviors.
This study, with its unabashedly interdisciplinary perspective, has shown that
natural and conventional contexts can be scientifically modeled together. It is only our
imagination that can limit the synthesis of knowledge from undertaking multidisciplinary
pursuits of our decisions that affect our environments. Importantly, statistical decision-
aiding models can be used, first to describe the current state of environment and our
decision-making effect on it in a synergistic manner; and secondly, the evidence from
these multidisciplinary, statistical decision-aiding models can be used at the meta-level
of reflection as an evidence to think about our future.
7.3.2 Measurement of latent variables through quasi-experimental methodologies
in indirectly observed stochastic systems
Human decision behaviors, as also their environments, are complex and
stochastic in nature. Due to incomplete information, ironically in this age of information
203
glut, it is not always possible for designers of public policy mechanisms to directly
observe the variables of interest. Let’s refer to these variables as “latent variables”.
 Quasi-experimental methodologies, as used in this study, provide one
interesting methodology to measure the latent variables. Cooperative and non-
cooperative decision behaviors are examples of latent variables; and it will perhaps
remain a challenge for public policy evaluators for a long time to come to find precise
parametric location of such latent variables. On the other hand, newer technologies of
data gathering, such as remote sensing data, and data analysis methodologies, such as
spatial analysis in GIS systems, can be combined in quasi-experimental studies to
measure many latent variables of policy interest at a finer contextual level.
7.4: Conclusions
 The decision makers/agents affected by regulatory environmental policy
interventions are neither perfectly cooperative nor non-cooperative. In a case-study of IM
program intervention in the Atlanta airshed, it was found that about 42% of the high-
emitting drivers play cooperatively while the other 58% do not cooperate and attempt to
free ride on the common resource of clean air.
There is no statistical difference in the vehicular tail-pipe CO and NO emissions
produced by vehicle owners in cooperative and non-cooperative groups. However,
vehicles in cooperative groups emit less HC emissions as compared to the vehicles in
non-cooperative groups.
The IM program intervention, due to its assumption of the ‘polluter pays
principle’, targets high-emitting vehicle owners to bear the repair costs on the emission
control systems of their vehicles. The high-emitting vehicle owners, however, reside in
lower income areas and own older vehicles than normal-emitting vehicle owners. The IM
program intervention therefore targets drivers in lower income areas, which is not fair.
The ‘polluter pays principle’ thus may not always lead to fair outcomes. If the value of
fairness is desirable in evaluating the public policies, the ‘polluter pays principle’ would
need to be modified/relaxed in the light of the contextual conditions of the
affected/regulated decision makers.
Though both cooperative and non-cooperative high-emitting vehicle owners
come from lower income areas than those of normal emitting vehicle owners, it is found
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in this study that cooperative vehicle owners come from relatively higher income
neighborhoods as compared to the non-cooperative vehicle owners. These results
suggest that non-cooperative vehicle owners are not cooperating with the environmental
policy laws because they are concerned that an unfair public policy is targeting them for
producing a benefit that is to be shared by even those who are not targeted by this
public policy. It can be inferred that a concern for fairness induces decision makers to
exhibit non-cooperative decision behaviors.
The regulatory policy mechanisms should be made more adaptive to changes in
the natural, conventional and technological contexts of the decision makers. The
adaptive mechanism designs explicitly take into account multiple values, on which the
outcomes of public policies are measured. Meta-decision models act as tools of adaptive
mechanism designs to descriptively analyze the current outcomes and normatively
prescribe the desirable outcomes in the space-time of policy horizons.
In the case of high-emitting vehicle owners in the Atlanta airshed, the IM
regulatory program can be adapted to become more effective in reducing vehicular
emissions as well as fairer in distribution of costs and benefits on all income groups of
the society. This adaptation will require that (a) current rules of the game be changed,
such as disallowing IM test failures from registering anywhere in the state of Georgia
and requiring an emissions test on every change of vehicle ownership inside the 13-
county IM program area and (b) transfers from normal-emitting high-income groups of
the society be made to the high-emitting low-income vehicle owners, which will change
the incentive structure of the regulatory mechanism design and result in higher
cooperation, effective reduction in environmental pollution and fairer distribution of policy
intervention costs and benefits. The adaptive mechanisms, as aided by meta-decision
models, provide methods for public policy analysis to design policy interventions that
help improve the outcomes, which are desirable according to the multiple values
cherished by human societies.
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APPENDIX A
METHODS TO CONVERT EMISSION CONCENTRATION RATIOS INTO MASS
EMISSION FACTORS AND MASS EMISSION RATES
Remote sensors measure CO, HC and NOx as concentration ratios – such as %
CO/CO2, %HC/CO2, %NO/CO2 – which are denoted as CRCO, CRHC and CRNOx
respectively. These emission concentration ratios can be converted into mass emission
factors (YCO, YHC and YNOx) that are measured in units of grams of pollutant per gallon of
gasoline burned by an automobile. The conversion process is based on a
stoicheometeric theory of carbon balance. Singer and Harley (2000:1784) proposed the
following generalized stoicheometeric equation to convert concentration ratios into mass
emission factors:
(A.1): YP = [CRP / (1+CRCO + 3 CRHC)] . [(wc ρf / 45.4249) MP]; for P = CO, HC and NOx.
Where YP is the mass emission factor for CO, HC and NOx in grams per gallon
(gg-1); CRP is the molar exhaust concentration ratio of pollutant P to CO2 measured by
the remote sensor; wc = 0.85 is the carbon mass fraction and ρf = 750 gl-1 is the density
of gasoline; MP is the molecular mass of the pollutant being considered (28 g mol-1 for
CO, 44 g mol-1 for HC as propane, 30 g mol-1 for NOx as NO); and 45.4249 is the
product of 12 (for atomic mass of carbon) and 3.7854118 (for converting the gasoline
volume in liters to US gallons). The first quotient of equation A.1 --  [CRP / (1+CRCO + 3
CRHC)] – reduces to the molar ratio of CO, HC or NO to total carbon atoms in vehicle
exhaust; and the second quotient -- [(wc ρ f / 12) MP] – defines the molar concentration of
carbon atoms per gallon of un-burned gasoline. Equation A.1 also includes a factor of 3
in denominator of first quotient to convert from moles of propane to moles of carbon,
because HCs were measured as propane111.
                                                 
111 Singer and Harley (2000: 1785), in order to convert HC emission factor –i.e. EFHC -- into VOC
emission factors – i.e. EFvoc further multiplied EFHC (estimated through equation 4.1) by a factor of
2.0 ± 0.1.
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Pokharel et al. (2001) estimated following specific equations A.2 to A.4 to convert
emission concentration ratios (CRp) into mass emission factors (YP) , which are
employed in this study to measure the dependent variables for equations 1.7, 1.8 and
1.9:
A.2: YCO (gram/gallon) = 5506.CRCO/(15 + 0.285CRCO + 2.87 CRHC)
A.3: YHC (gram/gallon) = 8644.CRHC/(15 + 0.285CRCO + 2.87 CRHC)
A.4: YNO (gram/gallon) = 5900.CRNO/(15 + 0.285CRCO + 2.87 CRHC)
The equations A.2 to A.4 present two important constraints for converting
remotely sensed pollutant emission concentration ratios into pollutant mass emission
factors:  First, mass emission factor for CO can only be measured if and only if both CO
and HC concentration ratios are available for an observation. Similarly, mass emission
factor for HC can only be measured if and only if both CO and HC concentration ratios
are available for an observation. Furthermore, mass emission factor for NO can only be
measured if and only if NO, CO and HC concentration ratios are available for an
observation. Second, the equations are defined for strictly positive concentration ratios;
i.e. CRCO > 0, CRHC > 0 and CRNO > 0. Remote sensors however also report negative
concentration ratios for the observations when mean value is smaller than the standard
error of measurement. The negative concentration ratios are converted into missing
values in the remote sensing sample before estimating pollutant emission factors, as in
equations A.2, A.3 and A.4. Note that both the above-mentioned constraints resulted in
reducing the remote sensing sample size from 775,606 observations for CRCO into
466,640 observations for YCO between 1997 and 2001; 741,869 observations for CRHC
into 466,640 observations for YHC between 1997 and 2001; and 136,486 observations for
CRNO into 89,408 observations for YNO between 1999 and 2001. Their descriptive
statistics are presented in table 5.1. Limitations and biases that arise due to these two
constraints are discussed in section 5.6. For a meaningful policy analysis, it is important
to convert remote sensor measured emission concentration ratios into mass emission
factors. The most important results of this study in sections 6.2.2; 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 are
reported in terms of changes in emissions factors (gg-1) as the independent parameters
change in the models estimating equations 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9.
Once the concentration ratios of pollutants (CRCO, CRHC and CRNO) measured by
remote sensors in units percentage of pollutant per percentage of CO2 are converted
into mass emissions factors (YCO, YHC and YNO) in units grams of pollutant per gallon of
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gasoline burned, then it is a usual practice among environmental policy analysts to
generalize the study results to the study area by estimating mass emission rates (ERCO,
ERHC and ERNOx) in units (grams or) tones of pollutant per (day or) year. Mass emission
rates can be estimated through two methods –fuel based and VMT based -- which are
described below. Both methods require fuel economy (FE) measures in units of miles
per gallon to convert mass emission factors into mass emission rates. At the moment,
monthly fuel sales data for the Atlanta area between 1997 and 2001 is not available,
while VMT data for the state of Georgia for the study period is available from Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS).112 This study, therefore, uses VMT based method to
estimate mass emission rates for eleven fleet types during the study period, as
explained in method 2 below.
Method 1: Fuel-use based mass emission rates:
Fuel-use based method employs fuel/gasoline-sales data to convert mass
emission factors into mass emission rates (Singer and Harley 1996, 2000).113 The
fraction of total fuel fij used by vehicles of each model year i and vehicle type j114 is
calculated as shown in equation A.5:
A.5: fij = [(vij/FEij)/∑i ∑j (vij /FEij)
Where vij is the fraction of vehicles by each model year and type (vij = nij/N where
nij is the count of model year i and type j vehicles and N is the total number of remote
sensor measurements) and FEij is the average fuel economy of model year i and type j
vehicles.
Fleet average emission factors YaveP are calculated using the fuel fractions fij and
emission factors YP, ij for each vehicle model year and type, as shown in equation A.6:
A.6: YaveP = ∑i ∑j fij.YP, ij (in grams per gallon)
                                                 
112 The appropriate data can be downloaded from the BTS website http://www.transtats.bts.gov/
113 Normally one has to be careful in calculating the fuel sales for the area of study for specific
times. Singer and Harley (2000: 1785) used statewide released monthly fuel sales data ( in units
of liters per month) which was adjusted to represent fuel used by cars, LDGV and LDGTs in the
IM program area for the study period. They used population percentage (from census data) and
vehicle registration percentage (from vehicle registration data) to estimate fuel use for
program/study area. Further, gasoline use by construction and farm equipment, boats and other
off-road engines was also deducted from the estimates of fuel use in program area.
114 Singer and Harley (2000: 1786-7) did not separate cars and trucks for estimating fuel-use
fractions (equation A.5) by vehicles of each model year, which biases the results because trucks
have, on average, compared to cars, higher (NO) emissions factors as well as lower fuel
economy.
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Total mass emissions rate of CO, HC and NO in the program area for the period
of study is calculated as the product of the fleet average emission factors YaveP and the
total gasoline (Gij) used by i cars and j trucks in the program area. Fleet average mass
emission rates ERavePIJ for each model year [I] and vehicle class [J] are estimated by
using equation A.7:
A.7: ERave Pij = [∑I ∑J (Yave Pij). (Gij)] (in tones per year)
Method 2: VMT based mass emission rates for 11 fleet types:
Suppose YPQIJT represents emission factor (in grams per gallon) for pollutant P
[i.e. CO, HC and NO], fleet type Q, vehicle model year i [observation year – vehicle age],
and vehicle type j [i.e. car or truck] in time T [1997, 1998….2001]. Reduced115 OLS
models were used to estimate equation A.8 for measuring YPQIJT in the Atlanta airshed
between 1997 and 2001. Estimated equations are presented in table A.1.
A.8: YPQIJT = [α0 + ∑q=211 βqQq + ∑r=12 γrRr + ε1]T
Where α0 represents emission factor of control fleet passenger car of age 0 in
time t (in 1997 it will be model year 1997, and so on). βq for q = { 2,3,…11} respectively
represent emission factors for ineligible, waived, rest-of-GA, missing, retest pass,
migrated pass, retest fail, migrated fail, missing fail and missing pass passenger cars of
age 0 in time T. γr for r = {1,2} respectively represent coefficients on the variables vehicle
age and vehicle type in time T.
Further suppose VMTQIJT represents vehicles miles traveled by a vehicle of fleet
type Q, model year i, vehicle type j in time T. Ideally, if odometer data was correctly
reported in vehicle registration data, VMTQIJT could have been estimated from there. But,
unfortunately, as extensively discussed in section 5.4.1, odometer data is not correctly
reported in registration data. As a second best option, I used aggregate VMT data for the
state of Georgia released by BTS for each year between 1997 and 2000, which is
denoted as VMTT, GA, and the data values are reported in table A.2.  The total number of
vehicles registered in the state of GA during the study period are also reported in table
A.2.
                                                 
115 Full model, as used in estimating equations 1.7 to 1.9 was not used to estimate equation A.8
because fuel economy data for each vehicle manufacturer, country of vehicle manufacturer,
vehicle type and model year of the vehicle is not available. Sales-weighted fuel economy data for
model years 1974 and above is available for both cars and trucks at the USA level, which has
been used in this study.
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Table A.2: Annualized vehicle registration and VMT statistics for the state of Georgia.
(Source BTS)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total vehicles 6317832 6979592 7059719 7243077 7396731
Cars 3688005 4032998 4011725 4066530 4084746
Trucks 2537703 2843253 2943465 3070459 3201501
Buses 16499 17068 17520 18017 18538
Motorcycles 75625 86273 87009 88071 91946
Total VMT
(million miles) 93840 97030 98859 105010 107897
Rural VMT
(million miles) 39645 40618 42904 47523 49690
Urban VMT
(million miles) 54195 56412 55955 57487 58207
VMT/Vehicle
(Miles/year) 14853.19 13901.96 14003.25 14497.98 14587.12
Trucks/Cars
ratio 0.4076 0.4135 0.4232 0.4302 0.4394
Next, Vehicle Miles Traveled in the 13 county area during the study period,
denoted as VMTT, 13 county area, were imputed by using equation A.9:
A.9: VMTT, 13 county area = VMTT, GA * [finside + foutside]
Where finside represents fraction of total GA vehicles registered inside 13 county area and
foutside represents fraction of rest of GA registered vehicles observed visiting inside the 13
county area.116 finside was estimated from the vehicle registration data, while foutside was
estimated from both the vehicle registration and the remote sensing sample data.117
Below is the estimated equation A.9 for each year of the study:
A.9.1: VMT1997, 13 county area = 93840 * [0.403 + (0.1140*0.597)] = 44,204.0827 million miles
A.9.2: VMT1998, 13 county area = 97030 * [0.408 + (0.1118*0.592)] = 46,010.2288 million miles
A.9.3: VMT1999, 13 county area = 98859 * [0.417 + (0.1065*0.583)] = 46,769.1054 million miles
A.9.4: VMT2000, 13 county area = 105010 * [0.411 + (0.1145*0.589)] = 50,240.9844 million miles
A.9.5: VMT2001, 13 county area = 107897 * [0.407 + (0.1135*0.593)] = 51,176.0866 million miles
Next, suppose that vQIJT represents the fraction of vehicles by fleet type Q, model
year I, vehicle type J in time T, then vQIJT is estimated from the remote sensing sample
by using equation A.10:
A.10: vQIJT = [nQIJ /N]T,
                                                 
116 An ideal analysis would also include fraction of out-of-GA state vehicles found visiting inside
the 13 county area; but this is not included in the analysis due to the data restrictions.
117 Foutside is estimated as being equal to {[(Q4 + Q7 + Q9)/∑q=111Qq]*frest-of-ga} from the remote sensing
sample and vehicle registration data, where frest-of-ga represents the fraction of vehicles registered
outside the 13 county area in the state of Georgia.
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Where nQIJ represents the total number of Q fleet type vehicles by model year I and
vehicle type j observed in time T, and N represents the total number of vehicles
observed in time T in the remote sensing sample. VMTQIJT is then estimated by equation
A.11.
(A.11): VMTQIJT = vQIJT * VMTT, 13 county area
Where vQIJT is estimated by equation A.10 and VMTT, 13 county area is estimated by
equation A.9. This equation assumes that vehicles of all fleet types, model years and
types travel on average equal distance in a given year in the 13-county Atlanta area.
Sales-weighted Fuel Economy data FEIJ for model years I and vehicle types j is gathered
from Singer and Harley (2000) and converted in miles per gallon, which is shown in
figure A.1. Sales weighted fuel economy improved exponentially during the late 1970s
and 1980s, but it is noticeable in figure A.1 that the exponential trend of improved fuel
economy has tapered off during the 1990s. Trucks on average have lower fuel economy
standards than the passenger cars and the difference between the two is shown in figure
A.1.
Figure A.1: Mean sales-weighted fuel-economy standards by vehicle
model-year in the USA
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ERPQT represents total mass emissions rates of the pollutant P (CO, HC and NO)
in tons per year of fleet type Qq in time T and is estimated by using equation A.12.
(A.12): ERPQT (tons per year) = ∑i ∑j [(YPQIJT * VMTQIJT)/FEIJ]
Where YPQIJT is estimated through equation A.8 [estimators are shown in table
A.1] in grams per gallon, and VMTQIJT is estimated through equation A.11 in million miles
and FEIJ is measured in miles per gallon. The estimated values for ERPQT in tons per
year are shown in table A.3. The results from table A.3 are discussed in detail in section
6.2.4.
Table A.3: Estimated mean CO, HC and NO emission rates (in tons per year) for eleven
fleet types in five years of the study
Panel A: Mean CO emission rates
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Control 86,407.35 88,745.00 77,687.78 74,333.41 131,321.43
Ineligible 288,786.01 224,804.63 188,131.27 157,329.07 47,864.03
Waived 1,855.66 2,331.20 2,719.81 1,366.50 2,165.97
Rest of GA 70,471.89 59,086.88 43,264.16 41,723.61 38,787.59
Missing 28,468.72 33,078.88 8,705.94 6,476.68 8,123.43
Retest pass 13,116.39 14,257.20 14,316.41 13,491.38 19,452.58
Migrated pass 0.00 3,810.03 5,892.47 5,742.29 4,538.54
Retest fail 3,195.99 5,525.70 3,091.38 2,230.54 4,252.01
Migrated fail 0.00 1,487.18 1,833.02 1,811.48 1,323.52
Missing fail 0.00 2,318.74 5,093.46 4,672.21 4,372.58














IM eligible total 133,044.11 164,914.17 136,942.21 125,309.96 194,400.94
Cooperative total 13,116.39 18,067.23 20,208.88 19,233.67 23,991.12
Non-cooperative
total 3,195.99 22,691.86 27,619.80 23,899.70 28,798.99
Panel B: mean HC emission rates (VOC emission rate ≅ 2*HC emission rate)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Control 11,449.06 9,170.78 6,513.26 5,909.85 2,788.53
Ineligible 37,892.73 22,907.54 14,901.89 12,931.90 1,172.56
Waived 206.93 138.90 206.32 92.14 51.56
Rest of GA 8,333.41 5,625.64 3,151.81 2,777.56 816.77
Missing 3,465.57 3,070.42 686.84 519.8 184.15
Retest pass 1,053.61 1,058.62 912.8 793.7 398.29
Migrated pass 0.00 306.55 441.77 385.33 109.17
Retest fail 258.69 379.53 184.56 158.42 106.99
Migrated fail 0.00 76.18 88.27 88.06 22.57
Missing fail 0.00 156.95 265.13 248.03 105.38












IM eligible total 16,433.86 15,193.78 10,679.13 9,352.47 4,181.40
Cooperative total 1,053.61 1,365.17 1354.57 1179.03 507.46
Non-cooperative
total 258.69 1448.51 1918.14 1651.65 649.7
Panel C: mean NO emission rates (in tones per year)
1999 2000 1999-2000 2001
Control 10,135.79 13,567.56 23703.35 24,092.44
Ineligible 24,328.96 27,595.92 51,924.88 8,570.72
Waived 241.57 188.03 429.6 299.97
Rest of GA 5,049.38 6,328.56 11,377.94 5,989.20
Missing 1,148.34 949.43 2097.77 1,266.79
Retest pass 1,731.61 2,239.81 3971.42 3,330.38
Migrated pass 882.31 939.29 1821.6 778.36
Retest fail 326.12 309.32 635.44 747.21
Migrated fail 158.78 188.1 346.88 151.36
Missing fail 352.28 595.55 947.83 676.11









IM eligible total 17,222.47 21,653.31 38,875.78 34,474.74
Cooperative total 2,613.92 3,179.10 5,793.02 4,108.74
Non-cooperative
total 3,082.85 3,769.19 6,852.04 4,706.8
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